| Relying on the modern information technologies such as Internet,Big Data and so on,Online Lending has positive application value in reducing transaction costs,improving transaction efficiency,expanding transaction scope and improving social capital allocation efficiency with its de-centered "disintermediation" advantage.However,since the emergence of Online Lending in China in 2007,the trend of"alienation" from real to virtual has become increasingly obvious,and the risks are increasingly concentrated.Based on the objective situation of continuous market risks and industry ecological environment deterioration,the main demands of this paper are to understand and analyze the operational characteristics of Online Lending in China,analyze the source of risks,and propose risk prevention and standardized development path.To achieve the research purpose,this article follow the theory-the organization and its entrepreneurs are the leading part of shaping the direction of institutional change-put forward by North(1994)and follow the thoughts-many individuals’ decision-making behavior under the same target will promote organization,system,and even social change-raised by Malcolm Rutherford(1999),then set the decision-making behavior of lenders who are regarded as the operational leading role of the Online Lending network model as the research object.As the main receiver of Online Lending network credit risks,lenders investment decision-making risk mainly focused platform and the borrower default risk,moral risk.Considering the enormous existing research about the selection from lender to the borrower and the election from lender to the investment project,combined with the platform as the first factor and importance of the investment decision-making for lender,this article will put the choice decision-making and risk prevention for heterogeneous platform to lenders as research breakthrough point.Furthermore,considering the subjective model of new classical economics is not suitable for Online Lending market with incomplete information,learning from the theory of behavioral finance,sociology,and psychology,this paper analyses the lenders’trust tendency and selection decisions for heterogeneous platform which become the differences with the existing research from the trust of lending trading foundation.At the same time,this paper introduced individual decision analysis of actor into the institutional change theory,and build a institutional change research framework based the perspective of actors’decision analysis.Then it integrates and develops different disciplines theory such as the trust theory,information asymmetry theory and herd behavior.Therefore,it becomes tentatively marginal contribution in theory and practice to analyze the root cause by the individual risk decision-making behavior,and to put forward the market risk prevention and Path of system improvement.In terms of the overall content,this paper,based on the investigation of the development status of China’s Online Lending market,makes an in-depth analysis of the platform trust dilemma and slow-release mechanism of lenders under the condition of asymmetric information with the help of relevant transaction trust theories.Through the empirical test of the transaction data of the Online Lending market,the paper clarifies the influencing factors and trust tendency that affect the lenders’ choice of heterogeneous platform,and studies whether the lenders’ platform choice decision has herd behavior and whether it is rational.This paper empirically verifies the role of information disclosure and reputation constraint in alleviating information asymmetry and reducing lenders’ capital security risks,and finally puts forward specific suggestions to promote the sound development of Online Lending industry.In the part of theoretical analysis,with the help of trust theory,fuzzy avoidance theory and game method,this paper firstly analyzes the influencing factors of lenders decision-making under the condition of asymmetric information,providing support for the later empirical test of the influencing factors of lenders’ platform selection.And on the basis of the building for trading trust model in Online Lending platform,this part analyses the relationship between lenders’investment decisions and trade trust tendency,dissects moral hazard and adverse selection behavior from platform and borrowers under the commissioned-agent relationship,interprets to lenders’decision-making risk source in theory,and also provides theoretical support for later lenders’herding behavior and their rational judgment on the platform choice.Finally,the mechanism of slow-release adverse selection and moral hazard behavior is analyzed through different theoretical models such as information disclosure mechanism and reputation constraint mechanism,so as to provide theoretical basis for relevant suggestions in this paper.In the part of empirical analysis,this paper uses the transaction data of Online Lending market to verify the platform factors and transaction trust decision-making tendency that affect the decision of lenders.Check whether lenders have herd behavior and rationality in platform selection.To verify the role of signal transmission and reputation constraint in reducing information asymmetry and risk slow-release,thus laying an empirical foundation for relevant suggestions.The relevant research conclusions are as follows:(1)All different platform factors have positive effects on the investment of lenders,but cognitive trust has a stronger impact on the investment decisions of lenders than institutional trust.This paper divides lenders’ trust on platform information into institutional trust and cognitive trust,and empirically tests the influencing factors of lenders’ platform decisions and the weight difference between the two kinds of trust in lenders’ platform choice decisions.The empirical results show that each explanatory variable corresponding to different platform information has a positive effect on the lender’s investment.In other words,the compliance of Online Lending platform and the improvement of risk guarantee mechanism will improve the lender’s institutional trust level.The differences in the size,popularity and background of Online Lending platforms have a significant impact on the cognitive trust dimension of lenders.Besides,the empirical study of principal component analysis further shows that although the investment decisions of lenders are driven by institutional and cognitive trust,the influence of cognitive trust on investors’ decisions is stronger than that of institutional trust.