| Platform enterprises in the two-sided market are widely exists in the economic life, which not only exist in the newspaper media, bank CARDS,housing rental intermediary organization and other traditional industries,but also present in the e-commerce, the operating system, Internet media,search engines, and other emerging industries. The platforms enterprises are facing two (or more) different types of market demand, by providing products and services to promote the deal. Therefore, it is the most important problem for the platform that how to gather the two-sided users in the platform. Pricing strategy is one of the commonly used competitive strategies of platforms, which will not only affect the demand of both users,but also affect the size of the platform. Therefore, it is essential that developing effective pricing strategies for the development and even the survival of platforms.In the face of fierce competition, some platforms have adopted loyalty incentives such as loyalty rewards for loyal users, and some use based behavior discrimination (BBPD) for new and old users based on purchasing behavior. These different pricing strategies for different users are referred to as dynamic pricing strategy.However, the existing research on the pricing strategy of two-sided markets focus on static pricing strategy, that is to say, once the price is determined, the platform will not change, and there is little research on the dynamic pricing strategy. However, what are the impact of these dynamic pricing strategies on the pricing and profitability of the platform? Users, as the object of the pricing, what kind of impact will its behavior have on the dynamic pricing strategy? At the same time, competitive platforms often have different market share in the reality. So, in this asymmetry competition state, what kind of impact will the dynamic pricing strategy on the platforms? These questions that lead us to think, is the main content of this paper.Based on combing and summarizing the research results at home and abroad, this paper adopted the concept and analysis framework of the current general two-sided market. By using game theory, decision science and simulation case analysis, this paper do a carefully research on loyal reward and BBPD strategy in real life. The main research contents and conclusions are as follows:1. The research on the loyalty reward pricing with different user ownership structure. Firstly, combining with the two-sided market pricing model and switching cost theory, this paper constructed loyalty rewards pricing model in competitive platforms with single homing on both sides of the user. Then, analysed the loyalty influence on customer retention rate and the influence factors of loyalty according to equilibrium result.Subsequently, compared the result of the loyalty model with the one of unified pricing model, points out the loyalty influence on platform pricing and profit. Finally, expanding the model to one side of agent is single homing and the other is multi-homing, in order to study the operation mechanism of loyalty rewards pricing strategy in competitive platform enterprises from the perspective of different user ownership structure.The study shows that the specific pricing of loyalty reward increases with the degree of platform differentiation and the expected discount coefficient, which decreases with the increase of the transfer cost.Comparing with the results of unified pricing strategy, it shows that the exogenous switching cost and the discount factor of user expectation of future are important factors influencing platform loyalty rewards pricing strategy. If the user emphasis on the future from the platform to obtain loyalty awards, providing loyalty rewards increase the total profit of the platform; while if users pay more attention to the effectiveness of the first stage, providing loyalty rewards will reduce the total profit platform.Providing loyalty rewards can increase the total profit of the platform,when the exogenous switching costs are small, while providing loyalty rewards will reduce the total platform profit inverse. Meanwhlie, by comparing the model with user's different ownership structure, we found that loyalty rewards have the same effect on the platform pricing and profit.2. The research on the BBPD with different user ownership structure.Firstly, based on the Hotelling two-stage dynamic game model, the BBPD pricing model of the competitive platform under sigle homing structure was constructed. Then, analysed the influence factors of BBPD according to equilibrium result. Subsequently, compared the result of the BBPD model with the one of unified pricing model, pointed out the BBPD influence on platform pricing and profit. Finally, expanded the dynamic model to one side of agent is single homing and the other is multi-homing,in order to study the operation mechanism of BBPD pricing strategy in the competitive platform enterprise from the perspective of different user ownership structure.The study shows that the second stage of the platform for single-owned new and old users to discriminate against the pricing depends on its market share offirst stage. When the market share of the first stage platform is greater than 1/3, the platform implements low prices for new users to further expand market share. When the first phase of the two platform market share is less than 1/3, the two platforms prefer to the platform implements low prices for old users to maintain a competitive position.When the first phase of the platform market share is equal to 1/3, the two platforms implement a unified pricing. Comparing with the results of the unified pricing strategy, the BBPD pricing strategy reduce the profit of the platform when the users are single homing. The impact of the discriminant pricing on the two-stage profit of the platform depend on the size of the user's network externalities on both sides.3. Research on BBPD pricing strategy with asymmetric platform.Firstly, established the BBPD pricing strategy modle with asymmetric competitive platform. Then, analyzed the factors on the asymmetric platform of preferential pricing of new and old customers and influence.Finally, compared the result of the BBPD model with the one of unified pricing model, pointed out the BBPD influence on platforms pricing and profit.The research shows that the platform with the market advantage increases the pricing of the new users with the increase of the asymmetry of the two platforms. The pricing of the new and old users decreases with the asymmetry of the two platforms. Platform for the old user pricing with the first phase of the market share increases, the pricing of new users with the first phase of the market share increases. Comparing with the results of unified pricing strategy, the impact of BBPD pricing strategy on asymmetric platform pricing and profit depends on the size of network externality and the asymmetry of platform.The innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)Established the loyalty reward pricing model of competitive platforms under different ownership structure, analyzed the influencing factors of loyalty reward pricing strategy. Compared with the unified pricing model, and revealed the conditions for the implementation of loyalty reward pricing strategy.(2)Established the BBPD model of competitive platforms under different ownership structure, analyzed the internal causes of the discrimination pricing of the new and old users. Compared the unified pricing model, and revealed the conditions of the BBPD pricing strategy.(3)Established the BBPD pricing model of asymmetric competitive platforms, analyzed the influence of asymmetry on platform pricing.Compared with the unified pricing model, revealed the conditions of BBPD pricing strategy. |
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