| Scholars at home and abroad on the basis of research on financial risks and financialregulation, the use of game theory and methods of China’s financial risks and financialregulatory issues related to the theoretical analysis and empirical research has made someimportant theoretical significance andconclusions of practical significance, and practicalissues policy recommendations.(1) Entering the21st century, China’s economic development will face more complexand severe domestic and international situation, China’s economic development has a crucialfinancial market development, will directly affect our ability to achieve sustainablemacroeconomic the healthy development of the key factors. Must further enhance the degreeof attention of the country’s financial market, we start from the analysis of the status quo ofChina’s financial market development, financial markets operability and maneuverability ofthe dual perspective of China’s financial market equilibrium problem. Benassynon-equilibrium framework to construct the model of supply and demand relationshipbetween financial institutions and financial enterprises, explore the main factors affectingfinancial institutions and the finance corporate strategy selected, the following significantpractical problems to be solved theoretically: First, China’s financial system is not perfect,financing enterprise needs are not met, the level of financing the financing of enterprises inthe non-market manipulation under the quota allocation? Second, given the number of financecompanies can manipulate the market quota signal to the entire financial market what kind ofimpact? Third, in the future development of the country’s financial market, how to ensure the long-term and stable development of the financial markets? The main theoretical contributionof this paper is based on the actual situation of China’s financial market financing rationingbased on China’s financial markets from the point of view of non-equilibrium analysis. Expectthis theory on the basis of the model solution, several major practical problems in answeringdraw conclusions have important implications for the development of China’s financialmarket.The results show that: in the financial markets can not be manipulated; prone toexpansion of financial risk in the financial markets steerable. In order to promote the healthydevelopment of the stability of China’s financial market as soon as possible to establish amodern enterprise system of financial market institutions, rich Kim Seung types of marketand broaden the types of investment options and the investor base, continue to reform andimprove the market system of the golden touch, to form a comprehensive range of financialmarket system, guard against financial market risk, improve the ability to resist risks offinancial institutions, strengthen market supervision of the golden touch, while reform KimSeung pattern of market supervision.(2) China’s economy is in transition, is necessary to guard against financial risks thatmay occur. In order to explore the financial risk to pass and financial risk accumulationprocess, we build a model of the game between the commercial banks and finance companies,as well as the game between the commercial banks and the central bank model explore theimpact of financial risk and shift the financial risks of the main factors contemplated fromtheoretically solve the following significant practical problems: First, China’s financial systemis not perfect, obviously financing to accompany the problem exists in the financial markets,then see how the connotation of China’s financial risks? Second, enterprises have continuedfinancing needs, in order to promote the economic development needs of the commercialbanks more indirect financing the enterprise, how the financial risk in financing the gradualaccumulation? Those are the main factors affecting the financing risks accumulated? Third,shift the financial risk between the commercial banks and the Central Bank of the internalmechanism and factors influencing what? Expectations theory these great practical problemsin answering important implications of financial risk transfer and accumulation of financialrisks related issues conclusions.Concluded by the solution of the model and analysis: in the process of corporate financeto financial institutions, due to asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, and financial decision-making body of the soft budget constraint, resulting in a high debt and thebank formed a huge amount of non-performing loans;the results of the game between thecommercial banks and the central bank will also increase in the liabilities of the central bankand currency issuance. Formed from the control of financial risks: increased transparency ofinformation between the commercial banks and finance companies; improve the internalmanagement system of commercial banks and financing technology, strict control of illegaloperations; enhance awareness to the prevention of financial risks and to establish theappropriate measures to guard against financial risks; companies need to cultivate the basis oftheir own development needs and more able to look at all the financial risks that may occur inthe process of financing talent from an international perspective; further improve China’sfinancial industry laws and regulations system construction, to make up for our many defectsexisting financial laws and institutional environment of the financial market as a whole;improve our financial institutions the information disclosure system. Construction of acomplete set of accurate identification, early warning, as well as evaluating the financial riskmethodology.(3) the developed countries loose financial regulation and excessive financial innovation,which eventually led suffered heavy losses in the financial crisis. China’s financial regulatoryinfrastructure is still very weak, and government and regulatory agencies is the main drivingforce of the regional financial innovation. In this paper, evolutionary game theory and methodof analysis of China’s financial institutions and regulatory bodies in the course of the gamebetween the strategic choice. We build the game model between the financial institutions andregulatory bodies, to explore the main factors to affect the strategic choices of financialinstitutions and regulatory bodies, following significant practical problems to be solvedtheoretically: First, China’s financial system is not perfect, many problems still need financialinnovation, social welfare is financial innovation, internal driving force of China’s financialinstitutions? Second, China needs to continue financial innovation, which requires financialderegulation, but for the stability of the financial system can not ignore the financial risks thatmay arise, then the impact of the strategic choices of the main factors of China’s regulatorybodies are those? Third, the future development of China’s financial innovation and financialsupervision, how to make the financial regulatory system to protect financial innovation, howto play a reasonable financial innovation saves regulatory resources, enhance the role ofregulatory efficiency, and ultimately China’s financial innovation and financial supervision of the between each other. On the basis of the model solution, the use of numerical simulation onthe model parameters affect