(2)There is a significant herding behavior in the lender’s platform selection decision,and the behavior is not completely rational.Based on the data of different platforms in the market,this paper uses the fixed effect model and the system GMM estimation to test whether the lender has herding behavior in the Online Lending platform selection decision,and uses the Logit model to test the rational degree of the lender’s herding behavior.The empirical results show that there is a significant herding behavior in the platform selection decision-making of lenders in the Online Lending market,and this behavior is not completely rational and has the characteristics of true herding behavior to a certain extent.Although platforms with bank custody,top development rankings,state-owned assets departments,banking departments,and so on have advantages in ensuring the security of lenders’ funds,with many types of platforms,in the face of the information disclosed by different platforms,the lender can not choose the optimal platform,and the lender can not be completely rational when investing according to the attributes of the platform.(3)Investors can effectively identify the value of information disclosed by the platform.Therefore,signaling and reputation constraints can alleviate the information asymmetry between the platform and investors to a certain extent,and help investors to identify and mitigate decision-making risks.In this paper,we use the quantity and quality of information disclosure to measure signal transmission,whether the platform provides executive information to measure reputation constraints,and use the Logit model and OLS to carry out regression respectively,empirically testing the role of signaling and reputation constraints in reducing information asymmetry.The study found that the more the platform information disclosure quantity and the higher the quality,the lower the probability that the platform is the problem platform,and the more the number of investors,which shows that the investors identify the platform information and risk with the help of the signal transmission of the platform.On the other hand,the proactive disclosure of executive information and the better the executive education background,the lower the probability that the platform is the problem platform,and the more investors,which indicates that investors can identify the value of executive reputation constraints and identify the platform risk.Based on theoretical analysis and empirical research results,this paper holds that reducing information asymmetry,improving the decision-making rationality of lenders and perfecting the relevant system of Online Lending supervision are the basic path to prevent Online Lending risks and promote the healthy development and institutional change of Online Lending industry.Specifically,the first is to further improve the information disclosure system,strengthen the main body of information of the Online Lending platform,reduce information asymmetry,and guide investors to change from cognitive trust to institutional trust.Second,it is necessary to strengthen the education of consumers in Online Lending finance,strengthen the risk awareness of investors,improve the rational level of lenders’ decision-making,actively promote the Online Lending platform to actively incorporate the third-party credit information system,and improve the information submission management system of online lending platforms.At the same time,we should build the system of regulatory sandbox,promote the development of digital supervision technology,in order to prevent the financial risks of Online Lending from the source of institution.Drawing on the existing research results,the innovations of this paper focus on the following aspects:first,in the research content,this paper introduces the idea of institutional change,and uses the different discipline theories to study the borrowing platform trust tendency,platform choice decision-making behavior and risk mitigation mechanism,and constructs a theoretical research framework for the development of Online Lending specification development based on the perspective of individual decision-making analysis.Secondly,different from the existing research in the current situation of lenders’ decision on borrowers and borrowing targets,this paper constructs a theoretical model of transaction trust in Online Lending market on the basis of transaction trust theory.This paper discusses the trust dilemma and slow-release mechanism of Online Lending platform,and selects the lender’s trust tendency,choice decision-making behavior and rational problems to make an empirical study in order to explain the risk of the current Online Lending market more realistically;thirdly,in view of the current situation that the existing research mainly analyzes the role of signaling and reputation constraints in reducing information asymmetry,and the lack of empirical research support,this paper empirically examines the value of signaling and reputation constraints in reducing information asymmetry and slow-release market risk in the Online Lending market,which not only improves the research in this field,but also is of positive significance to the operation,supervision and decision-making of Online Lending platform,regulators and investors. |
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