| For a long time,compensation of executives in listed companies has always been a controversial topic both in the academic world and the practical world.Executive compensation is associated with not only corporate governance level and corporate performance,but also social equality.Apart from a few hot social issues,the topic concerning about compensation of executives in listed companies has always been touching the public nerve.According to the Principal-agent Theory,in spite of the differences of the nature of property right and contractual arrangements of those enterprises,the incentive effects of executive compensation should be realized.However,as a result of different institutional backgrounds of our country from western countries,the incentive effects of executive compensation in China are therefore particular.With A-share listed firms and A+H-share listed firms as the research objects,the thesis systematically analyzed the change situations of compensation of executives in listed companies and its incentive effects under some special institutional backgrounds.The special systems include: the Compensation Management System of Senior Executives in Central Enterprises,the Cross-listing System,and the Stocks Special Treatment System.Through the research,conclusions of the thesis are as follows:1.The incentive effects of executive compensation under the Compensation Management SystemIn 2009,after the promulgation and implementation of Instructions on further Standardizing Compensation Management of Responsible People in Central Enterprises,hereinafter referred to as Instructions,the compensation of senior executives in state-owned enterprises didn't decline,instead increased significantly,and executives' Compensation-Performance Sensitivity had declined significantly.For further study,the implementation of Instructions made the upward speed of the compensation of senior executives in state-owned enterprises decline significantly.Compared with local state-owned enterprises,senior executives in central enterprises as the direct objects of Instructions,their Compensation-Performance Sensitivity had been influenced more greatly before and after the implementation of Instructions.With regard to enterprises in regions with different marketization degrees,the higher the marketization degree,the weaker the intervention willingness and the intervention capacity of the government to the enterprise,and executives' Compensation-Performance Sensitivity had no significant difference before and afterthe implementation of Instructions.But for enterprises in regions with low marketization degrees,those executives' Compensation-Performance Sensitivity had significantly declined after the implementation of Instructions.Compared with those enterprises which didn't strictly implement Instructions,the Compensation-Performance Sensitivity of executives in enterprises which strictly implemented Instructions had increased significantly.2.The influence of cross-listing on the incentive effects of executive compensationIn line with the Bonding Hypothesis,it can be found in this thesis that after the cross-listing of mainland enterprises,senior executives' compensation level would be promoted significantly.After the cross-listing,the effects of holding shares of senior executives as a compensation incentive method would be enhanced significantly.Cross-listing changed the way of enterprises to motivate senior executives.Compared with private enterprises,after cross-listing,the Compensation-Performance Sensitivity of executives in sate-owned enterprises would be more influenced.Compared with enterprises in regions with relatively low marketization degrees,the Compensation-Performance Sensitivity of executives in regions with high marketization degrees is likely to be influenced more greatly.3.Special Treatment SystemThe compensation level of executives in listed companies would influence whether the enterprise will be given ST,enterprises whose executives' cash compensation and shareholding ratio are lower are more likely to be given ST.After the listed company being given ST,the time to get rid of ST has a negative correlation with the shareholding level of executives.Enterprises whose executives' shareholding level is higher are easier to realize “uncap”.As for enterprises which had already been given ST,compared with private enterprises,the shareholding level of executives in state-owned enterprises is more obvious to get rid of the effects of ST.The research of the thesis enriched the literature of executive compensation and its incentive effects,and the innovation is stated below:(1)The existing literature researched on incentive effects of executive compensation is either distinguished by different samples or examining the influence of enterprise internal systems.This thesis systematically tested the influence of some special institutional environment in the process of carrying out reform of modern enterprise systems,which would provide theoretical basis for testing the overallimplementation effects of external systems and further completing environmental construction of the systems.(2)The existing research mainly uses executive cash compensation to measure executive compensation level,the Split Share Structure Reform in 2006 standardized the stock ownership incentive of senior executives of listed companies in China.This thesis took the stock ownership incentive as an indicator to measure executive compensation level and analyzing incentive effects of executive compensation,which enriched the literature of executive compensation research.(3)By categorizing different enterprises,this thesis considered incentive effects of executive compensation in the perspective of government intervention,which provided the government with basis to formulate classified compensation structure and a check-up system appropriately.(4)Through research on special compensation management systems in China,the thesis revealed the effects of compensation management as the supplement for the disclosure system of listed companies,which provided basis for further completing executive compensation supervision. |
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