Research On Decision-making Model And Optimization Mechanism Of Supply Chain With Behavior Factors

In the context of economic globalization and supply chain competition,supply chain management has become increasingly prominent in the survival and development of enterprises,and has increasingly become the focus of scholars and practitioners in the industry.In the past,most of the research on the supply chain considered that the decision makers were completely rational 'economic people',and did not consider many complex and uncertain factors in the practice of supply chain management,especially human behavior and cognition.However,with the development of experimental economics and the emergence of a large amount of realistic evidence,research ideas based on complete rationality are gradually replaced by bounded rationality.Behavioral operation is a new research field that integrates knowledge such as psychology and sociology into operational management,focusing on the impact of human behavior and cognition on operational systems.Based on the framework of behavioral operation,this paper establishes supply chain decision-making models in different situations from the perspectives of personal cognition and social preference,focusing on the impact of subjective behavior on supply chain decision-making and related performance.The paper expounds the research background and significance of this paper in the introduction part,briefly introduces the main research contents,research methods and overall technical route of this paper,and summarizes the main innovations of the paper.The second chapter summarizes and reviews the research literature and research background related to this paper.The subheadings of this chapter include supply chain management,the application of game theory in the supply chain,and the application of behavioral operations in the supply chain.In the supply chain management part,the basic definition and main research branches of supply chain management are introduced,and the important achievements in the field of newsboy model and supply chain contract are reviewed.Subsequently,the important results of the newsboy model and supply chain contract are reviewed.In the application part of game theory,we review the Stackelberg and Cournot games from the perspectives of traditional game theory and evolutionary game theory.Based on the main research topics of this paper,the literature review of behavioral operation is carried out from four perspectives: fair concern,overconfidence,risk aversion and loss aversion.The third chapter studies the supply chain performance with retailers' fairness concerns and sales efforts and the corresponding coordination mechanism.We derived the equilibrium strategy solution for a wholesale price contract and cost sharing of effort(CS-E)contract offered by the manufacturer,and the results indicated that both contracts achieved channel coordination with different requirements.Further,the profit of the manufacturer and the sales effort of the retailer under CS-E contracts were never less than those for the wholesale price contract,and there was an interval during which the retailer's profit and utility and supply chain efficiency were better than those under the wholesale price contract.In addition,we described situations in which a CS-E contract is unnecessary.The fourth chapter studies the influence of retailers' overconfidence on supply chain performance and coordination mechanism under the newsboy model.According to the characteristics of overconfidence,the decision model of retailers' overconfidence is constructed.By solving the optimal order quantity of the retailer under overconfidence,it is found that the characteristics of the order quantity are in line with the description of the 'pull to center' effect.Subsequently,in order to correct the retailer's deviation in decision-making,this paper verifies the coordination of the repurchase contract,and finds that the repurchase contract can only coordinate the supply chain when the order quantity is less than the system optimal.In order to improve the defects of the repurchase contract,the inventory revenue sharing contract is proposed,and the parameter setting and application scope of the contract are discussed.The theoretical results were verified by numerical simulation and the results were visually displayed.The fifth chapter studies the complexity of the dynamic Cournot-Stackelberg game in which members have risk aversion.In this chapter,a dynamic gaming market consisting of a professional manufacturer and two retailers is established,in which professional manufacturers are dominant in the market and cooperate with one of the retailers.The two retailers play the Cournot game and hold different levels of risk aversion in decision making.Firstly,this chapter constructs a static game model and a dynamic game strategy respectively,and obtains the system Nash equilibrium point and evolution fixed point,and theoretically gives the system stable boundary conditions.It is found that the system will lose stability if the adjustable speed of strategy is too fast.Through numerical simulation,the impacts of adjustable speed on the decision-making and performance is demonstrated from multiple dimensions,and the impact of retailer's risk attitude on system stability is emphasized.Finally,a method with chaos control are used to control the disadvantageous strategies of members.The sixth chapter studies the optimal decision-making and coordination mechanism with retailers' loss avesion and manufacturer's efforts.This chapter construct a newsboy model combining the prospect theory.In this model,manufacturers can invest quality efforts which influence the market demand,while retailers have the characteristics of loss aversion.First,through the implicit function derivation rule,we solve the optimal decision of the supply chain and find that the optimal performance cannot be achieved.On this basis,this chapter studies the buyback contract and the GLB contract respectively.The results show that both two contracts are not performing well in the coordination of the supply chain.Therefore,we propose a mechanism of the cost sharing and buyback contract(CSB)and proves that this contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the supply chain decision with different distribution functions is presented by numerical simulation,and the theoretical results are extended.This part also gives the parameter setting of CSB contract with different loss aversion levels and the corresponding supply chain performance.