| This study investigates the executive compensation of Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.I include board size,board independence,CEO duality,accounting based firm performance,and market based firm performance,insider ownership,and pay dynamics variables to analyze the top executive's compensation.Moreover,this study also examines the factors that influence the CEO compensation.Utilizing the data of Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2011 consecutively.Final sample firms include all Chinese firms that are publicly listed on local stock markets namely Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange.This study integrates the agency theory and wage dynamic theory to examine the impact of board structure and firm performance on top three executives compensation under the lenses of corporate governance.Using board structure and firm performance variables,I find that board structure has significantly positive relationship with executive's compensation.On the other hand firm performance has overall significantly positive influence on executive's compensation in the Chinese firms.Therefore,this study concludes that board size,board independence,market based firm performance,accounting based firm performance,insider ownership,and executive's wage pay dynamics arethe major factor that determines the executive compensation in Chinese publicly listed firms.This thesis has many practical implications for researchers,investors,and policy makers. |
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