Self-framing,Mixed-framing,And Moral-framing Effect In Decision Making

Framing effect refers to significant changes in decision making regarding the same problem when the problem is presented differently. In the past 40 years, framing effect has been considered as a key issue in behavioral decision making research and as important evidence for bias in human reasoning. Studies have shown that framing effect is a stable and robust phenomena in economics, life saving, resource allocation, and management decision making among others. Previous studies mainly focused on the theoretical explanation, effect size and classification of framing effect. However, framing effect itself needs some further explorations. The current study expanded framing effect in the following five perspectives: One, based on previous studies, self-framing is the active coding of decision-making information. Personal traits influence not only the formation of self-frames, but also the decision-making tendency. At the same time, self-frames also influence decision-making. We aimed to develop a model to describe the trilateral relations among these three related variables. Two, Kahneman and Tversky described the Asia disease problem with two frames. However, we discovered that there were more than two frames that can be used to describe the same question. If different vocabularies are used in one frame, we call these kinds of frames as mixed frames. It resulted in multiple reference-points in one decision-making task, which caused problems when analyzing the results on the basis of the Prospect Theory: According to the model, people‘s cognition about the value of option outcomes is relative to the reference point, rather than their practical value. However, in the face of multiple reference-points decision-making tasks, it was hard to say which reference point worked as the basis for estimation. The current study aimed to explore the framing effect of mixed frames. Three, systematically analyze the difference between making decisions for self and giving advises for others. Four, explore the framing effect in moral judgment. Five, explore the effects of some social clues in risky decision making, like attitude-behavior difference, perceived fairness and rescued proportion.The current study consists of five parts.Part one investigated how trait-anxiety influenced the formation of a self-frame and decision-making. Participants(N=1044) responded to the Trait Anxiety Inventory. Those with trait anxiety scores ±1 Z score from the sample mean(N=328) were recalled to respond to the self-frame questionnaire. The results suggested that trait anxiety differences could result in differences in the editing of decision making information, thereby influencing risky choice. Compared to the low trait anxiety group, participants from the high trait anxiety group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self-frame, and tended to choose conservative plans. Self-frame suppressed the influence of trait anxiety on decision-making. These results further confirmed the hypothesis that individual differences in personality traits might influence the processing of information in a framed decision task. The results of part one were published in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, an SSCI journal.By applying unitive vocabulary, ―die‖ or ―save‖, to respective frames of the Asian disease problem, Tversky and Kahneman were able to define framing effect. In part two, we preliminarily explored the effect of mixed frames, which are characterized by the use of different vocabulary in one frame. Part two consists of three experiments. In our first experiment, we found that only the ―sure‖ option description had significant effect on decision making, while the effects of ―risky‖ option descriptions were not significant, nor were interactions between descriptions. In a subsequent experiment, the results suggested that after controlling the effects of the hedonic tone of the sure options, risky option description did not significantly predict decision making. In a third experiment, we found that neither the sure-to-risky option presentation order nor presentation order within risky options had significant effect on decision making. We thus concluded that sure option description can serve as the decision-making foundation(reference point), for decision-makers in mixed frames.Part three aimed to explore the difference in decision making between doctors and patients. 420 undergraduates majoring in clinical medicine were recruited and randomly assigned to six groups. Each group was presented with one of six descriptions of a medical choice between radiotherapy and surgery. The choice descriptions varied positiveeutralegative frames and decision making for self vs. others. The Results revealed that compared with giving advice for patients, participants had a greater tendency to select the lower treatment risk, worse treatment outcome, radiotherapy option when they made decisions for themselves. Participants given a positive or neutral frame tended to choose surgery which had a higher treatment risk but better treatment outcome more than those given a negative frame. The framing effect was not significant in making decisions for oneself, but was significant when giving advice for patients. The results of part three were published in PLOS One.Part four investigated the effect of dilemma types, framing descriptions, and number of saved lives on moral decision making. The results indicated the significant main effects of all the three variables. People were more willing to sacrifice one worker to save in the trolley problem than in the footbridge dilemma. People were more willing to sacrifice one worker when the number of saved workers increased. Participants preferred saving more workers in the positive frame than that in the negative frame. Moreover, a significant three-way interaction was observed. In the trolley problem, the framing effect is significant when the number of saved lives is 5, whereas the framing effect is insignificant when the number reaches 15. In the footbridge dilemma, the framing effect is insignificant when the number of saved lives is 5, whereas the framing effect is significant when the number reaches 15. Therefore, moral judgment is affected by framing, and this effect can be moderated by dilemma type and number of saved lives.Part five consists of three experiments. In experiment one, we aimed to explore whether the discrepancy between attitude and behavior exist in decision making and whether framing description can influence decision making behavior and attitude. Results suggested that the discrepancy between attitude and behavior did exist in decision making. Additionally, framing description had a significant impact on decision making behavior and attitude. In experiment two, we found that perceived fairness has significant effect on decision making. People always tend to choose more fair options. In experiment three, we found that when the saved proportion became majority from minority, people more tended o choose sure option. The results of part five were published in Social Indicators Research.In the current study, we got some theoritical contributions. Firstly, we revised the self farming questionnaire, and firstly confirmed the trilateral relations among personality trait, self frame and risky decision making. Secondly, we firstly suggested the concept of mixed frames, and systematically explored the framing effect of mixed frames. Thirdly, we analyzed self-other decision making differences based construal level theory. Fourthly, we expanded framing effect from risky decision making to moral judgment. Fifthly, we expanded framing effect from decision making behavior to altitude change.