| In recent years,with a series of policies to support entrepreneurship issued by Chinese government,innovation and entrepreneurship has gradually become the mainstream of economic behaviors.However,the rate of success entrepreneurial activity is not high,the development of entrepreneurial enterprises are faced with problems such as financing difficulties,contradiction between capitalists and founders,inefficiency of corporate governance,etc.Under this background,to do theoretical research in entrepreneurial enterprises,analysis their resources condition for the smooth development and in order to improve their performance has important theoretical and practical significance to promote and guide the development of start-up enterprises.To a large extent,the establishment and development of venture enterprises is actually the process of resource aggregation between the founding shareholders and external shareholders.This process implies at least two respects problems roughly.Firstly,it means the polymerization of shareholder's resources as their "physical" nature.That is to say,the mutual integration of shareholder resources has gradually formed the enterprise resources,and the rational combination and coordinated use of enterprise resources enhance the competitive advantage and value creation.Secondly,it means the polymerization of shareholders as their "human" nature.In fact,accumulation of shareholders' resources,At the same time,is also the process of gathering resource' owner and forming shareholder groups.Firm's original ownership and control structure will change after external shareholders entered and invested their resources in.There exist two sources of literature related to these views.(1)The former related documents based on the resource based theory,and the relationships between resources and performance suggested by the RBV have largely been supported.But in those researches,measurement of enterprise's resource is limited to the static stock at a certain point of time.Researchers ignored problems about resource sources and its acquisition,exaggerated the importance of managers in resource deploy process and,on the contrary,ignored the role of the resources' owner.They pay attention to some specific resource and take no count of resources overall combination feature.(2)Literatures related to the latter aspect focuses on the research of corporate governance and equity structure,such as,analysis governance role of big shareholders,the economic consequences of ownership structure and so on.The theory of property rights and agency cost are employed in such studies.Shareholders are treated as homogeneous financial capital investors and their control rights based on their shareholding ratio but their non-financial resources investment.Non-financial resources' important role in control rights allocation and the shareholders' governance action has been unheeded.Conclusions of these studies can't provide a convincingexplanation for questions about choice of external shareholder,corporate control rights allocation,and differences in shareholder governance behavior,etc.By raising a new conception and new research perspective,shareholder resources,research of this paper combined above two types of literature study and delve deeper into related issues.On the one hand,this paper studies the source of enterprise resource and its' acquisition process,consider shareholders as the main provider of resource,and analysis the influence of shareholder choices,shareholder resources and their combination characteristics on the performance of the company;On the other hand,this paper penetrated the traditional analysis of equity structure to resources behind shareholders,and pay more attention to the impact of resource attributes on the behavior of shareholders.From this new lens,this paper carried out antecedents and consequences research about venture enterprises' ownership structure between founder and external investors in financing context.That is to say,this study focuses on how to choose external shareholders and the formation of shareholders resource structure,and their influence on corporate governance and corporate performance.In the chapter IV,this paper research on selection of shareholder and shareholder resources.The central point of this paper is that entrepreneurs are active and knowledgeable decision makers in their fundraising process.They make choice based on their own resources and resource demands,and form ownership structure in pursuit of resources complementary and maximizing the value of their resources.Whether introduce in the external financial shareholders depending on both inducement and opportunity factors which affected by their resource endowments.Founder's technical resources,social capital and financial capital and their resource needs play important roles in the process;especially technical resources work as signal mechanism to attract the external shareholders.Empirical results show that enterprise technical resources,social capital and introduced outside shareholders has a significant positive correlation to the probability of introduce in external financial shareholders.While financial resources of founding shareholders have inversely correlation to it.But when technological resources and financial resources are both abundant,firms are more inclined to use their own capital to develop and converse technological achievements and reluctant to forming investment relationships with outside financial shareholders;and the more the technical resources,financial resources and social relation resources,the fewer relation entrepreneurial shareholder formed with financial external shareholders.In the chapter Chapters V and VI,this paper focuses on the effect of shareholder resources on the company control rights and shareholders' governance behavior.The types of shareholders' resources affect their earnings expectations,governance roles and behaviors mode,and the formation of a company's corporate governance structure and governance state is essentially a reflection of the structure of the shareholders' resources.By studying the case of fight for control rights in NVC Company,this paperdraws these conclusions:(1)the existence of non-financial resources leads to the separation of ownership and actual control rights,and it is the essential reason for the company control battle between big shareholders.The nominally control and the legal earnings rights of shareholders are based on the ownership proportion,but the distribution of actual control rights is closely related to the importance and dependence of their resources.They will seek private benefit using practical control inevitably when their return on resources can't met the rent expected,which resulting in dissatisfaction of other shareholders,and then fight for control occurred.(2)The degrees and power of participation in corporate governance is difference between industrial shareholders and financial shareholders.Industrial investors' participation level is higher than that of financial investors,and has a strong ability to fight for control.This is because industry shareholders have to take an actively and positive mode to participation in management and corporate governance to avoid the risk brought by the features of industry resources' specialty and uneasy-to-exit,and the irreplaceable characteristics of industry resources also gives industry investors greater control power.Instead,financial capital is general resources.Financial shareholders can be relatively easy to vote-with-feet due to its high level of liquidity.So they often keep a considerable distance to company business about decision-making and governance.And with the development of the capital market,the degree of financial capital's scarcity declined,with has weaken their power in control rights allocation.In chapter VI,I used the large sample empirical test of China GEM Listing Corporation to prove that the corporate governance participation of industrial shareholders is higher than that of the financial shareholders.It specifically demonstrated that industrial shareholders on the board of directors occupy more excess seats,the board have meeting more frequency when firm has industry investors,and the more the types of shareholders and complex of the structure of resources,the more frequency the board of directors have meeting.The seventh chapter analyzed the positive effect of shareholder resources complementarity on firm's performance.Diversified shareholder structure not only provides a more diversified and complementary resources,but also to enhance the management experience and decision-making ability of company's management team.My empirical results in chapter XII show that the diversification of shareholder and their resources structure is positive to corporate value and financial shareholders play a more important role to promote corporate value than industry shareholders.But this paper did not prove industry shareholders have significant influence on the value of the company.In general,this paper based on the perspective of "shareholder resources",and takes China GEM listed companies as the study object and by theoretical analysis,case study and archival empirical method verified the following points: Polymerization of shareholder resources(especially the non-financial resources)is an important basis forselect external investors;the importance and relative dependence of shareholder resources is the essence source of their actual control power;deference of shareholder resources' types is important factors affect their governance behavior;shareholder resources portfolio characteristics has significant effect on firms' performance.Of course,these viewpoints are not only applicable to start-ups,but also can be used as a general theory to explain the similar problems of general enterprises.The above conclusions put forward the following management inspiration:(1)Broaden the understanding of the investment of shareholders.Start-up enterprises should recognize the important role of non-financial resources in enhancing compatibility and complementarity of the resources and select external shareholders based on their resources background.(2)Refreshing the conception of shareholders.Shareholders(especially large shareholders)are no longer merely providers of capital,even not only resource providers,but they also are resources managers.So,Start-up enterprises should try to keep a clear-sighted view of the purpose of outside investment before they select them to avoid the risk of strategic interference,resource expropriation and control rights transferred.(3)Prepending the design of corporate governance system.Types of shareholders' resources affect their governance behavior.Start-up enterprises should choose the appropriate shareholders by analyzing their influence of corporate governance according to their resources background during the finance activities.(4)Highlighting the situational role of the shareholders' resources in the process of value creation.Venture enterprises should construct diversified shareholder structure and complementary resources structure by introducing the diversified external shareholders in order to gain more firm value. |
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