Research On The Relationship Between Ultimate Ownership Structure And Dividend Policy Under Information Asymmetry

Dividend policy is a financial strategy for listed companies to make reasonable allocation of after tax income between cash payment and retained earnings,and it is related to the shareholders of current income and long-term development of enterprise.Dividend policy is made by a specific subject,and the behavior characteristics of a specific subject are limited by the corresponding corporate governance structure,ownership structure is the property right foundation of corporate governance,and the ultimate control structure hidden behind it can influence the decision-making behavior of corporate managers;the company's dividend policy has been paid close attention to by every stakeholder within the ultimate control structure of the company;different companies and external stock markets also have different levels of information asymmetry because of the quality of information disclosure.After the completion of the split share structure reform,the institutional basis for controlling the interests of the controlling shareholders through the cash dividend will not exist,but for this objective information asymmetry exists ultimate ownership structure and internal market,and the dividend policy of the agent,which caused the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection,the quality of information disclosure and transfer problems caused by the difference,it is more general and more research value.Based on the agency theory and the signal transmission theory,the index of information asymmetry in financial market microstructure theory,and the characteristics of ultimate ownership and corporate governance of Chinese listed companies,the purpose of this paper is to clarify the ultimate ownership structure and its structural characteristics for investors,and how to influence the dividend policy of listed companies,and What kind of influence will the degree of information asymmetry have on the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and dividend policy.On the one hand,if investors can recognize different ultimate controlling ownership,they can make the right decisions according to the impact of dividend policy based on the degree of asymmetric information;on the other hand,it can provide empirical evidence for supplementing and improving the dividend policy theory,and which can also reveals the differences of governance efficiency between the companies with different ultimate controlling ownership,then provides a new theoretical basis for corporate governance.This paper draws lessons from the existing research conclusions and methods at home and abroad,considering the fact that China's capital market is an emerging market which is still to be improved,stock prices are more susceptible to noise.Draw lessons from previous research results and methods,based on the reverse relation between stock price synchronicity and stock price noise(Wang Yaping et al.,2009;Wangetal.;2009;Huand Liu;2013),the volatility of stock price is chosen to reflect the reverse of stock information content,and then to measure the degree of information asymmetry.This lays the foundation for further research on the influence of ultimate ownership structure on dividend policy under the condition of asymmetric information.The third chapter introduces the method of measuring the information asymmetry using the characteristics of the company and the market microstructure,the non volatility of stock price is chosen as an alternative variable to measure information asymmetry,then the characteristics of information asymmetry of Listed Companies in China are analyzed.According to the R2 value,stock price volatility and non synchronous calculation results of calculation according to the time characteristics,characteristics of the industry,asset size,the proportion of managerial ownership,the nature of the ultimate controller,equity balance degree,the proportion of institutional ownership and market type classification statistics,the present situation of information asymmetry of listed companies is comprehensively analyzed.The results show that there is no significant difference between different industries in the degree of information asymmetry;large scale listed companies have higher information asymmetry than smaller listed companies,which may be due to "transaction noise";the information asymmetry of listed companies with high proportion of executives is low,and the proportion of senior managers can reduce the degree of information asymmetry;the degree of information asymmetry of state-owned listed companies is lower than that of non-state-owned listed companies;the degree of information asymmetry of listed companies with high degree of equity restriction is higher than that of listed companies with low balance of ownership.Since the concept of ultimate control concept was first put forward by La Porta,the research perspective changes from the traditional ownership structure to the ultimate ownership structure,the focus of agency theory has also shifted from the conflict of interest between managers and external shareholders to the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.The separation of the two powers leads to the principal-agent relationship,and the principal agent relationship is the main reason for the asymmetric information.Improving corporate governance is one of the important means to ease information asymmetry,and the ultimate ownership structure plays a key role in corporate governance.According to ultimate property rights theory,the ultimate ownership structure includes the nature of ultimate controller,ultimate control,ultimate ownership,and separation of two powers.The ultimate ownership structure may lead to asymmetric information,and asymmetric information may lead to changes in the ultimate ownership structure.The subtle relationship between the two always involves the choice of interests among stakeholders.In the fifth chapters,from the micro level empirical research on ultimate control rights and the nature of the ultimate controller,the ultimate ownership and the separation of two rights of ultimate ownership variables and the influence of equity structure,managerial ownership,institutional ownership,whether the chairman serves as general manager of corporate governance variables on the degree of asymmetric information,this paper analyzes the characteristics of different ultimate ownership variables and corporate governance characteristics,and the quality of information disclosure of the company determines the extent of the market information asymmetry,according to the principal-agent theory and the quality of information disclosure of internal ultimate ownership structure because of principal-agent risk principal-agent contradictions,improve the quality of information disclosure of the company can effectively alleviate agency conflicts and reduce the degree of information asymmetry.The study of the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and dividend policy has become an important part of dividend policy research in recent years.Explore the influence of each characteristic variable of ultimate ownership structure on dividend policy.Not only can provide a new perspective and evidence for the study of dividend policy,but also helps to grasp the supervision department of the securities information disclosure of listed company structure of property rights,and further guide and provide an empirical basis to standardize the information disclosure behavior of listed companies.In the sixth chapter,according to the signaling theory of dividend policy and the theory of dividend agency,and the ultimate property right theory and the present situation of China's capital market,the paper analyzes the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and dividend policy,the empirical results show that there is a significant correlation between the ultimate ownership structure and dividend policy.Among them,the ultimate control of key variables,the ultimate controller of the nature of the ultimate ownership structure of rights,ultimate ownership,separation of two rights and other content have different effects on the dividend policy cash dividend,stock dividend,the total dividend policy,the conclusions of previous studies are verified and new conclusions are drawn;at the same time,makes a comparative analysis of small and medium-sized board and gem market,and compare the influence of ultimate ownership structure on dividend policy under different information asymmetry in different market sectors,discovers differences and differences for investors to better understand the characteristics of the 3 markets,identifies the motivations and information implications of dividend policies under different ownership structures in different markets.It also provides a contrastive study of the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and the dividend policy,which enriches the research perspective and content of the relationship between ultimate ownership and dividend policy,and unlike previous studies which focused solely on cash dividend policy,this paper also studies the stock dividend and the total dividend policy,and makes a comprehensive study of the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and dividend policy.In the seventh chapter,this paper introduces the information asymmetry variables,and empirically analyze whether the degree of information asymmetry affects the effect of the ultimate ownership structure on the dividend policy.The empirical results show that: the introduction of information asymmetry variables,information asymmetry variables and the ultimate ownership structure of the key variables of ultimate controller nature,ultimate control rights,ultimate ownership,separation of two rights and other cross multiply items on dividend policy are cash dividend and stock dividend,the total dividend policy is interactive on the issue,showed a big gap.The nature of the ultimate controller and the asymmetric information product of the dividend policy of the interaction,the ultimate control mode and the degree of information asymmetry is closely related with the product of the separation of two rights on dividend policy interaction,and the other two main characteristics of ultimate ownership structure,the ultimate control,the ultimate ownership and the asymmetry of the galaxy,have no influence on the formulation of dividend policy,which is inconsistent with the original hypothesis.In addition,the interaction of corporate governance variables and asymmetric information,such as ultimate control ownership structure,institutional ownership ratio,and so on,also have different influences on the formulation of dividend policy.It is proved that the existence of asymmetric information can strengthen or restrain the decision making of dividend policy in different ultimate ownership structure and different corporate governance,and provides more valuable and comprehensive reference for investors to better understand the dividend policy information of listed companies and pay more attention to the impact of asymmetric information.