the strategic choices of financial institutions and regulatorybodies for further analysis, the expectations from theory to make answer these several majorpractical problems, come to our country financial innovation and financial supervisionconclusions have important implications.Model analytical and numerical simulation concluded: regulatory resource consumptionis too large to slightly less than the supervision of regulatory bodies for financial innovation;lack of consideration for the welfare of the community as a whole as well as innovative lowercost resulting in strong financial institutions on financial innovation inputs; excessive thelower level of innovation for the high-yield and punish financial institutions to choose themost important reason for excessive innovation. For the post-crisis era, China’s financialinnovation and financial supervision: to continue to strengthen financial regulation to focus onimproving the efficiency of supervision; moderately increased financial innovation, andactively guide the reasonable innovation of financial institutions can not be ignored; efforts topromote balanced development of financial regulation and financial innovation; strengthenfinancial consumer protection.(4) China’s financial regulatory infrastructure is still very weak, and all the peopleinvolved in financial activities, the risk of the financial system is hugely magnified. In thispaper, evolutionary game theory and method of analysis of the financial regulatorycooperation between the People’s Bank of China and three financial regulators, reveal thedeep-seated reasons affecting financial regulatory body strategy selection and the efficiencyof cooperation in China’s financial regulatory process. The international financial crisiscontinued to obscure the reality of the domestic financial risk hugely magnified to China’scooperation in financial regulation some problems to solve new problems: First of all, in thecountry’s financial market, the People’s Bank of China and the three regulatory agencies havetheir respective areas of regulatory, market economic system makes financial regulatory bodyto pursue their own interests to maximize the most fundamental goal, then select on the issueof financial regulation Regulatory Cooperation The strategy is the optimal strategy of bothsides choose? Secondly, in today’s financial market environment and financial system, due toinformation asymmetry between the People’s Bank of China and the three regulatory bodies inthe process of financial regulation, the two sides actively choose the possibility of regulatorycooperation strategy be? Finally, select the mechanism of action of regulatory cooperation strategy for achieving the regulatory body, the coordination of financial supervision of thefinancial regulatory system exists which institutional weaknesses, what is needed to improvethe financial regulatory system? The needs of real-world problems and theoretical researchgaps in these areas, making the study of China’s financial regulatory cooperation has greattheoretical and practical significance. Based on the above analysis, the paper systematicallyconsider the costs of the financial regulatory cooperation between the People’s Bank of Chinaand the three regulatory agencies, factors such as income distribution, to build evolutionarygame model analysis of China’s financial regulatory cooperation, the introduction of penaltiesand protection mechanism to do the model further discussion. Explore the parameters changewhat impact the strategic choices of the financial regulatory body theory these great practicalproblems in answering the important implications of China’s financial supervision andfinancial developments conclusion.Model analytical and numerical simulation concluded:"opportunism" and coordinationof financial supervision mechanism is not perfect is the main cause of China’s financialsupervision and long-term cooperative behavior in the low efficiency of state; initial return ofthe financial regulatory body directly affects the size of the regulatory body strategic choices,but there are still a lot of possible "prisoner’s Dilemma"; cooperation in financial regulation,the introduction of punishment and protection mechanisms, the strategic choices of theregulatory body has been significantly changed; build a complete coordination of financialsupervision institutions, strengthen financial supervision and parties information sharing caneffectively improve the institutional environment of cooperation in financial regulation.(5) To explore the development of international financial regulation in the post-crisis era,new ideas and new trends, pointed out that China has profound theoretical and practicalsignificance in the historical opportunity policy choices. In this paper, by constructing theinternational financial regulatory evolution game model of strategic choice in the process ofinternational financial regulation financial regulatory body. This paper theoretically-depthanalysis of the following very important practical problem: First, each country in theinternational financial regulatory process in order to achieve their own interests as a separateindividual maximization as the goal, the existing international financial regulatory system andinternational financial regulatory coordination mechanism to select regulatory cooperationstrategy No financial regulatory bodythe optimal choice? Secondly, the financial internationaldevelopment context, in order to cope with the possible re-emergence of the international financial crisis, international cooperation in financial regulation more and more urgent, thenhow likely each country’s financial regulators to select regulatory cooperation strategy andwhat factors affect their strategic choices? Finally, in-depth analysis of international financialregulation, the substance of the matter based on a clear understanding of both internationalconflicts and interdependencies fact, China’s peaceful rise as a rapidly largest economy in thefuture of international financial regulation how to locate? It can be said that the internationalfinancial regulatory issues both rationality and applicability. Based on this, we build theinternational financial regulatory evolution game model to study the financial regulatory bodyin the process of international financial regulatory policy choice, and analysis of the policyoptions in this historic opportunity.Model solution and numerical simulation results show that: in international financialregulation, financial regulation, the main focus on short-term interests will choose regulatorycompetition strategy, focus on the long-term benefits will be chosen regulatory cooperationstrategy; Because it is difficult to change the majority of the regulatory body the pursuit ofshort-term interests of the status quo, resulting in the face of complex and volatileinternational financial environment, should actively participate in international cooperation infinancial regulation, and promote the reform of the international financial institutions andinternational financial regulatory system, improve China’s international in the process ofinternational financial regulation "prisoner’s dilemma" problem still exits’ position in thefinancial system, and the right to speak in the international financial regulatory rulemaking. |
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