Research On The Causes Of Institutional Transaction Costs And Management Performance Of Forestry Enterprises

Since the mid-1990 s,the industrial and commercial capital,with which forestry enterprises as the main body have been invested in forestry industries for more than 20 years.Forestry enterprises have a strong willingness to invest in forestry and the speed of entering the forestry was fast;In general,the procedure has three stages.The policies and laws and market environment of forestry enterprises that entering the forestry industries at different stages are different,but forestry enterprises are plagued by excessive government regulation and weak property rights protection during the operation process,which increases the operating costs of forestry enterprises and reduces their willingness to enter the forestry industry.It is necessary to sort out the institutional transaction costs borne by forestry enterprises after entering forestry industries,determine the causes,and study the theoretical mechanism,direction,and degree of institutional transaction costs affecting forestry enterprises' management performance.The institutional transaction costs are different from market transaction costs,and they are not equivalent to institutional costs.Institutional costs include two parts,one part is the necessary cost and the cost that the system must pay when running and implemention;the other part is the non-essential cost,that is,the institutional transaction costs,which mainly from excessive government regulation and weak property rights protection.It is a burden to the forestry enterprises,forced or disguised,that has to deal with government officials in the business process,and has to deal with the various conflicts,disputes and losses.Besides,the costs are “non-reciprocal and involuntary consumption”,which are non-essential costs that inhibit market functioning and increase market uncertainty,with greater risks and stronger uncontrollable factors.The excessive government control of forestry enterprises is mainly the logging permit control.The current logging management system has exacerbated the uneven supply and demand of logging indicators for forestry enterprises,and the distribution of logging indicators is not open and opaque.It is difficult for forestry enterprises to handle logging permits.There has been a phenomenon of forestry enterprise rent-seeking,government officials renting rents,and other entities grabbing rents.In terms of weak property rights protection,mainly indicates in ownership disputes and transfer contract disputes,manifested in the ownership disputes caused by changes in policies and laws,the legal validity of forestry rights transfer contracts in different periods,the duration of forestry rights transfer contracts and rent payment methods exist bigger risks and the weak legal effect of forestry rights transfer contracts,etc.In order to protect the security of their property rights,forestry enterprises have to increase costs and expenditures,thereby increasing the institutional transaction costs of forestry enterprises.Based on the theoretical analysis of the causes of institutional transaction costs of forestry enterprises,the paper chose 9 forestry enterprises in Guangxi and Guangdong as case study,andRegression analysis of the listed forestry enterprises,It was found that forestry enterprises are subject to excessive government regulation.It is in the implementation of the logging system,including the allocation of logging indicators,logging permits and discretion,etc.The forestry enterprises are subject to constraints from farmers,village committees,township forestry stations,township governments,forestry bureaus and other agencies in the process of handling logging permits.In order to maintain the relationship with the above subjects,public relations and other measures will be taken to increase the institutional transaction costs of forestry enterprises.In terms of weak property rights protection,it was found that forest rights disputes occurred frequently,which significantly affected the normal operation of forestry enterprises.In terms of measurement analysis,government regulation has made it more difficult for forestry enterprises to obtain administrative licenses,and the number of logging has been restricted to a certain extent,squeezing out funds used for production and increasing the institutional transaction costs of enterprises.By further dividing heterogeneous enterprises,it is found that compared with state-owned enterprises,the institutional transaction costs of non-state-owned forestry enterprises are more affected by government regulation.In terms of property rights protection,the impact of forestry rights protection on state-owned enterprises and private enterprises is not significant enough.Compared with large-scale enterprises,government regulation has a greater impact on the institutional transaction costs of small-scale enterprises,increasing the institutional transaction costs of small-scale enterprises to a greater extent.After taking the “opening business” at the location of the forestry enterprise as an instrumental variable for property rights protection,and the proportion of transportation expenditure in the total fiscal expenditure as an instrumental variable for government regulation to resolve endogenous issues,it was discovered that the logging permit control and forest rights disputes are the forestry enterprise system,The results of transaction cost sources are still robust.Taking forest cutting quotas and collective forest rights reform as alternative variables for government regulation and property rights protection,the paper found that the longer the period of collective forest rights reform,the greater the institutional transaction costs of enterprises.The number of forest harvesting quotas will affect the institutional transaction costs of enterprises is significant.Based on the analysis of the performance mechanism of the institutional transaction cost of forestry enterprises,logging permit control increases the direct and indirect costs of forestry enterprises.Forest rights disputes increase the cost of protecting property rights of enterprises,affect the financing capacity of forestry enterprises,and reduce the profitability of forestry enterprises.Institutional transaction costs affect the level of innovation of forestry enterprises,reduce the innovation capacity of forestry enterprises,complex and tedious administrative approvals reduce innovation time,distort resource allocation prices,and lead to resource mismatch.Forestry rights disputes increase innovation “spill-out” and enterprise property rights protection costs,reduce the company's willingness to innovate.On the basis of the above theoretical analysis,select the listed forestry enterprise to process quantitative analysis,and it isfound that institutional transaction costs have a significant negative impact on the forestry enterprise's operating performance,significantly reducing the forestry enterprise's innovation level and innovation ability,and thus reducing the forestry enterprise's operating performance.In terms of policy recommendations,the legal effectiveness of the forest management regulation and the legal validity of the forest tenure transfer contractshould be strengthened;and the provisions on the period of plantation management,revenue sharing and risk sharing mechanisms should be increased.