| The earnings management has always been a hot topic in the field of practice and academia.With the continuous development and improvement of the capital market,the impact of CEO reputation on corporate earnings management has become increasingly prominent.So,how to effectively evaluate the CEO reputation,and whether the reputable CEO will keep the spirit of contract,and work hard to achieve maximum value for the company?Or the reputable CEO will use their own good reputation for rent-seeking,to meet the personal interests,encroachment on shareholders,damage the company's property?In view of this,this article based on the reputat:ion perspective,around the CEO reputation and earnings management to carry out a large number of studies,hoping to identify the earnings management for the company's stakeholders to provide a new perspective and to constraints the earnings management for other regulatory authorities,regulating the capital market to provide reference.This article mainly includes six chapters:The first chapter,the introductiorn,elaborated the research background and the significance,defined the concept of CEO reputation and the earnings management,combed this article the research content and the research mentality,introduced the technical route of the article;The second chapter,the domestic and foreign related research progress,first sort out the related research on the earnings management,CEO reputation,and finally make a comment on the CEO reputation and corporate governance of the existing literature review;The third chapter,the comprehensive evaluation of CEO reputation,through the factor correlation analysis to eliminate the indicators to reflect the duplication of information,combined with the coefficient of variation,entropy method to build the CEO reputation comprehensive evaluation model;The fourth chapter,this chapter constructs the impact model of CEO reputation on earnings management and cross impact model of externa]governance environment and CEO reputation on earnings management,empirical research the influence of CEO reputation on the earnings management of listed companies,reveals the function mechanism of CEO reputation on the earnings management of listed companies in the China capital market.The fifth chapter,research on earnings management constraint model based on CEO reputation.The CEO reputation variable is incorporated into the double principal-agent relationship analysis framework,and according to Nash equilibrium formation mechanism,constructs the earnings management constraint model considering the CEO reputation.The sixth chapter,the conclusion and prospect,summarizes the main conclusions and innovation points of the article.The main results of this paper are as follows:(1)This paper constructs a comprehensive evaluation index system of CEO reputation,reflecting 97.79%of original information by 25.93%of screening indicators,and combined with the entropy weight method to build a comprehensive evaluation model of CEO reputation.Based on the classic high-frequency indicators at home and abroad,this paper selects three criteria from the CEO's personal characteristics,the CEO's personal competence and C.EO's social influence according to the principle of eliminating the redundant information and retaining the maximum content of information content.The CEO reputation comprehensive evaluation index system including seven indicators:net profit,market share,investment rate of return,internal promotion or external employment,corporate social responsibility and the contribution rate to the country.The CEO reputation comprehensive evaluation index system,uses 25.93%of the indicators reflect the 97.92%of the original information.On this basis,this paper uses the entropy weight method to weight each index,constructs the CEO reputation comprehensive evaluation model,and conducts comprehensive evaluation on the reputation of 2432 CEO samples from 2009 to 2014.The study found that:from 2009 to 2014,with the development and improvement of the capital market in recent years,the mean CEO reputation is increasing year by year,show that the improvement of capital market,can promote CEO pay more attention to personal reputation.(2)By incorporating the reputation variables into the double principal-agent analysis framework,according to the Nash equilibrium formation mechanism,and considering CEO reputation,constructs the earnings management constraint model.In this paper,the CEO reputation is incorporated into the framework of double principal-agent relationship analysis,and constructs the profit optimization model of CEO,controlling shareholders and small and medium shareholders.Calculating the mixed Nash Equilibrium solution of behavior intensity through concatenating the profit optimization models of actors.And finally,constructs the earnings management constraint model considering CEO reputation.The research shows that,first,when the market process is higher,third party regulatory investigation probability higher,if the CEO with reputation,because the impaired reputation after being investigated,inhibit the CEO's directly misappropriate behavior and inflated profits behavior.When the market process is lower,third party regulatory investigation probability is lower,despite the CEO with good reputation,but the probability of the CEO's directly misappropriate behavior and inflated profits behavior will be punished is low(that is,less likely to damage the CEO reputation),plus directly misappropriate behavior and inflated profits behavior will bring so much interest,so the CEO will take more misappropriate behavior and inflated profits behavior.Second,when the market process is higher,third party regulatory investigation probability higher,if the CEO with good reputation,it will reduce the controlling shareholders' sharing rent-seeking behavior.Third,as for the reputable CEO,small and medium shareholders should strengthen supervision,in order to avoid "lights black" phenomenon.(3)Using the data of listed companies,we empirically test the mechanism of CEO reputation on earnings management.The study found that:the overall reputation mechanism in China's capital market is still unable to effectively play its regulatory functions,but with the process of marketization,the reputation mechanism of the supervision and management functions gradually play.This paper examines the influence of CEO reputation on the earnings management of listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2009-2014.First,from the whole,the reputation mechanism in China's capital market can not effectively play its function of supervision and management,the CEO with high reputation often use its"star" aura,to extract rent,to maximize the private interests;Second,when distinguishing property rights,there is a positive correlation between the CEO reputation and the degree of real activities earnings management in state-owned listed companies,while there is a positive correlation between CEO reputation and accrual-based earnings management in non-state-owned listed companies.In other words,in the state-owned listed companies,reputable CEO,taking into account the political risks associated with accrual earnings management,tend to adopt a real activities earnings management strategy to maintain their good image,while in the non-state-owned listed companies,reputable CEO,based on the cost of earnings management and future career development,tend to use accrual-based earnings management strategy to maintain its good image;Finally,in further studies,we found that there is a negative correlation between the cross items of the process of marketization and CEO reputation and corporate earnings management.That is,with the improvement of the marketization process,the reputation mechanism can exert its supervision and management function and restrain the earnings management.The conclusion shows that improving the marketization process can improve the reputation mechanism,protect the reputation mechanism to play its supervisory function,and suppress the earnings management. |
PDF Full Text Request