Analysis Of Innovation Incentive Effect Of Advantages Support Policy

As the core of national competitive power,innovation has always been one of the key objectives of national industrial policy design.Whether and how to ensure sufficient innovation incentive intensity has become an important part of industrial policy design.Since the Schumpeter hypothesis gives the theoretical judgment that moderate monopoly helps innovation,the answer of whether it is monopoly or competition has a stronger incentive for innovation in a specific national institutional environment determines the formulation of relevant industrial policies that are guided by innovation incentives.Specific to China,China’s industrial policy characteristics of stimulating innovation,in fact,is based on Japan and South Korea’s growth miracle as a model of "advantage support",its policy logic is to try to focus on financial support,financial capital,market and technology to key enterprises,stimulate The accelerated realization of economies of scale and the formation of a monopoly position,and then accelerate the guarantee of sufficient R&D investment through capital accumulation,is also called the industrial strategy of"choose winners".But unfortunately,as a frontier industry of technological innovation,China’s high-tech industry development practice shows that the superior support policy has not effectively achieved innovation incentives,overcapacity,homogenization competition,and technology exposed in the development of China’s high-tech industries.Low capacity and weak international competitiveness of enterprises have led us to a series of related issues:the special manifestation of the regular changes in the market structure in the process of technological progress in developing countries proposed by Gerschenkron(1962)is not able to explain and Applicable to the development of China’s high-tech industry?Why is the significant incentive effect of the industrial policy of "advantageous support" on innovation not fully reflected in China?Therefore,this paper focuses on the innovation incentive effect of the "superior enterprise support" policy on China’s high-tech industry.And in accordance with the superior enterprise support policy,we will proceed from the policy path of advantage support--realization of scale economy--acquisition of monopoly status--research and development incentives,answering the two key issues of "Does the acquisition of monopoly status stimulate innovation?" and "Does the superior support strategy form economies of scale?"This provides an explanation for why it is difficult for China’s superior support policies to form innovative incentives.The main work of the full text includes the following points:Firstly,combining with the practice of China’s high-tech industrial policy,this paper analyzes the historical process of the superior support policy becoming the industrial system design idea of emerging market countries,and use a market structure endogenous model to demonstrate the incentive effect and incentive path of the superior support strategy to technological innovation.The path of innovation incentives for complete superiority support policies is the support of superior enterprises—the concentration of market share to superior enterprises—the reduction of economies of scale and competitors—the emergence of monopolies—incentive innovation,and the specific intensity of the incentive effect is related to the level of technology spillovers and the entry cost of potential competitors that determined by the strength of the entry barrier.Accordingly,the realization of the policy effect of the "advantageous support policy"of developing countries depends on two path-restricting processes,namely,"can the advantage support achieve economies of scale" and "can economies of scale stimulate innovation"?Therefore,these two constraints determine the effectiveness of the implementation of specific national industrial policies.Next,this paper first pays attention to the constraint of "scale economy and monopoly can stimulate innovation",and uses a panel model to verify this based on China’s high-tech industry experience data.The conclusions show that the impact of monopoly on innovation is significantly related to the intensity of barriers to entry between industries.In an industry with a high proportion of state-owned economic components and strong barriers to entry,monopoly is conducive to innovation in the Schumpeter hypothesis is a partial establishment.However,in the industry of low entry barrier strength,the Arrow effect is supported,and competition is the institutional direction that can achieve innovation incentives.Linking to practice of China’s advantageous industry support policies,this shows that China’s long-term implementation of the superior enterprise support policy is actually inefficient,and can only generate innovation incentives for some industries with a relatively high state-owned economy.To some extent,this explains the fact that there is insufficient innovation performance in China’s high-tech industry policy.On the other hand,it also shows that it is necessary and appropriate to shift the tone of industrial policy from advantage support to competition encouragement since 2006.and can only generate innovation incentives for some industries with a relatively high state-owned economy.To some extent,this explains the fact that there is insufficient innovation performance in China’s high-tech industry policy.On the other hand,it also shows that it is necessary and appropriate to shift the tone of industrial policy from advantage support to competition encouragement.At the same time,in order to control the endogenous nature of the market structure,this