Traceable Information Sharing Mechanism For Key Segments Of Food Supply Chain

In recent years,food safety incidents have occurred continuously in our country,and food safety problems have aroused widespread concern from the society.From economic perspective,information asymmetry in food supply chain counts as the underlying cause of food safety incidents.How to eliminate the information asymmetry in the food supply chain to effectively solve the food safety problem is a major issue faced by the society.Food traceability system is one of the critical means to ensure food safety by providing consumers with the information of food quality and safety.Accordingly,to eliminate the information asymmetry in the food supply chain,it is of huge theoretical and practical significance to studying the problem of traceability information sharing in the food supply chain.By summarizing the results of research on food supply chain information management,this study aims to share the information sharing in accordance with the evolutionary game theory,differential game theory,government regulation theory and information economics theory,and to study on the mechanism of traceability information sharing in key segments of food supply chain.This study is primarily organized as follows:to clarify the current situation of food traceability information sharing,and to understand the problems in traceability information sharing.This study,under the market mechanism and the government regulation mechanism,builds the traceability information sharing evolutionary game model of agricultural producers and food processing enterprises,and analyzes the factor impacting the behavior of enterprises sharing traceability information.The differential game model of traceability information sharing between agricultural producers and food processing enterprises under different models is built.The respective income and total income of traceability information sharing are studied,and the distribution of profits is discussed under centralized decision mode.The three-party game model of government supervision departments,agricultural producers and food processing enterprises is built,and the strategic choice of these three participants in different situations is studied.Based on the microcosmic data acquired from field research,the traceability information of consumer preference is studied in the aspect of amount and content of information.The major conclusions of this study are drawn as folows:(1)The food traceability label of our country primarily comprises basic information that is distinct from each other.(2)Government subsidies can effectively make the agricultural producers and food processing enterprises more willing to share traceability information.(3)The centralized decision-making model can increase the income of the particpants in the food supply chain more effectively.(4)By introducing a third party and other social supervision,the government supervision department can guide the enterprises to share the real traceability information.(5)There are differences in consumers' preference and between the type and content of traceability information shared by enterprises.Therefore,this study believes that the sharing of traceability information in key segments of food supply chain should be based on the establishment of a reasonable cost sharing mechanism of the traceability system,the establishment of the vertical cooperation mechanism of participants in the traceability information sharing in the food supply chain,the supervision of the enterprises that share the traceability information timely,the establishment of the cooperative supervision mode,the improvement of the traceability standard of different types of food,and the development of traceability information sharing strategies to meet consumers' preferences.The features and innovations of this study are as follows:(1)Given the difference of the content of traceability information shared by enterprises in different segments and the different impacts of government supervision behavior on the information sharing of“true and false" among enterprises in different segments,this study explores the regulatory mechanism of“true and false" traceability information sharing.(2)The analysis of the overall profits and respective profits of the food supply chain participants in the decentralized decision-making mode,the agricultural producer-led cost sharing model,the food processing enterprise-led cost-sharing model and the centralized decision-making model,and the explication of the partic ipation mode of traceability information sharing in the key links of food supply chain.(3)Based on the current situation of enterprises sharing traceability information to consumers,obtaining consumers' preference for different types of traceability information and content preference is obtained,and the strategy of type and content sharing of enterprise traceability information is proposed.