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Research On The Incomplete Contract Relationship Between Universities And Students

Posted on:2011-06-25Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:K K ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2167360302497500Subject:Educational Economy and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
University of organizational attributes and determine the nature of the relevant contract between the main series of game behavior and their internal complexity of economic relations. College students are the core stakeholders, between students and university education and teaching the game to work directly affects the effective start. But on the important economic relationship is far different in the doctrinal statement is not clear, leading to a lot of unexplained or difficult to deal with educational issues. The real property and lease the organization to explain precisely the dynamic nature of new institutional economics. Therefore, based on new institutional economics perspective on the economic relationship between universities and students that education economists need a new subject of research with theoretical and practical value.Contractual nature of universities, students as consumers and prompted an initial client contract with both the impulse to be contract. Choose between them with each other or the transaction is a follow the principle of comparative advantage and there is a specific contract process. The contract is an objective existence, that is a bridge between knowledge and tuition to add value both of resources for the purpose of dynamic process. Between the university and students, however, the full contractual relationship can not be realized, more performance for the content and implementation of the incomplete, and often other than the market system, for a more incomplete contract too, which is essentially a contract did not fully state-dependent. The main essence of higher education services brought from bounded rationality, external and internal aspects of university information asymmetry, transaction costs of maximizing behavior, and incomplete contract on the universities and the agent itself can force the need for adaptation and so on.Thus, the university and students do not complete the contractual relationship there are two situations:the objective and subjective and incomplete contracts incomplete contract. Objective is usually incomplete contract will bring a negative economic impact, mainly human capital investment choices for students when adverse selection, moral hazard with hidden actions and based on specific acts of extortion and other opportunistic; and subjective incomplete contract can reduce the impact of opportunism, thus enhancing the adaptability of university organization. Educational practice, this is not an absolute separation of two incomplete, often intertwined. So, what to universities and students to maintain the contractual relationship to what extent incomplete, ultimately depends on the contracting parties on the costs and benefits incurred in the balance.College students do not complete the contractual relationship with the nature and impact of the implementation makes the contract, which is support the system become very important later. Williamson's contract-based scheme plans, universiti es and students will choose to minimize the transaction costs of contractual relationship, determines the long-term contracts to some extent, informal and covert. Self-performance of contract in the relationship played an important role, its implementation mechanism of cooperation and threat often, communication and strategy. Universities and students although a contract is not complete objectivity, but its full extent is still important, and effective arrangements can improve the contractual right to the full extent. This requires the introduction of the client-the students break the budget balance, using the body or bodies of incentive to eliminate the school punish the opportunistic behavior of agents. Thus achieving a stronger contractual agency relationship.
Keywords/Search Tags:students, incomplete contract, transaction costs, opportunism, university governance
PDF Full Text Request
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