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Study On The Relationship Between Government Subsidies,Internal Controls And Corporate Performance Of Agricultural Companies

Posted on:2019-11-02Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q FengFull Text:PDF
GTID:1369330551450012Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The issue of agriculture,rural areas and farmers is a major issue that affects China's economic development and social stability.Promoting agricultural development,breaking through the bottleneck in agricultural production,promoting farmers' income,and promoting rural development are the fundamental ways to solve the "three rural issues".During the period of 1982-1986 and 2003-2018,the CPC Central Committee issued a total of 21 documents focusing on the issue of "agriculture,rural areas and farmers".It is gradually breaking through the series of measures to solve the problems of agriculture,rural areas and farmers that have long plagued China.In the "three rural issues" issue,the agricultural issue is the key issue.For many years,the Chinese government has mainly adopted direct subsidies and preferential taxation policies.It has invested a lot of funds and policy dividends to support agricultural development,and has listed agricultural listed companies as its main targets.With the advancement of time,the relationship between the development of agricultural listed companies and direct government subsidies and preferential taxation policies has become increasingly close.At the same time,China's agricultural listed companies have gradually become leading companies in agriculture-related fields,and they have played a leading role in China's agricultural development.The performance of agricultural listed companies directly affects the effectiveness of China's agricultural development.However,government subsidies such as direct subsidies,tax incentives,and other issues affect the performance of agricultural listed companies and how they are affected.Therefore,with the comprehensive advancement of the "Village Revitalization Strategy",it is of great theoretical and practical value to thoroughly study the relationship between government subsidies,internal controls,and the performance of agricultural listed companies.In the 1950s,government subsidies appeared in our country.At that time,it was only expressed as a single form of cotton and cotton subsidies.Since China's reform and opening up in 1978,the scale of government subsidies began to expand rapidly,and the forms of government subsidies have become increasingly diversified.In order to standardize the accounting treatment and information disclosure of government subsidies,the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China issued the draft for"Donation and Government Assistance" in 1995,and issued the "Government Assistance and Government Assistance" in 2002 to solicit public opinions,and in 2005,The "Donation and Subsidy" draft was issued for public comments,and opinions were widely solicited.In 2006,government subsidies were formally incorporated into corporate accounting standards.Government subsidies are one of the important tools of the state's fiscal policy and play an important role in the development of the social economy.Effective government subsidies will help guide industry development,accelerate economic growth,promote social employment,and increase social welfare.The implementation of government subsidies is not our country's unique policy.Governments around the world are using government subsidies.government subsidy policy is based on the socialist market economic system and is even more special.Agriculture is the most basic and most important material production sector in a country's national economy.If the national economy is likened to a fully functional high-rise building,then agriculture is the foundation of this high-rise building.It is precisely because of the basic position and important role of agriculture and its related industries in the entire national economy,and because of the weak nature of agriculture itself,the government attaches great importance to agriculture.The government's subsidy to agricultural enterprises has always been relatively large,but the government's subsidy will not only cause injustice but also reduce the effective allocation of market resources.How enterprises will use the obtained government subsidies to achieve their own development depends on their understanding and understanding of the purpose and nature of government subsidies.At present,many agricultural enterprises(including listed agricultural companies)lack the correct understanding of the purpose of government subsidies,there is excessive reliance on government subsidies,and even subsidized income is used in non-agricultural operations,resulting in government subsidies that have become a breeding ground for business inertia and seeking.Hotbeds for rent.The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether government subsidies(direct subsidies and tax incentives)will help improve the performance of China's agricultural listed companies,and how the performance of agricultural listed companies will be deduced under the influence of the internal control level.The problems existing in the implementation of government subsidies and give corresponding improvement measures.In a theoretical sense,it helps to enrich the relevant theory of government subsidies.This paper studies the implementation effect of government subsidy policy in agricultural listed companies,and provides theoretical basis for government departments to formulate relevant financial subsidy policies;it provides theoretical support for improving the performance of agricultural listed companies,and from a realistic point of view,the study of this paper It is helpful to evaluate the effectiveness of existing subsidies,and at the same time encourages agricultural listed companies to strengthen internal controls.Combining theoretical significance and practical significance,this paper takes agricultural subsidized agricultural listed companies as the entry point and internal control as the intermediate variable.It adopts a layer-by-layer approach to study two types of subsidy policies:direct subsidies and tax incentives,and single The influence of policy intensity and different government subsidies with different strengths on the performance of agricultural listed companies and the impact of government subsidies on corporate performance.From 2011 to 2015,the agricultural listed companies that received government subsidies were selected as samples,and the regression analysis was conducted using SPSS20 and STATA14.0.Concluded as follow:(1)The empirical analysis of the panel data model shows that the relevant government agencies can use the subsidy policies of "weakening" and "reinforcement"to help agricultural listed companies improve their corporate performance.That is,the state formulates agricultural products that support weaker direct subsidies.The company's direct subsidy policy is more effective,and formulating tax incentives for agricultural listed companies with stronger ability to obtain direct subsidies is more effective;the country's formulating direct subsidy policies that stimulate corporate R&D investment tends to acquire direct subsidies.Weak agricultural listed companies are more effective.Formulating general-purpose tax incentives that stimulate corporate R&D investment tends to be more effective for agricultural listed companies with weak tax incentives,and formulating competitive tax preferential policies that stimulate corporate R&D investment.It is more effective to obtain agricultural listed companies with stronger tax incentives.