Phenomenal Concepts And Phenomenal Properties

This dissertation addresses the hard problem of consciousness, which is, how to find a place for phenomenal consciousness in the natural world. The goal is to defend Property Dualism—the doctrine that the phenomenal properties are not physical. Two aspects of work are needed to be done:one is to give an argument for Property Dualism and to defend the argument, and the other is to argue that some other problems are not fatal to the acceptance of property dualism.Specifically, I offer a new version of the conceivability argument, the soundness of which relies on two theses:the Revelation Thesis of Phenomenal Concepts (RTPC for short) and Modal Rationalism (MR for short). Revelation is a feature of phenomenal concepts, and RTPC means that if we understand a phenomenal concept Q of a phenomenal property q, then we know the essential conditions for an object to be q. It is the materialists that have the most enthusiasm for the phenomenal concepts, and yet the dualists have not developed a comprehensive framework concerning the phenomenal concepts. I will fill the gap here. By comparing phenomenal concepts with other ordinary concepts, I conclude that phenomenal concepts have a unique feature in revealing the essence of the phenomenal to us. Also I use two-dimensional semantics to illustrate my reasons for RTPC. The basic idea of MR is that conceivability under certain restrictions is a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility. I argue that the restrictions are that one should conceive using revealable concepts and the conceived scenarios cannot contain any logical contradictions. We should accept MR considering our applications of modal notions and our understanding of possible worlds. I also defend MR from some salient counterexamples and objections.Based on RTPC and MR, I give a new version of conceivability argument for Property Dualism and defend its soundness from the objections from the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS for short), which is thought as the most promising strategy in defending materialism. I improve Chalmers’ Master Argument and rebut the PCS once for all.The second aspect of my work deals with other doubts about Property Dualism, including the problem from mental causation, the challenge from Substance Dualism and the accusation of being anti-scientific and anti-naturalism. I argue that these objections are not fatal. In a word, Property Dualism is a tenable theory.