Research On Reverse Supply Chain Operation Strategy Based On Fair Concern

Many traditional researches about reverse supply chain are based on fairness neutral.However,many behavioral research practitioners have found that behavioral factors,such as loss aversion,overconfidence,and fairness concerns,affect the decisions and operational strategies of companies in the supply chain through a large number of experiments.Therefore,this paper considers the factor of fairness concern and constructs the Stackelberg game model of manufacturers and recyclers in the reverse supply chain.It uses the game theory and simulation analysis to analyze the operation strategy and the contract coordination of the reverse supply chain in the case of fairness concern,which is based on the recyclable price and the optimized level of recycling efforts.And the paper researches the reverse supply chain decision in the case of enterprises with competition and dual fairness concerns.And analysis is carried out to verify the conclusions.The research content and related research results of this paper are as follows:(1)The paper analyzes the recyclable price optimization and contract coordination of reverse supply chain based on fairness concern.Firstly,the paper analyzes the optimization and coordination of the reverse supply chain based on fairness concern of recycler.The study shows that the manufacturer's recycling price increases and profits decline with the increase in fairness concerns of recyclers;the recycling price and recycling volume of recyclers remain unchanged,and utility increases.It also proves that the revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the reverse supply chain,and the cost-sharing contract realizes the simultaneous coordination of the recyclable price and the recovery amount of the reverse supply chain.Secondly,the paper analyzes the optimization and coordination of the reverse supply chain based on fairness concern of manufacturer.As manufacturers' fairness concern increases,recycling price and utility of manufacturer increase;For recycler,recovery prices and recycling volumes decrease,and their profits decline.It also proves that the revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the reverse supply chain,and the cost-sharing contract realizes the coordination of the reverse supply chain.Finally,the analysis about the above two different fairness concerns is made,the manufacturer is more sensitive to fairness concern than the recycler.(2)The paper analyzes the recyclable effort level optimization and contract coordination of reverse supply chain based on fairness concern of recyclers(or manufacturers).Firstly,the optimization and coordination of the reverse supply chain are studied based on fairness concern of recycler.In the three situations of fair neutrality,manufacturer's consideration of recycler fairness concerns,manufacturer's non-consideration of recycler fairness concerns,the conclusions show that the manufacturer's profit is the maximum in the case of fair neutrality;the utility of the recycler is greatest when the manufacturer considers the recycler's fairness concern.And for the manufacturer considering the recycler's fairness concern,the cost-sharing contract is used to coordinate the reverse supply chain.Secondly,the paper analyzes the optimization and coordination of the reverse supply chain based on the fair concern of manufacturer.In the three situations of fairness neutrality,recycler consideration of manufacturer fairness concerns,recycle contractor disregard of manufacturer fair concerns,the conclusions show that manufacturer's utility is greatest when the recycler does not consider the manufacturer's fairness concern;the profit of the recycler is the maximum when recycler is fair and neutral.And for the manufacturer considering the recycler's fair concern,the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the reverse supply chain.(3)The paper analyzes the decision making problem of reverse supply chain considering the competitive relationship of decision makers based on horizontal fairness concern and vertical fairness concern.Firstly,there is competition between manufacturers,the paper analyzes the decision problem of reverse supply chain based on horizontal fairness concern and vertical fairness concern of manufacturer.The conclusions show that based on horizontal fairness concern of manufacturer,the profit decreases and utility increases of the manufacturer which has fairness concern,the profit of the manufacturer decreases which has fairness neutral,the profits of recycler increase;Based on vertical fairness concern of manufacturer,the profit decreases and utility increases but not much increase of the manufacturer which has fairness concern,the profit of the manufacturer increase which has fairness neutral,the profits of recycler decrease;Secondly,there is competition between recyclers,the paper analyzes the decision problem of reverse supply chain based on horizontal fairness concern and vertical fairness concern of recycler.The conclusions show that based on horizontal fairness concern of recycler,the profit decreases and utility increases of the recycler which has fairness concern,the profit of the recycler increases which has fairness neutral,the profits of manufacturer increase;Based on vertical fairness concern of recycler,the profit and utility of the recycler increase which has fairness concern,the profit of the manufacturer increase which has fairness neutral,the profits of recycler decrease.(4)The paper analyzes operation strategies of the closed-loop supply chain based on double fairness concerns of the decision makers.Firstly,the paper analyzes the decision-making of reverse supply chain based on recycler's and manufacturer's fairness concerns.Conclusions show that there is a positive relationship between the manufacturer's utility and the fairness concern of the manufacturer;There is a negative relationship between the profit of the retailer and the level of fairness concern of the manufacturer;the utility of the recycler has a positive change in the level of fairness concern of the manufacturer and has a negative relationship with the fairness concern of the recycler.Secondly,the paper analyzes the decision-making of reverse supply chain based on retailer's and manufacturer's fairness concerns.Conclusions find that there is a positive relationship between the manufacturer's utility and the manufacturer's fairness concerns,and the retailer's utility is positively related to the retailer's fairness concerns.There is a negative relationship between the profits of recyclers and the fairness concern of manufacturer.Lastly,the paper analyzes the decision-making of reverse supply chain based on retailer's and recycler's fairness concerns.Conclusions show there is a positive relationship between the manufacturer's profit and the fairness concern of the retailer.There is a small negative change relationship with the fairness concern of the recycler;the retailer's utility has a positive change in the fair concern of the retailer,and the utility of the recycler has a positive change in the level of fair concern of the recycler.The innovations of this paper are:(1)Fairness concern is introduced into the reverse supply chain system composed of manufacturers and recyclers.The paper analyzes the influence of the change of fairness concern on the recovery price of the manufacturer,the recovery price of the recycler and the performance of the manufacturer under the two circumstances of the manufacturer's fairness concern and the fairness concern of the recycler,and compares the decision and performance of the manufacturers and the recyclers in the two cases,and discusses the effectiveness of the income sharing contract and the cost costing contract,which can coordinate the reverse supply chain.(2)In reverse supply chain,the competition relationship between manufacturers(or recyclers)is considered.The paper analyzes operation strategy of the reverse supply chain based on vertical fairness concern and horizontal fairness concern.(3)The factors of fairness concern are introduced into Closed loop supply chain system,the paper analyzes the relationship between the reverse supply chain and the manufacturer to the retailer,and studys the impact of dual fairness concerns on the decision and performance of the whole closed-loop supply chain.