| Industrial relations are the most basic and important social relationship in the industrial society.Throughout the course of the establishment of the "Great society" in the western countries in the 200 years,we can get the conclusion that if the industrial relations are unstable and unharmonious,it’ll be impossible for a country to reach the level that "with the popularity of general prosperity of the people in the lowest lever of the society" and keep the society in harmony.Since the Third Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party in 1978,it has been in the excess of 30 years for China to make the transition from the system of planned economy to that of market economy.After the course of transition and the institutional change for more than 30 years,planned economics system has remained only residual and the socialist market economic system has been basically established.To adapt to it,Industrial relations,serving as the fundamental economic relationships in the industrial society,have Completed Market-oriented transformation preliminary.As the transition of Chinese system deepens,labor conflicts are becoming more and more key factors which restrict economic development of China and the social harmony.What is the incentive of the labor conflicts in China in the transitional period?What are the conflicting versions and what’s the mechanism of action?How to take efficient measures to realize the cooperative common win between the labor and the capital in view of the system characteristics of China in the transitional period?Taking the industrial relations in Chinese private companies in the transitional period as research object,considering the theoretical perspective of incomplete contract,in the way of the construction of game model combining with comparative institutional analysis,this paper deeply analyses the motive,performance,endogenous system mechanism and the influence on the development of economy and society of the labor conflicts in Chinese private companies.Also,on the basis of comparing and referring the industrial relations adjustment in the USA,Germany,Japan,Russia and so on,this paper puts forward policy recommendations on the construction of collaboration between labor and capital system in Chinese private companies in the empress financial crisis ages.This Paper Indicates:1.Industrial relations are the contractual relations which have strong incomplete contract properties.The essence of the conflicts and cooperation between the labor and the capital is whether both sides fulfill the obligation on the contract under the circumstances of incomplete contracts.2.Transforming from administrative subordinating relation to market contract relation,is the essential approach to the transition of Chinese industrial relations.As the institutional transition deepens,the dominant cooperation between the labor and the capital as well as the industrial relations of the recessive conflicts under the traditional planned economy system,have turned into dominant conflicts inch by inch.In this process,industrial relations pattern of "strong capital-weak labor",diversification and complication of industrial relations,also the conflict of normal within this framework have become the basic characteristics of the game between the labor and the capital in China during the transition period.3.Naturally the bounded rationality,transaction cost and opportunist exist in the real society are based on the incomplete information conditions.Thus it makes every contract incomplete.Labor contract is not exceptional.Meanwhile,the human capital has the natural features—inseparability with the owners,lurk and exclusivity—which make the manifestation external and the intrinsic incentive mechanism of the incomplete labor contract have some special features that other trade contracts haven’t,that is,the nature of the human capital decides that the user of human capital must respect their owner.Once the right of the human capital property is damaged,the values will immediately be devalued or all go.Therefore,the values of the human capital cannot be oppressed but encouraged,which is not only the logical beginning of the research of labor-management cooperation mechanism,but also the aim of its establishment.The incomplete contract shows a series of problems such as the insufficiency of the relationship-specific investment between the labor and management,the adverse selection during the process of labor-management cooperation and the double risks of morality,which influence the allocative efficiency of resources and the residual output of labor-management cooperation.Thus,in the process of signing a treaty and enforcement of the labor contract,the prior well-designed mechanism may lose effectiveness after the event,which is based on the theoretic incomplete contract.The party should sign a simple contract in advance,and then negotiate.This shows two enforcement mechanisms:one is based on the third-party enforcement mechanism(such as court,government or intermediaries);the other is the self-enforcement mechanism through the combination of relational contract and long-term contract as well as implicit contract.4.Under the condition of "strong capital-weak labor" pattern basically shaped,Chinese labor and management can overcome the latent defect of the incomplete contract.make labor-management cooperation and carve up the cooperative surplus through the repetition of game theory based on the relation contract in the transition period.With the deepening of such kind of cooperation,it will transform the labor contract from the relation contract to the implicit one,insiders’ governance structure to inner labor market.And it’ll bring about long-term stability of employment relationship,effective inner incentive mechanism,specific human capital or skill,and a series of effectiveness and welfare of on-the-job training.With the expansion range of labor deal,the internal defects of such ways of labor-management cooperation which is based on relations gradually shine through.Relation contract makes the marginal cost with the strangers constantly expand because it excludes the formal legal governance framework.Meanwhile.the contracting party of the relation contract owns a particular "reputation capital" which devalues with the perfection of rule of law and expansion of market segments.So the insiders will send the old system into lock-in in an organized way of delaying and stopping any reform of industrial relation.Especially,there is vacuum land,which often brings about confusion and conflict of labor relation,on the critical point of transforming the relational contract into market contract.The middle degree of labor relation market development of one country is often the most dangerous and most subtle segment of its labor relation development.The analysis on Chinese labor-management cooperation mechanism in the transition period,which is based on the non-game model construction,shows