Research On The Impact Of Creditors' Participation In Corporate Governance On Agency Costs

Corporate governance research has been shifting its focus with the governance environment changing in different periods,from the initial separation of rights between shareholders and managers,to the distribution of rights between controlling shareholders and dispersed minority shareholders,finally to the arrangement of rights between the actual controllers and stakeholders of the company.Each separation of rights represents a type of principal-agent problem,and this shifting-focus process also involves the externalization of internal agency costs.Given that the creditor is the main provider of the company's external finance and a major participant in the company's external governance mechanism,promoting the efficiency of corporate debt governance not only guarantees the security of the assets of claims,but also performs an indispensable function in perfecting the corporate governance mechanism and restricting the costs incurred by the three types of separation of rights.The paper,starting from the perspective of debt governance of listed companies in China,examines how financial institutions--which provide companies with funds to be claimed--influence the scale and structure of debt financing of listed companies through their screening and monitoring mechanisms;through empirical analysis,it then verifies the inhibiting effect of these two mechanisms on manager's agency cost,controlling shareholder's agency cost,and debt financing agency cost in China's listed companies.In addition,the paper also considers environmental factors that affect corporate debt governance like corporate internal governance,property right control,and external environment in combination with the marginal factors of debt financing scale,and verifies the varying effectiveness of the two mechanisms to the three types of principal-agent problem.