On The Viability Of Non-cognitivist Semantics For Moral Sentences

This thesis studies the viability of a non-cognitivist semantics for moral sentences.Non-cognitivism subscribes to two theses.First,that the meaning of sentences is to be explained in terms of the mental states these sentences conventionally express.Second,that there is a fundamental difference in the roles of the states expressed by moral(normative)sentences and the states expressed by descriptive sentences:descriptive sentences,according to non-cognitivist,express mental state which are representational and non-motivational,while moral sentences express non-representational and motivational states.Non-cognitivism has attracted many naturalistically inclined philosophers for its ability to explain many of the distinctive features of moral discourse and moral thought,without adding entities to our ontology that are metaphysically and epistemologically problematic,In this way,non-cognitivism promises to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary moral(normative)practice within a naturalistic world-view,without giving up on any of its distinctive features.Despite its benefits,non-cognitivism also faces significant problems.While one of these problems,the Frege-Geach problem,has attracted a lot of attention,there are several other problems that have not been sufficiently addressed by non-cognitivists.Given that the reasonable assumption that the plausibility of philosophical theories needs to be assessed holistically,it seems that one should pay attention to these problems to be able to assess non-cognitivism's overall plausibility.This thesis will focus on five problems faced by non-cognitivism,and whether non-cognitivist can solve these problems.First,whether or not non-cognitivism can solve the Wishful Thinking Problem,namely whether or not non-cognitivism can explain the reasonableness of valid moral modus ponens?I think that the answer is yes,but on the premise that non-cognitivism can solve the Frege-Geach problem.This means that if non-cognitivism can solve the Frege-Geach problem,then it also can solve the wishful thinking problem,and it can explain the reasonableness of valid moral modus ponens.Therefore,the wishful thinking problem is not independent of the Frege-Geach problem,and the former does not constitute a separate and decisive refutation of non-cognitivism;on the contrary,the wishful thinking problem is associated with the Frege-Geach problem,or in other words,the wishful thinking problem is the continuation of the Frege-Geach problem.Second,whether or not the claim of "motivational judgment internalism" is true,or whether the reasons we thought which support non-cognitivism really exist?I argue that motivational judgment internalism is not a correct view,thereby the reasons for supporting non-cognitivism are not as many as non-cognitivist thought.The motivational judgment internalism claims that moral judgment itself contains motivation.That is,if a person makes a moral judgment,then she is motivated to do the thing which is required by the moral judgment.If the moral judgment can promote action without any additional conative attitude,it seems that the moral judgment(at least partly)is constituted by conative state.It seems that non-cognitivism is correct.I argue that the motivation judgment internalism is wrong.the phenomenon of moral indifference is its counterexample:the morally indifferent makes moral judgment without any corresponding motives.Therefore,there is no internal connection between moral judgment and moral motivation.Motivational externalism is the best explanation to normal people's moral motivation.In short,the reason for supporting non-cognitivism is not as many as they are usually supposed to be.Third,whether or not non-cognitivism can explain the moral mind-independence?A central feature of ordinary moral thought is moral judgment is mind-independent:judging something to be morally wrong does not thereby make it morally wrong.To deny this would be accepting a form of subjectivism.Non-cognitivism is considered to be conflict with the above characteristics of moral thinking,so some people questioned the viability of non-cognitivism.A few people who advocate non-cognitivism made some replies to this.I argue that non-cognitivist cannot explain the moral mind-independence entirely.On the one hand,the internal reading of mind-independence is inconsistent with the conceptual identity of mind-independence;on the other hand,the external reading can guarantee the independence of moral judgment,but it would be in tension with non-cognitivist's semantics.Forth,whether or not non-cognitivism can account for a feature that accompany moral judgment---fundamental moral uncertainty?I argue that the answer is yes.Moral certitude(moral uncertainty),no matter fundamental morally uncertain or derivative morally uncertain,is not a feature of moral judgment.The derivative uncertainty is uncertainty about experience which need not any explanation,and the fundamental moral uncertainty is best understood as classificatory uncertainty.Since(1)the psychological factors behind fundamental moral uncertainty are analogous to the factors behind fundamental uncertainty regarding descriptive,non-moral,matters,and(2)fundamental descriptive uncertainty is naturally understood as classificatory uncertainty.Fifth,whether or not non-cognitivism is compatible with truth-apt minimalism?According to non-cognitivism,moral judgment does not express belief about moral facts.According to minimalism,however,moral judgment is propositionally clothed,and therefore expresses moral belief.It seems that non-cognitivism is not compatible with minimalism.I argue that this view is not correct,and non-cognitivism and minimalism are not incompatible.The best way to illustrate that they are not incompatible is to distinguish between two different beliefs.One of them is minimal belief,and the other is robust sense of belief.A minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R.If this distinction is correct,then non-cognitivism and minimalism are not incompatible,and it is not possible to prove that non-cognitivism is wrong by supporting truth-apt minimalism.This thesis discusses five problems that I think are important,and provides corresponding solutions to the problems.The purpose is to find out that whether the non-cognitivism is feasible,or how it can become a promising semantic theory for moral sentences.I hope that even if it does not enable everyone to draw a conclusion on whether non-cognitivism is a promising theory,it can at least provide a clear and consistent background for a shared understanding of non-cognitivism.