Research On Supply Chain Decisions Considering Agents' Behaviors Under Dual-channel Environment

Under the background of “Internet +” and innovation-driven,the supply chain system tends to change from single-channel distribution mode to dual(multi)-channel distribution mode.This dissertation considers two kinds of dual-channel supply chain systems: one consisting of a manufacturer's direct channel and a retailer's traditional channel,the other consisting of an incumbent manufacturer and a new manufacturer.By using game theory and methodologies of behavioral operation management,this dissertation explores the impacts of risk aversion,fairness concern as well as consumer behavior on inventory,pricing,coordination,financing,advertising and R&D strategies of dual-channel supply chain system.Specifically,the contributions of this work are summarized as follows.Firstly,considering the manufacturer who establishes a direct channel to encroach the market,the retailer may show risk-averse attitude when facing with the channel competition and the demand uncertainty.The two channels sell the same products and need to construct an inventory before the selling season.The reason why CVaR is chosen as the measure of risk aversion is explained,and the impacts of retailer's risk-averse attitude on the inventory and the pricing strategies are given.Further,an improved risk-sharing contract is designed to achieve the supply chain coordination.Secondly,when the retailer chooses to invest advertising to boost the demand,the manufacturer's direct channel may be a free rider,and the retailer may be risk averse.To mitigate channel conflict,the manufacturer may choose cooperative advertising with the retailer.The impacts of retailer's risk-averse attitude,advertising investing ability and consumer's acceptance of the traditional retail channel on the advertising strategy are discussed.The results show that the cooperative advertising may hurt the retailer's benefit.Thirdly,this dissertation studies the scenario in which the retailer may have financial constraint and the manufacturer would like to provide a deferred payment contract.Confronting with the channel encroachment,financial pressure and uncertain demand,the retailer may show risk-averse attitude.The results show that the deferred payment contract may improve the performance of the dual-channel supply chain system.Further,a mixed contract that combines revenue sharing and deferred payment is introduced to coordinate the supply chain.Fourthly,this dissertation considers the case in which the manufacturer and the retailer adopt a cooperative advertising strategy to boost sales.Different from the aforementioned scenario,assuming the retailer is the Stackelberg game leader while the manufacturer who is in the weak position has fairness concern.The results show that fairness concern can balance the relationship between the two agents and improve the supply chain performance.Moreover,when the system consists of two retailers,the retailer who occupies larger market share can benefit from the fairness concern.Finally,this dissertation models a two-period setting where an incumbent is a monopoly during the first period;while a market entrant competes with him in the second period.The incumbent and the market entrant decide whether or not to collaborate to innovate their products during the second period.Cooperation allows firms to share the innovation investment,but leads to fiercer competition due to less product differentiation.Besides,myopic consumers and strategic consumers may have different impacts on the firms' decisions.These two cases are analyzed,respectively.The results show that collaboration can be achieved only if consumers have similar valuation in the two products.In addition,an interesting result shows that when consumers obtain a lower utility in buying the product during the second period,the entrant may be better off.