| The construction of a new socialist countryside is not only an important part of China's "13th Five-Year" plan,but also a historic mission to achieve the two goals of one hundred years.Building a new socialist countryside,in the final analysis,is to achieve agricultural modernization,and contract-farming is an important helper to promote agricultural modernization.However,with the gradual development of contract-farming in China,the market failure in agricultural financial market and the weakness of agriculture make the problem of contradiction between banks and farmers about financing more and more serious in the contract-farming supply chain,and seriously restrict the process of agricultural modernization.As a government that can regulate the operation of the national economy through the development of financial subsidy policy,he can plays an important role not only in reducing the risk of supply chain financing,cutting down financing costs and increasing social welfare,but also in solving the financing problem in the contract-farming supply chain.The government can also intervene in economic development through subsidies to make up for the defects of the market and expand the scale of the economy in order to obtain social and economic benefits.Therefore,to solve the financing problem is the responsibility of the government.Then,as the government agricultural subsidies policy makers,how to design a subsidy mechanism to better improve the efficiency of subsidies? How does the subsidy mechanism affect the optimal decisions and benefits of the supply chain partners? How will the subsidy mechanism affect social welfare?In the research of supply chain financing,scholars pay more attention to trade credit and bank credit,but the current research is mainly focused on the traditional manufacturing supply chain.Due to the unique characteristics of agriculture,such as random yield,production easily affected by natural disasters,lack of effective collateral or guarantee of the main financing body,the contract-farming supply chain is different from the traditional manufacturing supply chain.Therefore,the optimal decision in the traditional manufacturing supply chain is not necessarily applicable to the contract-farming supply chain.In recent years,some scholars have considered the supply chain finance in the optimal decision-making of contract-farming supply chain.However,the existing researches are mainly embodied in the application of financial derivatives such as options and futures,the supply chain financing risk assessment or financing terms,and the innovation of supply chain financing model.Obviously,the above research has ignored the impact of government subsidies on the optimal decision of the contract-farming supply chain.In view of this,on the basis of previous research results,a two-echelon contract-farming supply chain comprised of a company and many farmers with capital constraints is studied in this paper.Considering random yield of agricultural products and bankruptcy risks of the farmers in supply chain financing,this paper studies respectively the problem of government subsidy mechanism under each of three supply chain financing modes which are trade credit,bank credit without Loan guarantee insurance and bank credit with Loan guarantee insurance.The main work and innovation of this paper are as follows:First,according to the government subsidies for the loss of advance payment in supply chain financing under trade credit,two different Stackelberg game models,in which the company is the leader and the farmers is the follower,are proposed respectively considering bankruptcy risks of the farmers.In the meanwhile,the comparative analysis on the farmers' optimal decision making is performed and the government subsidy mechanism is put forward.The government subsidy's values for both the social welfare and the supply chain are discussed finally.The research has the following findings:(1)the smaller the output rate of the disaster year is,the more favorable supply chain financing model,in which the farmers have the risk of bankruptcy,is to the farmers,(2)and the government subsidy mechanism can not only reduce the company's risk of advance payment and create more social welfare,but also motivate the farmers to design the proper production input to promote the supply chain efficiency,even to realize optimal expected profit of the centralized decision-making under certain conditions,and create more value for the capital-constrained supply chain.Second,according to the government subsidies for the losses caused by natural disasters in supply chain financing under bank credit without Loan guarantee insurance,the scenarios of both bankruptcy risk and no bankruptcy risk for the farmers are put forward.(1)In the above two scenarios without government subsidies mechanism,the optimal production strategies of the two scenarios for the farmers are analyzed comparatively.(2)In the scenario of bankruptcy risk for the farmers with government subsidy mechanism,three-phase Stackelberg game model is set up to characterize the competition of government,company and farmers.And the optimal government subsidy mechanism is got to realize the maximization of social welfare.It is shown that,(1)In the above two scenario without government subsidies mechanism,both the output rate in the harvest year and the interest rate are the main factors that decide which scenario is better to the farmers.(2)In the scenario of bankruptcy risk for the farmers with government subsidy mechanism,(1)When the probability of harvest year is large,and the ratio of the output rate in the harvest year and the output rate in the disaster year is small,the government will not provide subsidy.(2)When the probability of harvest year is small,the government will not provide one hundred percent subsidy.(3)Otherwise,the government will provide one hundred percent subsidy.(4)The government subsidy can not only increase the customer surplus and social welfare,but also increase the expected profit of company.(5)However,the farmer will only be benefited from the government subsidy as the output rate in the harvest year is large and the coefficient of sensitivity of price is small,or as the output rate in the harvest year is small.Third,according to the government subsidies for the loan interest in supply chain financing under bank credit with Loan guarantee insurance,this paper studies the four stage dynamic game between government,bank,company and farmer,and analyzes the effect of government subsidy on the optimal decisions and benefits of the supply chain partners.And the government's optimal subsidy mechanism is obtained from different angles which are social welfare maximization and farmer's expected profit maximization.It is found that,(1)the expected profit of the farmers is a strictly concave function of the subsidy rate,while the expected profit of the company is a strictly increasing function of the subsidy rate.(2)If the government designs the subsidy mechanism from the perspective of maximizing the expected profit of the farmers,the government subsidy rate will increase with the decrease of price sensitivity coefficient.(3)However,if the government designs the subsidy mechanism from the perspective of social welfare,the government subsidy rate will decrease with the decrease of price sensitive coefficient.When the ratio of the output rate in the disaster year and the output rate in the harvest year is increased to a certain value,the government subsidy rate is not affected by the price sensitivity coefficient,and the government will always provide subsidies.If the above ratio of the output rate is increased to a greater value,the government will provide full subsidies.The above research results not only provide some managerial insight for the government to design the subsidy mechanism,but also offer some useful theoretical guidance for the agricultural related personnel in the operation and financial decision-making. |
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