Research On Inventory Financing Decision And Operation Strategy Based On Overconfidence

Overconfidence is a common psychological behavior.The overconfidence of enterprise managers in demand cognition leads to the deviation between cognitive demand and actual demand,which has an important impact on enterprise decision-making.At present,the literature on overconfidence mainly focuses on the production and sales decision-making of supply chain enterprises,as well as the coordination between upstream and downstream enterprises,and has not yet involved the problem of enterprise capital constraints.On the other hand,most of the current research on inventory financing decision-making is based on the rational cognition of financing decision-makers to demand,without considering the influence of overconfidence on inventory financing decision-making and operation strategy.In this context,based on the overconfidence psychological behavior of decision-makers,this paper constructs a game model of inventory financing decision-making.By using game theory,decision optimization,numerical experiment analysis and other methods,this paper discusses the optimization of inventory financing decision-making and coordination problem under the conditions of overconfident retailer,overconfident supplier,overconfident bank and simultaneous overconfidence of multiple parties,the paper analyzes the financing decisions and operation strategies of inventory financing in different situations,and finally validates them by an example analysis.The research contents and related research results of this paper are as follows:(1)The inventory financing decision-making problem of financing enterprises based on overconfidence.This part introduces the overconfidence of financing enterprises on demand into inventory financing business,and studies the influence of overconfidence on inventory financing decision-making.The research results show that when the retailer is overconfident,the overconfident retailer makes more radical decisions than the rational retailer,and the retailer's sales effort and order quantity increase with the increase of overconfident degree.The probability of default of the overconfident retailer is related to its overconfidence.The retailer is subject to capital constraint,which the sales effort and order quantity with inventory financing are lower than that of the retailer without capital constraint.The actual expected profit of the retailer subject to capital constraint is also lower than that of the retailer withoutcapital constraint,and the difference between the two is gradually increasing with the increase of the degree of overconfidence of the retailer.With the increase of the degree of overconfidence of the retailer,the belief expected profit of the retailer increases,while the actual expected profit decreases.Moreover,the higher the overconfidence,the greater the difference between the belief expected profit and the actual expected profit,and the more serious the phenomenon of false profit.(2)On the basis of considering overconfidence,this paper studies the coordination problem between financing enterprise and the bank.Firstly,this paper studies the inventory financing decision and operation strategy when both the bank and the retailer are overconfident.According to the research results,the bank should choose fixed loan-to-value ratio for lending,and the default probability of the retailer increases with the increase of overconfidence.Then,this paper studies the financing decision and operation strategy of inventory financing with the rational bank.According to the research results,it is more advantageous for the bank to choose the loan-to-value ratio contract for lending,and the default probability of the retailer is fixed and controllable.Finally,the above two cases are compared and analyzed.From the research results,when the bank is rational,the change of the bank's loan-to-value ratio with the degree of overconfidence only depends on the retailer's return rate.When the bank also has overconfidence like the retailer,the change of the bank's loan-to-value ratio with the degree of overconfidence needs to compare the return rate of the retailer and the bank.The comparison of the retailer's sales effort in two cases is influenced by the bank's return rate.The comparison of the bank's loan-to-value ratio in two cases is influenced by the retailer's return rate and demand volatility.(3)In the supply chain environment,the inventory financing decisions and operation strategies are studied considering the overconfidence of individual member of the supply chain.This paper studies the inventory financing decision-making and operation strategy under the condition of the overconfident retailer and the overconfident supplier.From the research results,the change rule of bank's loan-to-value ratio is the same in the two cases of overconfident retailer and overconfident supplier;the change rule of retailer order quantity and supplier wholesale price is different in the two cases of overconfident retailer andoverconfident supplier.The implementation of inventory financing business is weaker in the case of overconfident retailer than in the case of overconfident supplier.That is to say,when the retailer is overconfident,it is not suitable to adopt inventory financing.When there is overconfidence of expectation demand,the bank adopts different loan-to-value ratio strategies under the two situations of overconfidence of retailer and overconfidence of supplier;when there is overconfidence of prediction accuracy,the bank adopts the same loan-to-value ratio strategies under the two situations of overconfidence of retailer and overconfidence of supplier.Overconfidence will make other game players get better returns,but it will cause the loss of returns to overconfident player.(4)In the supply chain environment,the research on inventory financing decision and operation strategy considering the overconfidence of all three parties in the financing chain.According to the research results,the decision-making of the retailer,the supplier and the bank is more radical than the rational situation;The default probability of the retailer is not related to the demand volatility and the repurchase price of the supplier,but only to the degree of overconfidence;The real expected profit of the supplier increases with the increase of overconfidence,while the real expected profit of the retailer and the bank decreases with the increase of overconfidence;The profit of the retailer,the supplier and the bank are closely related to the buyback price of the supplier,the higher the buyback price provided by the supplier,the higher the total profit of the bank and the whole financing chain;The profit of the retailer and the supplier is not only related to the buyback price of the supplier,but also related to the degree of the overconfidence;In the case of overconfidence among the three parties in the financing chain,the high buyback price of the supplier can make the whole inventory financing business carry out smoothly,and the real total profit of the three parties in the whole inventory financing chain is higher than that of low buyback price and non buyback.