(2)The panel threshold analysis shows that the government subsidy policy can indirectly increase the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies by inducing companies to increase R&D investment or expand the scale of investment,but this kind of incentive effect of government subsidy policy and government subsidies and corporate decision-making behavior related.In general,companies with large investment in R&D or investment tend to have strong national subsidies for access.Different types of companies may respond differently to the guiding national subsidy policies.Therefore,corporate decision-making behavior can amplify or suppress national subsidy policies.The implementation effect.Obviously,whether the state subsidy policy can help agricultural listed companies to improve their corporate performance lies in the classification and precise formulation and implementation of targeted direct subsidies and tax incentives.(3)Regression analysis shows that the improvement of the quality of internal control by enterprises can not significantly promote the incentive effect of direct subsidy policies for investment projects on the scale of investment expansion by enterprises.Once an enterprise makes a decision to expand the scale of investment,the scale of enterprise expansion investment can promote agricultural listed companies.Corporate performance.Increasing the quality of internal control of an enterprise can significantly promote the incentive effect of tax incentives for investment projects on the scale of the company's expansion of investment.Moreover,once an enterprise makes a decision to expand the scale of investment,the expansion of investment by enterprises can improve the performance of agricultural listed companies.From the above empirical results,under different levels of internal control,corporate performance under single policies and two collocation policies will be affected.Under a single policy,high levels of internal control,whether direct subsidies or tax incentives,will strengthen the agricultural sector.The effect of corporate performance improvement,and under the combination of the two policies,the difference in corporate performance under the level of internal control does not fully meet the theoretical expectations.In the subsidy intensity of low-group,internal control 'of a good company,there is a significant difference in corporate performance,otherstrength in the high There was no significant difference between the group and thelow-high group.In the low-internal control group,the performance of the company wasnot significantly different between the low,medium,high,and high groups of differentsubsidy strengths.In summary,this article believes that the state spends a lot of manpower,material resources,and financial resources on agricultural listed companies through direct subsidies and tax incentives every year.However,from the perspective of the development status of agricultural listed companies,government subsidies Far from achieving the desired results,it is an indisputable fact that government resources are inefficiently allocated to agricultural enterprises.In addition to being subject to unavoidable objective factors,the influence of subjective factors is also an importantreason for this result.On the one hand,due to the imperfect formulation andimplementation of government subsidy policies and the lack of supervision on special funds for subsidies,on the other hand,agricultural listed companies do not have the correct understanding and understanding of subsidy policies,resulting in failure to achieve the real purpose of government subsidy policies.And expected goals.Therefore,this paper starts from two levels of government and enterprises,and proposes corresponding countermeasures for how government subsidies can really be effective,from the perspective of R&D investment and expansion of production scale.There are three innovations in this article:(1)Research perspective innovation.This paper focuses on the three main problems in the literature on the role of government subsidies in domestic and foreign literature:First,the vast majority of government subsidies are mainly concentrated on the macro level;Second,the research targets are mainly private listed companies,high-tech enterprises,etc.;Most of the empirical data are collected through statistical yearbooks or survey questionnaires.Therefore,this paper collects related information and data of agricultural listed companies from the micro level,and innovatively divides the path of government subsidies into two paths:R&D investment and investment scale,which not only compensates for the poor accuracy of most current macro studies.Insufficient,and draw two conclusions:first,the quality of internal control of the company has a significant positive adjustment effect on the direct and subsidy policies through the R&D investment to enhance the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies on the indirect routes in the first and second quarters.The quality of internal control of the company cannot significantly positively adjust the direct subsidy policy to agriculture.The incentive effect of listed companies' investment scale,but can significantly positively regulate the incentive effect of the investment scale of agricultural listed companies on corporate performance;Second,the quality of internal control of the company improves the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies through tax incentives through R&D investment.There is a significant positive adjustment effect on the indirect routes of the first and the second segment;the quality of internal control of the company can significantly positively adjust the incentive effect of tax incentives on the investment scale of agricultural listed companies,and can also significantly positively adjust the investment of agricultural listed companies.The incentive effect of scale on firm performance;the quality of corporate internal control can significantly and positively regulate the incentive effect of tax incentives on the scale of investment in agricultural listed companies,and can also significantly positively adjust the incentives for investment in scale of agricultural listed companies for corporate performance..To sum up,from the micro-perspective of the internal control of agricultural listed companies,it is necessary to explore the realization of accurate subsidies for government subsidies and have certain innovations.