Corruption In The Process Of China's Economic Growth:Types,Consequences And Countermeasures

Since the reform and opening up,China's economy has experienced decades of rapid growth,but also accompanied by a more prominent corruption problem.Firstly,this dissertation analyses the main types of corruption in China since the founding of the People's Republic of China,especially at the present stage,and then explores its causes in the light of China's economic growth model.Then,taking enterprise innovation and mining disaster as examples,this dissertation explores the economic and social consequences of corruption in China.Finally,this dissertation attempts to take the discipline commission system as an example to explore possible ways of corruption governance.Firstly,this dissertation divides the history of our country since the founding into three stages:the planned economy period,the early stage of reform and opening up and the present stage.The problem of corruption in China is not serious in the planned economy period.In the early stage of reform and opening up,the price difference under the dual-track system,the unequal access to resources and opportunities of all sectors of society,together with the imperfection of laws and regulations,led to the proliferation of corruption.At this stage,the main types of corruption existing in the early stage of reform and opening up have gradually disappeared,replaced by new types of corruption.From 2013 to 2018,more than 1400 different levels of cadres were investigated and punished for violation of discipline.The results of the announcement and trial showed that land development,enterprise management,project contracting and project approval were the main areas of corruption at this stage.Compared with the early stage of reform and opening up,the number of corruption cases increases and the amount involved in the cases increases.By comparing the types of corruption between China and the West,we can find that the fundamental difference between the two is that our government is development-oriented,while the governments of the developed countries are service-oriented,which is mainly responsible for providing public services.Therefore,in the western developed countries,the types of corruption correspond to the public service functions of the government.Compared with this,because our government has more development functions,there are not only corruption types corresponding to public service functions,but also corruption types corresponding to development functions.Secondly,In theory,there has always been a controversy between "lubricant" and "stumbling block" about the relationship between corruption and economic growth.In practice,some countries represented by China have experienced coexistence of high-speed economic growth and frequent corruption for a long time.This paper finds that the coexistence of high growth and high corruption is mainly due to the fact that in the process of promoting economic growth,local governments are eager to seize the dominance of economic growth.The key measures for local governments to dominate economic growth are to control the supply of production factors such as land,build infrastructure,improve investment services,provide policy preferences and mobilize civil servants to attract investment.These key initiatives have also been accompanied by corruption in such areas as land development,engineering construction and planning approval,enterprise management and abuse of public funds.In the model analysis,the government's public expenditure is divided into investment-oriented public expenditure and consumption-oriented public expenditure.Among them,investment-oriented public expenditure and private capital play a role in the production function of enterprises.If officials can invest the illegal income from corruption into capital accumulation,then corruption can play a positive role in economic growth when the coefficients meet certain conditions.Furthermore,considering that officials adjust the structure of public expenditure dynamically according to the degree of corruption of investment-oriented public expenditure and consumption-oriented public expenditure,the economic growth rate is an inverted U-shaped curve of corruption level.Subsequent empirical studies also confirm this point.At the same time,the role of corruption in promoting economic growth is achieved by expanding investment When the government-led investment-driven growth model can no longer effectively promote economic growth,the role of corruption in promoting economic growth will also be weakenedThirdly,economic growth is only one aspect of social progress,and the social cost of economic growth must also be paid enough attention.Taking the mine disaster as an example,this dissertation discusses the social losses caused by corruption in the process of economic growth.China is a big coal-producing country,but the mortality rate of mine accidents has remained high for a long time.To solve this problem,the existing explanations are mainly based on the level of production equipment,the level of personnel training and the arrangement of property rights system.This dissertation holds that corruption is an important factor leading to frequent mine accidents.Combining with model analysis and empirical test,it is found that corruption has significantly increased the rate of mine accidents.As a microcosm of the three major social problems of "production safety","food safety" and "environmental safety" facing China at present,the problem of mine disaster reflects the intensified incentive effect of corruption on officials'acquiescence to enterprises' choice of low safety standards and high negative externalities under the performance appraisal system dominated by economic growth.In order to solve the three major security problems and reduce the social costs incurred in economic growth,we must abandon the extensive development model.The key to solve the problem is to break down the soil formed by the collusion of officials and businessmen to form a self-reinforcing chain by combating corruption in related industries.Finally,under the existing economic development model and government governance structure,it is possible to improve the effectiveness of corruption governance by breaking the interest alliance formed between local governments and enterprises through a certain system design and improving the anti-corruption function of local governments.Specifically,the system of transfer of officials from different places helps to break the local government-enterprise collusion,while improving the political status of anti-corruption departments and anti-corruption officials is conducive to alleviating the neglect of anti-corruption work and the indulgence of corruption due to the overemphasis on development functions.In China,the Secretary of the Discipline Commission plays an important role in the anti-corruption work.This dissertation examines the influence of the transfer system and the change of political status of the Secretary of the Discipline Commission on corruption governance in order to break the local interest alliance and improve the importance of anti-corruption functions.Based on provincial panel data and empirical analysis using double difference method,it is found that the anti-corruption performance of the seconded disciplines committee secretary and the seconded disciplines committee secretary with high political status is better,which confirms the above inference.The possible innovations of this dissertation include the following aspects.Firstly,this study systematically sorted out and distinguished the main types of corruption and their causes in the three periods of "planned economy period","the early stage of reform and opening up" and "the present stage".In particular,the corruption of more than 1400 cadres violating discipline has been sorted out and analyzed,which provides a supplement for the study of the history and current situation of corruption in China.At the same time,this dissertation examines the causes of corruption in the light of China's economic development model,and holds that the government-led economic growth model is the core cause of most corruption problems in China at this stage,and also the particularity of corruption problems in China.Secondly,this dissertation takes corruption as an example to examine the economic and social consequences of corruption on the economic growth and the occurrence of mining disasters,which is conducive to a comprehensive view of the three roles of corruption:lubricant,grasping hand and destructive hand.The study on the relationship between corruption and coal production safety can provide a footnote for explaining that China's economic growth model has both advantages of promoting high-speed economic growth and disadvantages accompanied by high social costs.Thirdly,under the current governance structure in China,more empirical studies are needed to discuss the impact of anti-corruption institutions and anti-corruption system design on the effectiveness of corruption governance.This dissertation introduces two institutional factors of anti-corruption cadres'different posts and political status,and comprehensively considers their impact on anti-corruption performance.The research conclusion has certain practical significance for the practice of corruption control in China today.