The Empirical Study On Contractual Governance, Relational Governance And Their Effects On Construction Project Performance

While the construction industry has a dominant position in the national economy, its efficiencyparadox is becoming increasingly apparent. As a project-oriented industry, project performanceaffects the efficiency of the construction industry directly. A number of studies have shown thatconstruction projects related to the problem is rooted in the contractual nature of the constructionproject resulting in project governance issues. These issues go beyond the project managementlevel, so institutional level must be addressed from the project. According to the theory andexisting literature, this study is based on the classic governance logic of transaction cost theory:transaction features—governance options—organizational performance, and establish a coretheory model. The variables are measured against measurement standards, and by applying thedata from261questionnaires, the theory model is empirical verified in two aspects: one is aboutthe relationship between the key factors and the construction governance options; the other is therelationship between the governance options and the construction project performance.The major conclusions of this study can be listed as following:(1)In this study, the author proposes that trust, asset specificity, project uncertainty and thecomplexity of the project is the key impact factors of contractual governance and relationalgovernance. Further this paper discusses the direct effects and the moderator effects of thevarious factors on contractual governance and relational governance. Especially, constructionprojects uncertainty is a moderator variable of the relationship between asset specificity andcontractual governance. Further the research verifies the quadratic effect relation between thecomplexity of construction project and contractual governance. And trust is a moderator variableof the relationship between project uncertainty and relational governance.(2)In this paper, the analysis, which is of the contract incentive and contract adaptability tomeasure the two dimensions of contractual governance and which is of the joint planning andjoint problem-solving to measure the two dimensions of relational governance mechanisms tomeasure the direct effect on project performance and interaction, is discussed. Both ofContractual governance and relational governance have positive impacts on the projectperformance. It is an important finding of this study that the antagonistic relationship betweencontract incentive and contract adaptability does not exist. In practice of construction project,contract governance can achieve the two impacts, and both of which promote the projectperformance. This is conflicting with some of the existing researches. Some studies suggest thatthe relationship of contract incentive and contract adaptability is on the opposition. That is, autility in another enhancement effect is always at the expense of weakening. The study refutesthis view. In addition, there is interaction effects between contractual governance and relationalgovernance, which jointly promote the project performance.