The Allocation Of Experimental Points In Contemporary China

"Experimental point"(EP)is widely regarded as a critical factor for China's spectacularly successful reform and opening-up.The allocation of experimental points(EPs)is the key point of the success of experimental point work.This study discusses the allocation of experimental points,answering two questions:in what way EPs are allocated and what factors influence the allocation of EPs.Previous studies have revealed two kinds of EPs allocating:local governments lobbying from bottom to up and upper-level governments appointing from top to bottom.Most of these studies presupposed that EPs are always initiated by upper-level governments.We find that EPs could be also initiated by local governments.EPs allocating is neither from bottom to up nor from top to bottom,namely not a one-way process,and it should be understood from the perspective of vertical interaction among governments.In order to systematically demonstrate EPs allocating,we distinguish four categories of EPs by two dimensions:the initiator of EPs and higher-level governments' preference in the allocation of EPs,conclude main models of EPs allocating,and describe these models by cases.Furthermore,the outcome of EPs allocating is that some parts of China are authorized to conduct new programs for the potential national or regional policy change but some others do not.What are the reasons?What factors influence the allocation of EPs?This article introduces government innovation theory,explaining the allocation of EPs,because EPs are government innovations essentially if putting aside the distinguished policy-making attribution in the Chinese contest.Considering the fact that EPs allocating is embedded in the vertical interaction of governments,we build an analytical framework by adding the vertical interaction of governments as an extra factor into the analytical framework of government innovation,and then raise eight groups of hypotheses.Using panel data of Chinese prefectures(2012-2015),we find that the administrative level of local leaders,the effect of predecessors of the party chiefs,and the vertical interaction of governments positively contribute to the EPs conditions of prefectures,however,local determines such as economic development,region,and distance from the regional center,are not statistically significant.We propose that the allocation of EPs in contemporary China could be generally described as "giving priority to Guanxi with due consideration to regional balance",but it does not mean that there is no other potential impact factors and features for the allocation of EPs,or "giving priority to Guanxi with due consideration to regional balance" could fully explain the allocation of EPs in all cases.We argue that the feature of "giving priority to Guanxi with due consideration to regional balance",to some extent,contributes to that experimental points successfully facilitating China's reform and opening up,because "giving priority to Guanxi" significantly reduces the collaborating cost,cuts down the time period for experimentation,and makes sure that local governments would not go against superiors' trajectory which might become a potential crisis for the whole system and "considering regional balance" prevents the allocation of EPs from Matthew Effect,which in turn maintains local governments'enthusiasm for experimentation,as a result,more governing wisdom form local could be discovered contributing to national policy changes.