The Research On The Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism With Risk Aversion

With the continuous development of supply chain management technology and the rapid progress of globaleconomic integration,the competition evolved from the inter-products of enterprise into the inter-supply chain.To avoid the "bullwhip effect"and "double marginalized effect",it is necessary to strengthen cooperation and contract coordination among the enterprises,which can improve supply chain performance and overall competitiveness.On the other hand,owing to customer individual requirement and high uncertainty of supply and demand,the supply chain managers are usually characterized by risk-averse behavior.Therefore,the research on supply chain contract coordination with risk aversion is of great theoretical and practical significance.Based on coordination theory,decision-making optimization theory,game theory and risk theory etc.,the purpose of this thesis is to design contract incentive mechanisms for complex two level supply chains by considering many factors that affected optimal decisions,including random yield,random demand,risk-averse preference,combined contract and channel competition.It can enrich and refine the related theory and provide decision support.Furthermore,we also introduce the option theory into irrigation water right trading,which provides new ideas and methods to optimize the allocation and management of water resources in our country.The main contents and conclusions are as follows.(1)The contract mechanism is designed to coordinate the supply chain with loss-averse retailer under random yield anddemand.The coordination ability of three well-known types of contracts(wholesale price contract,buyback contact and quantity flexibility contract)is analyzed.For comparison,we also analyze the buyback and quantity flexibility contracts withrisk-neutral retailer.We obtain the sufficient and necessary conditions of contract coordination in either case.Thenthe impacts of loss aversion and random yield on the decision-making behaviors and system performance are discussed.It shows that the random yield and risk-averse preference donot change the coordination ability of the contracts but affects the value of the contract parameters.Moreover,as the retailer's level of loss aversion increases,the supplier should provide a higher incentive cost.We also confirm that decreasing yield risk can improve the supply chain performance.(2)The combined contract coordination mechanism of supply chain with loss aversionunder yield and demand uncertainty is analyzed.A composite form combining buy back contract and quantity flexibility one is provided to coordinate the supply chain.It can achieve a Pareto improving situation and the profits can be arbitrarily allocated between the two agents.Moreover,compared to the single buy back contract or quantity flexibility contract,thiscomposite form has more opportunities to coordinate the supply chainwhen contract parameters are constrained.The numerical experiments show the effectiveness of this composite contract in supply chain coordination,and then the impacts of retailer's loss aversion level and random yield on the system performance are discussed.(3)A loss-averse retailer game with random yield and demand is studied.We investigate the combined impact of loss aversion attitude and competition on the retailer's decision-making behavior under buyback contract.Based on game theory and risk theory,the centralized and decentralized decision-making models areconstructed,respectively.It shows that there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibriumin this game.Moreover,there exists a threshold of loss aversion level(number of retailers),above(below)which a unique buyback price can achieve the coordination of supply chain.(4)The coordination mechanism of a hybrid-channel supply chain with loss-averse retailer in E-commerce is also investigated.The optimal inventory strategies of the loss-averse retailer and risk-neutral manufacturer are discussed in the centralized and decentralized decision model,respectively.We establish an option contract to coordinate this supply chain,and obtain the sufficient and necessary conditions of coordination.Then the impacts of demand fluctuations,retailer's loss aversion level and service level on the system performance are discussed through numerical experiments.(5)A water right trading model of irrigation area based on option contract is developed.In response to the risk of supply uncertainty and price fluctuation in spot water market,the option,one of financial derivativeswater,is applied into water right trading model.We take Zhanghe irrigation area in Hubei province for case study and discuss water option market construction.Then we analyze the buyer's optimal decisions of the option and spot market,and calculate the transaction volume,transaction income and water shortage rate of planning year 2030 with difference inflow frequency.The results show that the option trading can not only alleviate water resource shortage of industrial sectors in Jingmenunder 50%and 75%conditions,but also improve benefits of both the buyer and seller of water right.