The Antitrust Research Of Exclusive Dealing

In general,the scope of this article relates to a series of antitrust research and competition issues concerning exclusive dealing.Including some basic issues of exclusive dealing,the antitrust theory of exclusive dealing,the behavioral research of exclusive dealing and several relating issues in China.Furthermore,the behavioral research of exclusive dealing could be devided into two parts: the recognition of exclusive dealing and the special behavioral issues of the exclusive dealing.Therefore,this article is divided into seven chapters,namely: Chapter I Introduction,Chapter II Research on Basic Issues of Exclusive Dealing,Chapter III Antitrust Theoretic Research of Exclusive Dealing,Chapter IV Research on Behavioral Recognition of Exclusive Dealing,Chapter V Research on Particular Issues of Exclusive Dealing,Chapter VI Research on China's Issues and Countermeasures of Exclusive Dealing and Chapter VII Conclusion.It should be further noted that,while the nature of the exclusive dealing is made through the vertical relationship between the upstream parties and downstream parties,in many cases it always be identified as abuse of dominance.However,since the scope of this article focuses on the behavior of exclusive dealing,it will weaken,to some extent,the “relevant market definition” and “the determination of market dominance” necessary for the determination of abuse of market dominance.Specifically,Chapter ? is an Introduction for this article.First of all,the elaboration of the background and significance of this paper will be presented;secondly,after reading domestic and foreign literature of Anti Monopoly Regulation on exclusive dealing,I will summarize the merits and shortcomings of existing research results,and accordingly,construct the framework for this issue.Finally,the research methods of this paper will be listed.Chapter ? deals with the Basic Issues of Exclusive Dealing.First of all,I will prudently define the concept of exclusive dealing in the first section,and explain some of the errors of the definition for exclusive dealing in existing research.In addition,through the research on the relationship between the exclusive dealing and some related concepts,I will expound the defects of the relevant content and make the better concept for the exclusive dealing.Secondly,in the second section,I will classify the exclusive dealing from different perspectives and expound the function and significance of the classification from the perspective of theoretical research and the practice.Finally,I will elaborate the competitive effects of exclusive dealing in the third section.It is because of the dual nature of the pro-competitive effect and the anti-competitive effect,which makes the modern Anti-Monopoly Law always based on “rule of reason” for analysis of exclusive dealing and lead to the subsequent discussion of this article gradually.Chapter ? is Antitrust Theoretic Research of Exclusive Dealing.First of all,I will explain and make a comparison among different vertical restraints antitrust theories in the first section,argues that “Raising Rivals' Costs Theory”(RRC),is the most suitable antitrust theory for many vertical restraints conducts which have the effect of “exclusion”,can be more comprehensive and systematic for explaining why exclusive dealing could eliminate and restrict competition.Futhermore,the application of RRC theory indicates that the modern Anti-Monopoly Law has entered into a new stage in the cognition of many vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing.Secondly,in order to prove the general applicability and advantages of RRC theory,I will use the economics method to give a comprehensive and systematic introduction to the connotation of RRC theory to make it more intuitive and clear.Again,in the third section,I will show some exsiting problems of RRC theory from the opposite perspective,and expound the academic innovations in recent years for the improvement and breakthrough of RRC theory and try to prove the feasibility of RRC theory in practice.Finally,in the fourth section,I will explore the impact of RRC theory on the implementation of antitrust policy and its contribution to the exclusive dealing,and even many of the specific practices of vertical restraints.As a result,to lead the following two chapters on the behavior of the exclusive transaction.Chapter ? is the Research on Behavioral Recognition of Exclusive Dealing.First of all,the first section is the research of different path of Anti-Monopoly Law regulation for exclusive dealing.In this section,through the judgment of two most important antitrust law domains for a large number of exclusive dealing,we can see various issuses in US model and EU model.Secondly,in the second section,I will study the legislation of exclusive dealing in major countries and regions around the world.In addition to the choice of the United States and Europe,I will also choose Japan,South Korea,Taiwan and Hongkong as the research objects.Because to some extent,if we look at the competition laws in these 4 countries and regions from the views of different model of market economy compared with US and EU,we will found they are more referential for China.Therefore,some experiences and problems during the development in these 4 law domains can be used for reference for China,and thus pave the way for China's issues in the last chapter.Finally,in the third section,I will discuss some factors for evaluating the competitive effect of exclusive dealing.Under the influence of RRC theory,there are some more detailed rules for the regulation of exclusive dealing in the major law domains all around the world.In addition to certain market share as the premise,the “foreclosure rate”,“the level of market entry barriers”,“market concentration” and “contract duration” and even other factors have become more suitable and feasible.In order to make a balance between the pro-competitive effect and the anti-competition effect,the process of analysis,which is locked in a continuous chain of legal logic,will be based on the rule of reason.Chapter ? is the Research on Particular Issues of Exclusive Dealing.Generally speaking,there are two kinds of special issues caused by exclusive dealing,which are the special form of exclusive dealing and the exclusive dealing in special industry.Therefore,first of all,we will focus on the problem of behavior recognition caused by conditional discounts in the first section.Through both restatements of the different veritical restraints theories and case analysis to this issue,we can conclude that RRC theory is more widely applicable once again,and then discount conditions should be identified as exclusive dealing instead of predatory pricing.Secondly,we will deal with exclusive dealing in special industries or fields in the second section.Theoretically,the research of this part should includes exclusive dealing in the field of intellectual property,exclusive dealing in the the automotive industry and exclusive dealing in form of administrative monopoly in China.However,the last three topics are so particularity and complexity that can be independently written,avoiding overly broad writing,coupled with the limited space in this section,I will just only study on exclusive dealing in the Internet industry.Chapter ? is the Research on China's Issues and Countermeasures of Exclusive Dealing.First of all,from view of legislation,in this section I will discuss the issues existing in the current AML in China.Including: the provisions and the relative problems of AML corresponding to exclusive dealing,the coordination between the Article 14 and Article 17 in China AML,and the relevant issues in Anti-Monopoly administrative regulations and relevant provisions of the guidelines,etc.Secondly,I will elaborate some typical cases of exclusive dealing occurred in our country respectively from the different views of law enforcement and judiciary,and summarize the related experience as well as defects,which might be learned and absorbed by the subsequent cases.Finally,the research in the third section is concerning the innovation of antitrust regulation for exclusive dealing in China.In this part,I will put forward some relevant suggestions,in order to make a better response to the series of competitive issues caused by the exclusive dealing.Chapter ? is the Conclusion.As a summary of the full article,in this part I will collect the relevant issues have been put forward and demonstrated before,and finally draw some relevant conclusions.