The Study Of Evolutionary Game Mechanism On The Supervision Of Private Sector Behavior Of PPP Project

The public and private sector can give full play to their respective advantages and joint participation in the construction and operation of public infrastructure projects through the mode of public-private partnership,and to provide better public products/services.However,because of the conflict of interests between the public and private sector,the long operation of PPP project,the immature of PPP mode in China,and the imperfect laws and regulations,so the effective supervision and incentive of private sector of PPP project is very difficult.To some extent,it hindered the rapid development and application of PPP mode.In this context,based on public participation,reputation and asymmetric status perspective,this dissertation focused on how to supervise and motivate the behavior of private sector effectively during the operation of PPP project,so as to ensure the smooth operation of the project and protect the public interests.The main innovative point of this article has three aspects:Firstly,this dissertation analyzed the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory.And then the boundary conditions for constraining the opportunistic behavior of the private sector by the public participation were identified.Finally,the corresponding improvement measures and policy recommendations were proposed for the government in the circumstance of public participation.Secondly,the regulatory process was studied with the consideration of reputation.And the effects of reputation for the behaviors of private sector and government are analyzed basing on evolution game model.Then,the boundary conditions for constraining the opportunistic behavior of the private sector with the consideration of reputation were identified.Finally,some references were presented for the government regulator.Thirdly,the government is usually in the leading position at the present stage in China,that is,the status of public sector and private sector in the PPP project is often asymmetric,and this will lead to additional losses for the private sector.From this situation,the evolution game model was established,and the effects of asymmetric status for the behaviors of private sector and government are studied.Moreover,the superior government guarantee was introduced to improve the model so as to achieve a better evolutionary stable state.Therefore,the opportunism of the private sector was reduced,and theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of the government in line with the actual situation in China was provided.