that it’s hard to reach a balance of the labor-management cooperation under the condition of serious"strong-capital and weak-labor".The labor unrests in the post-financial crisis era,represented by the six Foxconn suicides and strikes in the Honda in the South China Sea and development zone in Dalian,which mark that the contradiction between the labor and capital is becoming one of the principal contradictions through 30 years of reform and opening up as well as gestation and development of market economy.A larger scale of contradiction between labor and capital and labor movement is around the corner.If there’s no coordination from the third-party enforcement,such as government and labor union at that moment,the contradiction between labor and capital will evolve into fierce unconventional conflict.5.We can come to a conclusion that every successful economic development model has an industrial relation management model which adapts to the characteristics of its nation’s systems throughout the course of establishing the labor-management cooperation mechanism of the western countries with mature market economy during the past 200 years and a harmonious and cooperative industrial relation is the key point of national economic development.We can see clearly that America.Germany,Japan and Russia make valuable explorations about the enforcement mechanism and what they could do are all in the terms of their current situation based on their own situation from the theoretic visual angle of the incomplete contract.The great advantages between of rule of law and contract make American industrial relation management develop towards relatively equal rights and balances of power between labor and management in order to achieve justice and efficiency of the labor market free competition.Faced with the reality of incomplete labor and capital pact,and the dysfunction of their labor market,Germany establishes coordinative industrial relation through the co-governance of labor-management within the enterprises and coordination outside the enterprises,and assisted by the construction of social security system.Japan solves the problems of incomplete labor-capital contract by the way of long-term contract of the internal labor market.Russia has set specific objectives about transformation of industrial relations.But the relative deficiencies of rule of law.especially the relative lag of judiciary,make the industrial relation in the condition of fierce confrontation between labor and capital.Russia chooses to solve and ease such inefficient state by the way of external balances of benefit through fighting against the financial giants and increasing inputs to people’s livelihood.The research and comparison of industrial relation practice of management about global typical countries plays a very important role in the establishment of Chinese labor-management mechanism during the fierce transition period,that is,the establishment of labor-management cooperation mechanism is closely linked with the spirit of rule of law and contract."The most important feature of the transformation lacks in constitutional order and the rule of law."(Yang Xiaokai,1999)The logical starting point of establishment of Chinese labor-management cooperation mechanism lies in admitting signing right of freedom between labor and management through the transition of rule of law and constitutionalism to make relative equality of rights and balanced power between labor and management,and changing Chinese current basic pattern of"strong-capital and weak-labor".People should increase the development of the social security system and fundamentally provide a place to settle down and get on with the labors’ pursuit in order to make them become the relief valve of the entire society.Establish and perfect the long-term labor contract mechanism to change the current situation that the short-term of industrial relation which,have brought about the efficiency loss in China.It is absolutely necessary of the function that collective negotiation system based on the labor union establishes the labor-management mechanism.A relatively independent labor union has great influence on Chinese industrial relation in the future.A government with relatively neutral profit plays a dominant role in establishing the labor-management cooperation mechanism,especially in the balance of interests.6.The establishment of Chinese labor-management cooperation mechanism growth should be accompanied by the course of market-oriented reform.It is restricted by the special Chinese politics,economy and social environment;however,there is high path to be depended during the transitional course of establishment.The labor-management cooperation mechanism that the "subject negotiating on its own is of primary importance,the proper regulation of the government is the secondary" at the beginning of reform and opening up doesn’t realize,which is influenced by integrated factors,such as holding political constrains,employment pressure and Chinese economic development model of"high-investment,high-growth,high-exports and low-wages".The labor-management interests’ intervention model that "government leading" is as logic becomes the only choice that can continue up to now in Chinese current political and economic environment.But the intentional logic of this kind of model is inconsistent with the connotation of the industrial relation after the transitions of market economy,which make the operational performance of the labor-management cooperation mechanism,have defects in practice."China has never established a real collective negotiation system"(Yang Lin,2010).At the same time,the operation of labor-management cooperation is of fatigue.The labor and management contradiction will happen frequently in China,and now the current mechanism needs to be improved urgently.The relative equality of right and relative balance of negotiation power are the key elements between the labor and management of one country from conflict to cooperation,the root of Chinese labor and management conciliating conflicts in the furious social transition period,and the main axle in policy to establish labor-management cooperation mechanism.Optimizing the information release mechanism of labor market,perfecting the labor social security system,inclusive growth and salary administration of profit sharing have become the necessary choice during the course of Chinese labor-management cooperation mechanism.Meanwhile,the perfection of legislation and enforcement of law in the labor field,especially the control and innovation of government labor relation and the reform of the third-enforcement coordination mechanism taking the labor union as the centre,have become the preferred choice of Chinese labor-management cooperation mechanism in the post-financial era in accordance with the specialty of Chinese system during the transitional period. |
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