The Bank Debt Governance Effect Contrastive Analysis Of Stated-Owned And The Private Enterprise

In recent years, the financial system deep reform has been promoted in our country, enterprise financing channels has always been innovating. However, it cannot be denied that bank lending is still one of the most main way. Bank lending has the function of control enterprise free cash flow、reduce the principal-agent cost、supervise business management process reasonably and effectively, and then have a positive effect on corporate governance.However, we found that consecutive huge bank loans fails to repay. The enterprise faces an uncertain future, bank loans can ever escape.In reality, the post-loan management of bank’s loan had to make people alert. By analyzing the research results at home and abroad, we found that banks and enterprises has formed a kind of effective stakeholder relationships in the western capital market, so bank creditors can supervise the enterprise activities effectively. However, in our country with a transforming economy, because of the problems of "insider controller"、"soft budget constraint" and so on, bank creditor’s rights did not form a positive corporate governance effect, Instead stifled enterprise business performance. Then whether China’s bank creditor’s rights does not play an effective corporate governance effect or In what aspects need to improve and refine our research?Take these contradiction, in terms of agency cost between listed companies and management, from the angle of bank creditor’s rights governance effect, by using the method of theoretical induction and empirically, we study the differences in corporate governance effect of bank creditor’s rights between the state-owned and private enterprises respectively. It turned out that:Bank creditor’s rights has significant inhibitory effect on dominant agency cost, the level of bank liabilities and fee income ratio has inverse relation, that is bank credit can effectively restrain the dominant agency cost to some extent. Relative to state-owned enterprises, private enterprise bank creditor’s rights has more significant inhibitory effect to the company dominant agency cost. Relative to the long-term bank creditor’s rights, short-term bank creditor’s rights has more significant inhibitory effect to the company dominant agency cost.In view of the recessive agent cost, bank creditor’s rights have no inhibition to it, that is bank debt levels had weak negative correlation relationship with its financial performance. Relative to private enterprises, state-owned enterprises bank creditor’s rights has more significant inhibitory effect to recessive agency costs, and in recent years has shown that the positive effect of corporate governance. Meanwhile, we see that private enterprise bank creditor’s rights still has no significant inhibitory effect to the recessive agent cost, but the improvement is obvious between annual. Relative to the short-term bank creditor’s rights, long-term bank creditor’s rights has more significant inhibitory effect to the company recessive agency cost.The major contribution of this paper is that we use the empirical methods test the different influence to the corporate governance effects between state-owned and private enterprises from2007to2012. In the aspect of research starting point, we started with the agency cost between listed companies and management, divide the cost of agency into dominant agency cost and recessive cost, the bank creditor’s rights into long-term debt and short-term debt, study the effect of different period of creditor’s rights on the corporate governance effect respectively. This is still a blank in the field of current research, also provides a perspective for later study.