Research On Industry-University-Institute Collaborative Innovation Mechanism Based On Stochastically Evolutionary Game Theory And Quantum Game Theory

Nowadays,‘innovation' is always a hot word appearing in all kinds of policy files.As a link between the enterprise and the research institute,Industry-University-Institute(IUI for short)collaborative innovation is of great importance.Literature on IUI collaborative innovation is abundant,but it seldom elaborates the IUI collaborative innovation mechanism from a quantitative perspective.Thus,this dissertation aims to make amends for the limitations of quantitative research.Based on the stochastically evolutionary game theory and the quantum theory,this dissertation studies on the evolution mechanism,the incentive mechanism and the profit distribution mechanism of the IUI collaborative innovation.It also compares four kinds of distribution methods,which is present in the practical example part.This dissertation can be divided into three parts,namely,the evolution mechanism,the incentive mechanism and the profit distribution mechanism.The evolution mechanism part incrementally introduces the deterministically evolutionary game,the stochastically evolutionary game and the continuous stochastically evolutionary game.It also analyzes the evolution process of efforts of both sides in IUI collaborative innovation,and furthermore presents the stable area in the stochastic evolution process.The result indicates that the high risk and uncertainty of revenue in the IUI collaborative innovation project is a double-edged sword.In the long run,reducing costs and improving quality and effectiveness will incentivize both sides radically.Only substantial fulfillment of cost advantage and production efficiency can maximally ensure steady operation of the whole IUI collaborative innovation project.The incentive mechanism part employs the quantum game paradigm to construct the IUI collaborative innovation model furtherly.The result indicates that the quantum game analysis shows great advantage over the classical game model,and implies that considering entanglement of states,the hardworking side will not take the risk of the other side's betrayal,which resolves the ‘Prisoners' Dilemma' in the classical game theory to some degree.In the IUI collaboration case,both sides need to negotiate and delegate a third party to formulate some performance indicators,and they also need to sign an ‘entanglement contract' to ensure that neither of them has the motivation to deviate from the quantum strategy.Thus,the quantum strategy with maximal effort is the most profitable.Furthermore,the profit distribution mechanism part compares the four distribution methods,namely,the fixed payment method,the profit sharing method,the fixed prepayment method and the mixed method.The numerical examples demonstrate the similarities and the differences with respect to the incentive degrees of both sides.Then,four distribution methods are studied in the stochastically evolutionary game and the quantum game cases to draw some corresponding conclusions and some implifications.Based on the stochastically evolutionary game and the quantum game analyses,this dissertation has some innovative and constructive insights as follows:(1)It exploits the stochastically evolutionary game paradigm to explore the evolution mechanism of both sides in the IUI situation.Random disturbance it employs can reflect the collaboration process more realistically.(2)It applies the quantum game to the incentive mechanism of the IUI collaborative innovation,and designs the ‘entanglement contract' involving quantitative performance indicators,which resolves the ‘Prisoners' Dilemma' to some degree.(3)The comparative research on the profit distribution mechanism involves risk aversion degrees of both sides,and also employs the modified Cobb-Douglas model,which can reflect the real collaboration process more authentically.(4)This research on the evolution mechanism,the incentive mechanism and the profit distribution mechanism of IUI collaborative innovation regards the effort as a continuous variable,which reflects the double-sided moral hazard problem with respect to implicit effort.