paper also analyzes how technological innovation works on the market structure.The conclusion shows that the market structure is significantly exogenous to technological innovation,so the market structure and technological innovation are more manifested as a single,static process.This shows that companies may not be able to gain market share concentration and monopoly dividends through innovation and product competitiveness improvement,in the long run,this will undoubtedly weaken the enthusiasm of research and development of micro enterprises.At the same time,it also shows that the market structure of China’s high-tech industry has a solidification feature,and the formation of monopoly may not be derived from competitive advantage,but the result of an exogenous institutional protection.Furthermore,this paper focuses on the path constraint of whether the advantage support policy can lead to monopoly.By constructing trans-log production function of random frontier,this paper measures the scale efficiency of China’s high-tech industries.The conclusion shows that China’s high-tech industry does show a significant "insignificance of scale efficiency".This shows that China’s long-term implementation of the advantage support strategy has not stimulated the concentration of the market to the superior enterprises through the concentration of resources,thereby accelerating the emergence of scale economy and the acquisition of monopoly status.Furthermore,from the perspective of structural convergence,this paper provides an explanation for the lack of scale efficiency of high-tech enterprises in China.The measurement analysis of the structural convergence of inter-provincial economies in China shows that the similar structural characteristics of inter-regional structure in China mainly manifests as "whole divergence and local convergence",that is,the divergence of overall industrial structure among inter-provincial economies.The measurement analysis of the structure convergence of inter-provincial economies in China shows that the similarity characteristics of inter-regional structure in China mainly manifests as "whole divergence and local convergence",that is,inter-provincial economies have divergent overall industrial structure,but they are similar in high-tech industries.It is also because of the existence of this structural convergence feature that local governments have passively implemented market protection strategies in the high-tech industry product market,in turn,it is derived from market segmentation and hinders the realization of scale economy of the advantageous enterprises and the formation of monopolies.The measurement analysis of the structure convergence of inter-provincial economies in China shows that the similarity characteristics of inter-regional structure in China mainly manifests as "whole divergence and local convergence",that is,inter-provincial economies have divergent overall industrial structure,but they are similar in high-tech industries.It is also because of the existence of this structural convergence feature that local governments have passively implemented market protection strategies in the high-tech industry product market,in turn,it is derived from market segmentation and hinders the realization of scale economy of the advantageous enterprises and the formation of monopolies.Next,this paper explains the emergence of structural convergence and the formation of market segmentation from the perspective of convergence competition.It is precisely because of the highly decentralized central governance structure and official assessment tilts toward economic incremental targets that the "regional bidding competition"competition mode has been formed.Highly decentralized powers and responsibilities do not match the framework and the promotion needs of local government officials,the formation of local government industry selection and industrial support policies has formed a double distortion incentive,in turn,it is expressed by the local government’s pursuit of political achievements,investment short-sightedness and local protection.It is precisely under the preference of such local governments that the competition between high-tech industries and emerging industries has intensified,which has led to the emergence of convergent competition.In order to further analyze the causes of local government’s convergence competition,this paper demonstrates the formation of local government’s convergence competition decision in the framework of a non-cooperative Cournot game model.As long as the central government releases strong performance signals in emerging industries,due to the existence of local government industry preferences,repeated construction and convergence competition will form on the basis of deviation from comparative advantage.At the same time,this article explains why it is difficult for the central government to coordinate and resolve the dilemma through certain industrial division of labor.On the whole,it is precisely because the Schumpeter hypothesis is only established in some high-tech industries in China,and because of the structural convergence and market segmentation caused by the convergence of competition,the stimulating effect of the superior support policy on the scale economy of the enterprise is separated.The long-term implementation of the superior support policies is difficult to achieve effective innovation incentives,and hinders the improvement of China’s independent innovation capabilities.Finally,from the perspective of the amendment of the local government incentive mechanism,this paper puts forward suggestions on how to avoid the convergence competition and the market segmentation derived therefrom.