| With the globalization of information and market competition intensifies, productlife cycles are getting shorter, and products are more complex. Enterprises need to bemore innovative. So they chose to cooperate with other enterprises for using of externalresources, reducing innovation risk, sharing the cost of innovation, and win thecompetition in the market by collective advantage. Cooperation innovation can achieveeconomies of scale, and partners can obtain complementary resources that can helpthem survive and grow, but it will also bring new risks of cooperation. These factorsmake the aforementioned potential advantage disappears, and to some extent, lead to thefailure of cooperation innovation, if partners are unable or unwilling to provide theresources needed for innovation, or partners may free ride on other member’ R&Dinvestment, and partners will first choose to reduce the provision of resources, this willlead to cooperation innovation into a vicious circle. So it has certain practicalsignificance to improve the success rate of cooperative innovation through depth studyof member companies in a certain environment factors R&D investment case andidentify the members’ the willingness to invest.This dissertation uses measures such as literature research, game theory, simulationstudy and so on to study systematically partners’ behavior of R&D investment ofsuppliers to participate in collaborative innovation. The main contents of this paper areas follows:(1) A game model with one supplier and one manufacturer for cooperationinnovation is created to study the difference under three cooperation modes of theamount of R&D investment, profits, consumer surplus and social welfare in thecondition of effective cooperation, then discusses the selection problem of enterprise tocooperation model.(2) A game model with homogeneous multi-suppliers and one manufacturer forcooperation innovation is created to study the effect of horizontal and vertical spillovers,the number of suppliers involved on partner’s R&D investment, then discusses thatenterprises need to take corresponding measures to improve their R&D inputs undercooperation in different modes.(3) A game model that suppliers take part in cooperation innovation with market risk is created to study the effect of the number of suppliers involved, the methods ofsuppliers to distribute intermediate goods, and new products’ form of the utility functionon partners’ R&D investment, and suppliers’ total R&D investment, and supply chain’stotal R&D investment, then discusses the selection problem of partners and cooperationmode in cooperation innovation process.(4) A game model that suppliers take part in cooperation innovation considered thecore values of product is created to study the effect of income distribution, market size,and manufacturers and suppliers of capital relative to the size and other factors when themanufacturer is at the core of product innovation on suppliers and manufacturers’ R&Dinvestment willingness.(5) A game model with suppliers and manufacturers for cooperation innovationexisted spillovers is created to study the effect of spillover efficiency, enterprise’sinnovation ability, and enterprise’s absorption capacity to the spillover on the suppliersand manufacturers’ R&D investment willingness, then discusses the effect of measurethe relative accuracy of the capital on Expected investment of R&D cooperation underproportional profit sharing.The dissertation comes out with these main conclusions:(1) In the condition of effective cooperation, suppliers and manufacturers’ R&Dinvestment increase with the increase of degree of cooperation, namely, collusion R&Dmodel is greater than collaborative R&D model, and collaborative R&D model isgreater than non-alliance R&D model.(2) An increase in vertical spillovers always increases suppliers and manufacturers’R&D investment, but the effect of horizontal spillovers on R&D investment is related tocooperation model and market structure.(3) The number of suppliers are more, the suppliers and manufacturers’ R&Dinvestment are less. But in the point of suppliers and manufacturers’ total R&Dinvestment, the right choice of partners and distribution method can maintain the totalR&D investment at a high level.(4) When the manufacturer is at the core of product innovation, it has a greatprobability to put its all capital into R&D. Suppliers have higher "free rider" willingnessat lower income market returns and equal profit sharing. With the increase of marketreturns or proportional profit sharing, suppliers will increase quickly R&D investment. |
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