| A resurgence of panpsychism in present-day philosophy of mind—the trend which is not wholly grounded in its own systems of theories or historical heritages.Nowadays many philosophers-scientists are keen on panpsychic doctrines,and even embrace certain kinds of panpsychism.The main reason is:Panpsychism as an ontology of mind-nature continuity,which could possibly become a foundation of a new discipline of science—consciousness science.Panpsychism is the view of mind-within-nature.To the defenders,panpsychism precedes other approaches to the mind-body relations conceptually and could deal with the relationship of nature and mind more coherently.And accordingly,the related problems of panpsychism are concerned and re-explored by scholars at present."The combination problem of panpsychism" is recognized as the hardest problem for any sort of panpsychic view.For any view of panpsychism,as it admits the mental composition thesis—mind is compositional,or mind exists whole-parts relationships(in the sense of mereology)—then it must face the possibility and actuality of mental composition;i.e.,a mind as a "whole" is composed of its "mental parts" within nature spatio-temporally.And panpsychists need present constitutive explanations of mind to defend this thesis and apply the projects to both realms—metaphysics of mind and science of mind(consciousness science).The mental composition thesis,in my view,first of all has been conceptual,and it also needs supports and confirmations from scientific evidences.Then the argument comes in two parts based on this point of view.Part I aims at clarifying basic metaphysical concepts related with mental composition and attempts to illuminate the possibility and actuality of mental composition.In the end,the resulting configuration depends on "principle of process"of mental composition(chapter 4).Summarizing,the argument goes as follows:(1)ontological commitment of panpsychism ?(2)common sense inquiry ?(3)individuation ?(4)mental composition ?(5)mental parts.The points:(1)All the problems of panpsychism(including the combination problem),however,begins with ontological commitment of panpsychism;the commitment:each actual entity has its own mind.(2)Then,panpsychic theories should reasonably respond to each ordinary object instantiated whether it has a mind,or not.These ordinary objects include:an atom,a rock,a phone,a cat,a person,etc.In my phraseology,this is the "common sense inquiry" by the folks.(3)Next,the specific procedure of judging ordinary objects as particulars whether have minds("the common sense inquiry"),can be further attributed to principle of individuation of mind.Suppose"pre-individual",a process of individuation is identical to a process of becoming from pre-individual to individual,thus,individuation(process)=(pre-individual ?individual);suppose "pre-mind",then the individualizing process of a mind is identical to a process of becoming from pre-mind to mind,thus,a mind(process)=(pre-mind? mind).(4)By resorting to basic concepts of contemporary metaphysics(including individuation,composition,constitution,mereology,temporality,etc.),chapter 3 attempts to revise the special combination problem(within panpsychic theories)to a generalized version.As a result,the core of the combination problem is the mental composition thesis.And in my view,as for the intractability of the combination problem,the main reason is:The dominant substance theory of mind in history rejects mind has"mental parts".(mind has no parts;thus,mental composition is meaningless.)(5)By resorting to processual analysis of mental composition,chapter 4 turns to diachronicity of mental composition instead of synchronic ones,and correspondingly,turns to process view of mind instead of substance ones conceptually.My view is that mental composition is possible.The individualized process of(a)mind,essentially exists a constitutive process.The presumed "mental parts"of(a)mind,which can be reasonably regarded as the temporal parts of this mind.On the possibility(and actuality)of mental composition:? propose a principle of process—what a mind is is constituted by its temporally mental parts.Part ? seeks supports and confirmations from scientific evidences(chapter 5).The main work is:(1)initial design of preconsciousness-consciousness conceptual framework;(2)constitutive-mechanistic explanation of consciousness science.As for the conceptual framework,I try to combine panpsychic theories with recent results from brain science,eventually propose consciousness as a process(preconsciousness?consciousness)at least has four mental parts:proto-consciousness,pre-phenomenal consciousness,phenomenal consciousness,and cognitive consciousness;the latter three mental parts even correspond with certain brain states of neural systems.As for the constitutive-mechanistic explanation,I introduce constitutive explanations from related disciplines(biology,brain science),and try to put constitutive explanations of mind into construction of consciousness theories.Any adequate approach to constitutive-mechanistic explanation of consciousness(science)which must satisfy three basic criteria:mental composition;constitutive-causal conceptual distinction;descriptive adequacy of consciousness.I end with the "Conclusion" on summarizing the significance of mental composition and reflecting the nature of consciousness.Conceptually,I accept a process view of mind,and reject the substance ones.On the nature of consciousness,by means of Bergson-Whitehead process philosophy,a processual view of consciousness outlines as follows:(1)Consciousness does have epistemological priority,and does not have ontological priority;(2)the "phenomenon" appeared in the contents of consciousness,which as the primary characteristic marks the existence of consciousness,does not have ontological priority;(3)the whole process of the genesis of consciousness within nature,however,is "traceable".Consciousness(at higher phases)still remains mental parts of the earlier phases. |
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