Operation Strategy Of Service Supply Chain Based On Fairness Concerns

The research of the traditional service supply chain is mostly based on fairness neutral assumptions, but a lot of experiments from the behavior researcher show that: the behavioral factors such as fairness concerns will have an important impact on the decision of the decision-making body. In view of this, the paper considers the impact of fairness concerns, constructing the game model of service supply chain, and through using the methods of game theory, decision optimization, simulation analysis and comparative analysis, the paper discusses the decision optimization and coordination problems of the service supply chain when the decision-making body under fairness concerns, the information asymmetry of fairness concerns, customer loss aversion while enterprise with fairness concerns, and so on, and at same time, the paper studies the competition of the nodes of the service supply chain, finally, the paper uses the examples to verify that. The main results are as follows:1) Study the decision optimization and coordination problems of the service supply chain based on fairness concerns. Firstly, considering the fairness concerns of the service integrator, the results show that:with fairness concerns of the service integrator increases, the wholesale price of the service provider drops, the order quantity and effort level of the service integrator remains unchanged, and through the combined contract of "cost sharing and revenue sharing", the service supply chain can achieve the coordination of effort level and order quantity, and also its coordination has flexibility. Secondly, considering of the fairness concerns of the service provider, and in the case, with fairness concerns of the service provider increases, the wholesale price of the service provider increases, the order quantity and effort level of the service integrator drops, and through the combined contract, it also can achieve the coordination of the service supply chain. Finally, a comparative analysis is given to two different cases of fairness concerns, from the comparing results, with fairness concerns increases, the coordination flexibility of the combined contract drops in the case of the service integrator fairness concerns, but in the case of the service provider fairness concerns, when the degree of fairing concerns is low, the coordination flexibility increases, and when the degree of fairness concerns is high, the coordination flexibility drops.2) Study the competition of the service supply chain based on fairness concerns. Firstly, study the competition between the integrator of fairness concerns and the integrator of fairness neutral, the results show that:with the degree of fairness concerns increases, for the service integrator of fairness neutral, its profit increases in the case of non-cooperation and the cooperation of service provider and the service integrator of fairness concerns, its profit drops in the case of the cooperation of service provider and the service integrator of fairness; for the service integrator of fairness concerns, its utility increases in the three cases; however, in the view of competition, the situation is more favorable to the service integrator of fairness concerns. Secondly, study the competition between the provider of fairness concerns and the provider of fairness neutral, the results show that:with the degree of fairness concerns increases, for the service provider of fairness neutral, its profit drops, and for the service provider of fairness concerns, its utility increases, so the service provider of fairness concerns has the competitive advantage from the view of competition. Finally, study the competition between the service supply chain of fairness concerns and the service supply chain of fairness neutral, the results show that:when the service provider has the behavior of fairness concerns in the service supply chain of fairness concerns, with the degree of fairness concerns increases, the competition is more favorable to the service supply chain of fairness concerns, but when the service integrator has the behavior of fairness concerns in the service supply chain of fairness concerns, the competition may be more favorable or unfavorable to the service supply chain of fairness concerns.3) Study the decision optimization and coordination problems of the service supply chain based on the information asymmetry of fairness concerns. First of all, study the problem of decision optimization, the results show that:with the estimated value of fairness concerns increases, for the case of decentralized decision, the wholesale price of the service provider drops, the effort level of the service integrator increases and the order quantity of the service integrator drops, and through the comparison with the case of centralized decision, it can be seen that the gap of two cases is smaller. Then, study the problem of coordination, the results show that:the combined contract of "cost sharing and revenue sharing" can achieve the coordination of the service supply chain, and its coordination has flexibility, but with the estimated value of fairness concerns increases, the flexibility of coordination drops, the negotiation between the service integrator and the service provider will be more difficult in the situation.4) Study the decision optimization and coordination problems of the service supply chain based on customer with loss aversion and enterprise with fairness concerns. First of all, study the optimization of the service supply chain, the results show that:whether the customer with loss neutral or with loss aversion, with the degree of fairness concerns increases, the wholesale price of the service provider drops, the effort level of the service integrator remains unchanged, and through the comparison, it can be seen that the service provider and the service integrator get more influence in the case of customer with loss neutral; then, study the coordination of the service supply chain based on the contract of cost sharing, the results show that:the contract can achieve the coordination of the service supply chain, whether the customer with loss neutral or with loss aversion, with the degree of fairness concerns increases, the value of coordination contract factor increases, but in the case of customer with loss aversion it increases faster, and at the same time, in the view of the performance, the change of fairness concerns give the influence to the service provider, the service integrator and the service supply chain, and its influence is different because of the situation of customer loss.