(2)Research viewpoint innovation.At present,domestic and foreign literatures mostly study the current impact of government subsidies on corporate performance.This paper innovatively considers the lagging influence of government subsidies on corporate performance,organically combines external influences and internal capabilities,and discusses the government under the company's internal control quality regulation.The role of subsidies policy,and pointed out that the company to improve the quality of internal control is the key to improving the effectiveness of government subsidies,government subsidies related to the design of the policy should fully consider the "internalization" and the effective implementation of the path of the effect.At the same time,this study has also refined three perspectives:first,the ex ante subsidy and direct subsidy of a company are only limited to the current period,and direct subsidieshave low sustainability.The enterprises received a huge amount of subsidies in the current period,and the inflow of large amounts of fuds increased the short-term profits of the enterprises.However,this form of subsidy may lead to the phenomenon of"providing laziness" and gradually losing the drive for market expansion.second,the quality of internal control does not have a significant regulatory role in the direct path of direct subsidy policies to enhance the corporate performance of agricultural listedcompanies.The quality of internal control is directly indirectly and directly through the R&D input to enhance the performance of agricultural listed companies.There is a significant positive adjustment on the path,and the quality of internal controls cannot significantly positively modulate the incentive effect of direct subsidy policies on the investment scale of agricultural listed companies,but it can significantly positively regulate the incentives for investment in the scale of agricultural listed companies.effect;third,the quality of internal control has a significant regulatory role in the direct path of tax incentives to enhance the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies.The quality of internal controls in the tax incentives through the R&D investment to enhance the performance of agricultural listed companies before and after the indirect route There is a significant positive adjustment effect,and the quality ofinternal control of the company can significantly positively adjust the incentive effect of tax incentives on the scale of investment in agricultural listed companies,and can also significantly positively adjust the incentives for investment in the scale of agricultural listed companies.Role;The quality of internal control of the company can significantly positively adjust the incentive effect of tax incentives on the scale of investment in agricultural listed companies,and can also significantly positively adjust the incentives of the investment scale of agricultural listed companies to corporate performance.(3)Research method innovation.The current situation and insufficiency of the current empirical analysis of government subsidies and corporate performance using two-variable measurement,according to the development needs of the rural development strategy "industrial prosperity",based on the empirical data of agricultural listed companies,based on the theme of corporate performance,comprehensive consideration The relationship among government subsidies,internal controls,and corporate performance,using the internal control as an intermediary variable,follows the empirical paradigm of "hypothesis ? empirical ? conclusion",and comprehensively applies measurement methods such as panel data model and panel threshold regression model.A comprehensive study of how government subsidies can be achieved through internal control to improve corporate performance propositions mainly embodies the following three empirically linked empirical procedures:the first is to use the panel data model to test whether the state subsidy policy has a significant incentive effect on the performance of agricultural listed companies.the second is the application of a threshold regression model to explore the mediating effects and threshold characteristics of corporate decision-making behavior(R&D investment,and investment scale expansion,etc.)third,the application of an intermediary model test method with direct effects and regulatory effects to explore the role of government subsidy policies under the company's internal control quality regulation.The following four conclusions are drawn:First,the state subsidy policy does have a significant incentive effect on the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies,but the incentive effect of the subsidy policy is related to the subsidy method and corporate decision-making behavior;the second is to stimulate companies to increase research and development investment.The following four conclusions are drawn:First,the state subsidy policy does have a significant incentive effect on the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies,but the incentive effect of the subsidy policy is related to the subsidy method and corporate decision-making behavior;the second is to stimulate companies to increase research and development investment.The following four conclusions are drawn:First,the state subsidy policy does have a significant incentive effect on the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies,but the incentive effect of the subsidy policy is related to the subsidy method and corporate decision-making behavior;the second is to stimulate companies to increase research and development investment.The following four conclusions are drawn:First,the state subsidy policy does have a significant incentive effect on the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies,but the incentive effect of the subsidy policy is related to the subsidy method and corporate decision-making behavior;the second is to stimulate companies to increase research and development investment.Directly-directed subsidies tend to be more effective for R&D-invested agricultural listed companies,and direct subsidies that encourage companies to increase investment scales tend to be more effective for large-scale agricultural listed companies;Stimulating enterprises to increase R&D investment-oriented tax incentives preferentially tends to be more effective for R&D investment in agricultural listed companies,while tax incentives oriented toward stimulating the expansion of investment will favor investment in.smaller agricultural sectors.Listed companies are more effective;Fourth,the internal control quality of the company does not have a significant regulatory role in the direct path of direct subsidy policies to improve the corporate performance of agricultural listed companies,and the quality of internal control of the company improves the quality of tax incentives for companies of listed agricultural companies.Performance has a significant direct path Section role.
Keywords/Search Tags:government subsidies, internal control, agricultural listed companies, performance
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