Research On Mechanism And Consequences Of Inspection Policy Restraning Officials Corruption

Because of imperfection in the construction of supporting system,the mechanism of fair competition and protection of property rights,various kinds of corruption happen occasionally in China.Especially,reports of corruption among executives of state-owned enterprises have been rife.Executive corruption can make the large amount of enterprise assets to be embezzled by individuals,resulting in the loss of enterprise assets,falling into financial distress and damaging the long-term development of the enterprise.From 2013 to 2015,central inspection group's inspection of central enterprises launched from pilot to the full path,and completed the inspection of central government enterprises.This provides a good point cut for us to verify the influence of inspection system on corruption in theory.This paper mainly studies the following problems.1.Can the inspection system play a role in inhibiting the corruption of the senior executives of central enterprises?2.As the key work of the inspection system,what role does internal control mechanism play between the inspection system and executive corruption?3,Under the inspection system,what are the economic consequences of the governance of executive corruption?Based on the framework of "theory summary-current analysis-empirical analysis-policy suggestion",this paper studies the above questions.Firstly,starting from the background of China's system,this paper introduces the problems that need to be discussed,summarizes the development history of the tour system,and analyzes the current situation of the inspection system,internal control and executive corruption.Secondly,this paper empirically studies the relationship between the inspection system and executive corruption,as well as the role of internal control plays between the two,and the economic consequences of executive corruption.The study findings include:the inspection system can restrain the corrupt behavior of senior executives,internal control plays the role of monitor between the both,and the alleviation of the executive corruption can improve the investment efficiency and the operation performance of central enterprises.Lastly,this paper puts forward policy suggestions based on the research conclusions.The innovation points of this paper are as follows:1.As an important institutional arrangement to promote anti-corruption,the establishment of the inspection system has become a hot issue in political science,public administration and history.However,there is not much research,and no empirical study yet.The research of this paper makes up the gap of related research and provides empirical evidence for the existing theoretical research.2.Combined with the actual implementation of the the inspection system in central enterprises,this paper adds internal control into the relationship between inspection system and corruption of senior executives,trying to find the mechanism among them,which makes up the blank between the both and provides valuable suggestions on how to further play role of the internal control mechanism in the work of the inspection system.3.This paper enriches and deepens the study about the economic consequences of executive corruption,studies the impact of corruption on investment efficiency and performance of state-owned enterprises from the micro perspective,which provides evidences to support the ongoing anti-corruption work in China and also provides policy suggestions to solve the problem about inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises.