Research On Problem Of Governance Effect Caused By The Mixed Ownership Reform In Chinese State-owned Enterprises

The governance issues of state-owned enterprise(SOEs)has always become a social focus.Under the background of economic transformation,the Mixed Ownership Reform has quickly become the emphasis and highlight in the field of SOEs reform and corporate governance.As the development direction and path of SOEs deepening reform,the Mixed Ownership Reform had been put forward in the third session of the thirteenth central committee of the CPC in November,2017.In 2015,the State Council repeatedly stressed in a series of documents on SOEs reform that it hoped to improve its corporate governance structure and improve the efficiency of SOEs through "the mixed ownership reform".In December 2016,the Central Economic Work Conference proposed that the mixed ownership reform is an important breakthrough in the reform of SOEs.In October 2017,the CPC Central Committee once again emphasized the policy of "deepening the reform of SOEs,developing a mixed ownership economy and fostering a world-class enterprise with global competitiveness"in its 19th report.All of these show that the mixed ownership reform will have a significant impact on SOEs.Therefore,this paper argues that paying attention to the follow-up effect of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs from a financial perspective has unique theoretical significance and important practical value.The current academic who research on the reform of mixed ownership focuses on macroeconomic theory.In fact,the macro-level hybrid ownership reform to the micro-level,which is the problem of optimization of ownership structure.So this dissertation systematically analyzes the mechanism of governance effect,which takes the ownership structure change of the state-owned enterprises in the mixed ownership reform as a starting point.According the point of Jensen&Meckling(1976),this paper argues that the governance effects of the mixed ownership reform in state-owned enterprises are mainly reflected in three aspects:agency costs,R&D investment and corporate performance.At the same time,it empirically tests the effect of the reform on the agency costs,R&D investment and corporate performance,and further reveal the inherent logic among three influence.The main research contents are as follows:Theoretically,under the guidance of Marxist economic theory and using the theory of property rights,institutional change and corporate governance theory,the article analyzes corporate governance effect on the agency costs,R&D investment behavior and firm performance caused by the mixed ownership reform of SOEs step by step.This paper holds that the change of ownership structure is a breakthrough in the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs.The mixed ownership reform in SOEs alleviates the agency conflicts among shareholders,managers and shareholders through the mix of ownership structure,which affects the R&D investment of SOEs simultaneously,so as to improve the performance of SOEs and enhance their production efficiency.Specifically,this paper first analyzes the mechanism of two types of agency costs in SOEs mixed ownership reform.This mechanism shows that the mixed ownership structure can provide better supervision and incentive mechanism for SOEs so as to ease the conflict between the two types of agency.During the reform of mixed ownership,SOEs have introduced different non-state-owned shareholders.Such as non-state-owned corporate shareholders,foreign shareholders,institutional shareholders and personal shareholders.They get the right of residual income according to the proportion of equity.For their own interests,non-state shareholders have a strong incentive and ability to participate in the company's operating activities,which can have a positive effect on the internal governance structure of SOEs and improve their management efficiency.And the greater the heterogeneity of shareholders,the higher the possibility of supervising the management,which is more conducive to reducing management chances,thus reducing the first type of agency costs between shareholders and management.In addition,in the mixed ownership structure of SOEs,there will be some checks and balances between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders.According to the theory of equity balance,the proper checks and balances will have a positive impact on the corporate governance structure and governance behavior,which then alleviate the second type of agency conflict among the shareholders of the company.Secondly,it analyzes the mechanism of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs in R&D investment.The mechanism shows that agency costs affect the firm's R&D investment decisions and efficiency.In the absence of effective supervision and incentive mechanisms,SOEs managers should reduce their commitment to R&D investment because of enjoying a comfortable life.The mixed structure of ownership structure in SOEs can reduce the high agency costs and high contractual costs required for the R&D activities of enterprises.The manifestation is that the cross-shareholding between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders can strengthen the restraint mechanism for managers in SOEs,which help to lower the self-interest of managers caused by agency problems,and effectively reinforce managers' choices of the willingness that are risky and challenging,so as to carry out more valuable R&D investment activities.On the other hand,the restrictive conditions for implementing R&D projects have become more demanding in the mixed ownership structure of SOEs.Equity arrangements in which state-owned shareholders and non-state shareholders check and balance each other reduce the likelihood of non-value R&D investment projects being adopted,while increase the likelihood that valuable R&D investment projects will be rejected.Finally,this paper theoretically analyzes the mechanism of SOEs mixed ownership reform effect in corporate performance.This paper argues that the mixed ownership reform of SOEs can affect the performance through two routes:agency cost and R&D investment.One of them is that the mixed ownership reform of SOEs helps to reduce the cost of two types of agency,which improves the internal governance structure of the enterprise,and enhances the corporate performance.The other is the mixed ownership reform of SOEs eases the agency conflicts in the R&D investment of enterprises,stimulates the R&D encouragement investment,and finally improves the corporate performance.In summary,this paper proposes a theoretical framework for the governance of mixed ownership reform in state-owned enterprises(MCCP).Continuation of theoretical analysis of ideas,in the empirical level this paper introduced CSMAR,WIND and CCER database of Chinese listed companies financial statements data,while manually collected and sorted out the top ten shareholding structure and shareholder nature data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2015.We take the mixed ownership structure and the balance of hybrid ownership as the measurement of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs,and from the static perspective empirically test the governance effect of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs on the agency costs,R&D investment and corporate performance.This paper has arrived at the following conclusions:First,the change in ownership structure is a breakthrough in the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs.No matter in terms of the nature of equity or the proportion of equity,the mixed ownership reform has a significant impact on the ownership structure.The cross-shareholding of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital has changed the state of ownership of SOEs in a single dominant state.The non-state-owned shares of different nature give full play to the heterogeneity of equity and complement each other with state-owned equity,playing a positive effect on the governance structure of state-owned enterprises from different perspectives.Second,the mixed ownership reform of SOEs alleviates both types of agency problems to some extent.This paper analyzes the agency problem among the shareholders and the managers of the state-owned enterprises as well as between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders.The study finds that the introduction of non-state-owned equity can alleviate the first type of agency costs of shareholders and management and the second type of agency costs among shareholders.Under the control of other factors,the relationship between the balance of the hybrid equity and the cost of the two types of agency in the company shows the relationship of "U"first reducing and then increasing.Further,Using Hansen(1999)panel threshold model results show that the impact of the mixed equity checks on corporate agency costs will change as the proportion of state-owned equity changes in the threshold variable.Third,the mixed ownership reform of SOEs can promote the R&D investment of enterprises.This paper finds that the state-owned enterprises in the reform of mixed ownership,the introduction of non-state-owned equity has an encouraging effect on the intensity of R&D investment,and the impact of different non-state-owned equity on company performance is significantly different.Further analysis shows that hybrid equity checks and balances can also help to promote R&D investment.Fourth,the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has raised corporate performance and production efficiency.The results show that on the one hand,the introduction of non-state-owned equity in state-owned enterprises in the mixed ownership reform has a significant positive impact on the company's financial performance and market value,and the impact of non-state-owned equity of different nature on company performance is significantly different.On the other hand,the balance of the hybrid equity will also affect the company's performance.Especially the positive influence on the corporate performance of the mixed equity balance in the competitive industry SOEs group is more significant.Meantime,these findings reflect complementary effect in the relatively slow process of market-oriented areas.Fifth,the results of the group test in this paper demonstrate that the SOEs' mixed ownership reform can affect corporate performance through two routes:Agency costs and R&D investment.For monopoly industries,the improvement of corporate performance caused by the mixed ownership reform in SOEs is mainly due to the reduction of agency problems and the improvement of corporate governance structure.For competitive industries,it is the result of the mitigation of the conflict between the two types of agents and the consequent increase in R&D investment incentives.In order to better test the governance effect of mixed ownership reform in SOEs,this paper also uses the DID-PSM method to examine the impact of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs on R&D investment and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective.The results have not changed,which show that the mixed ownership reform of SOEs have a positive effect.The contributions of this paper lie in:First,this paper establishes a theoretical framework of the governance effect of the mixed ownership reform in SOEs.Using the property rights theory,principal-agent theory and financial theory together,this article systematically analyze the mechanism of the governance effect of the mixed ownership reform in SOEs,and further reveals the inherent logical relationship among the three governance effects of the agency costs,R&D investment and corporate performance.Second,this article enriches the related research on the economic consequences of the mixed ownership reform.The conclusion of this paper not only provides a new explanation for the governance effect of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of mixed multiple ownership structure,but also provides an empirical basis for the economic effect of the mixed ownership reform,which has important policy implications for further deepening the governance reform of state-owned enterprises.Third,Compared with the existing literature,this paper use the dynamic and static research methods,which has reduce the selective and endogenous problems in the empirical analysis.At the same time,Hansen's threshold regression model is adopted to test the influence of the mixed ownership reform on the agency costs.The change threshold of the mixed equity balance is further measured to provide empirical evidence for the setting of the proportion of non-state-owned equity in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.