Study On Operational Mechanism Of Venture Capital Guidance Fund

Recently，Venture Capital Guidance Fund (VCGF) has become a hot trend acrossthe country，which promote the development of venture investment industry andcreate a broad platform between venture capital and small-and-medium-sizedenterprises. Now VCGF has become an effective way to improve efficiency in the useof government funds and the national economy. But because of that VCGF belongingto the early stages of development and its management mode， run mode is still in theexploratory stage， it is necessary to study in-depth of the operating mechanism ofVCGF according to China’s national conditions，which provide a theoretical referenceto guide our VCGF sustained and healthy development.This dissertation consists of three parts：introduction，main body，conclusion andfuture works. In the introduction，the background、practical significance and literaturereview of this study were introduced. Main content and the logical framework of thisstudy were presented. The innovation of results and future works were discussed. Inthe second chapter，the basic concepts of the thesis were is defined，including theconnotation、operating system and operating mechanism of the VCGF，which furtherclarified the main target of the thesis. In the third chapter，the Necessity to set upVCGF was discussed from both theoretical and practical levels，and foreign VCGFdevelopment experience，as well as our VCGF status and problems were analyzedand summarized，which further clarify the paper needs to address the problem.Chapter4to6is the main body of the dissertation. The Problem of adverse selection、moral hazard and conflicts of interest which may appear for the running of the VCGFwere research and analysis by the appropriate economic model，and put forward therecommendations of the mechanism design. The last part of the dissertationsummarizes issues of study and discusses the future work.The following conclusions were obtained from the study：First. The adverse selection problem exists in the VCGF to select the investmentmanagement organizations was effectively solved or relieved by combination of usingthe model of the signaling and screening model in which project proposal of theVCGF was the information signal. Second. Because of the explicit needs and hidden needs of the VCGF Investmentmanagers， it was very necessary to establish the incentive and restraint mechanisms.Market fluctuations and other external factors Can be effectively removed byEstablishing the a linear pay system which based on the average income of theinvestment in GEM，Therefore，the investment manager Can be effectively evaluatedand motivated. On the other hand，the study also found that the reputation mechanismon the long-term incentive of investment manager was effective，which was able tocompensate for the lack of incentive pay.Third. Because of the common agency， Incentive performance to agent(investment manager) is weakened when the interests between the principals(government and social investors) are inconsistent. The study found when themechanism of conflict management was established，the Incentive performanceWeakening can be effectively solved by transforming the Multi-Task of investmentmanager from Substitutes into the complementary relationship.There are several innovations in this study：1、the research perspective of theVCGF is broadened by taking operating mechanism as the object of study；2、Building a relatively complete framework of operating mechanism and seizing thekey issue by Starting with the principal-agent problems，moreover,The innovativeuse of common agency theory on operating mechanism of the VCGF Broke throughthe traditional framework of bilateral principal-agent theory；3、According to China’snational conditions，The strategies are designed for The problem of adverse selection,moral hazard problems and conflicts of interest，which provides a guideline for theVCGF operation.