| The private benefit of control behavior of controlling shareholders is the difficulty and focus of global corporate governance.As an emerging economy,China's private benefit of control behavior of controlling shareholders are also more prominent.The major shareholders of listed companies disregard the long-term development of the company and the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,and carry out activities such as disorderly reduction of holdings,related guarantees,frequent distribution of high cash dividends,long-term occupation of listed companies 'funds,asset injection,targeted increase in issuance,and earnings management.After the equity division reform,it entered the era of full circulation.The interests of major shareholders and the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders tend to be in line with the system.However,the stock reform has not changed the characteristics of the equity concentration of listed companies in China,and listed companies still have "one dominant" or more major shareholders,The majority or controlling shareholder will still use the control to empty the listed company,and then grab the private benefits of control.The way of hollowing out is more subtle.The controlling shareholders realize the separation of control right and cash right through pyramid holding or cross-holding,and use the "double control chain" of the stock right control chain and the social capital control chain to increase the infringement on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.So in the context of full circulation,What is the internal mechanism of the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder?(What is the motive and decisionmaking mechanism of private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholders? How do the structural influencing factors and contextual factors of private benefits of control behavior of controlling shareholders fit into each other?)how do the private benefits of control behaviors of controlling shareholder evolve? Under the background of full circulation,how to control the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder? These questions are worthy of in-depth study and exploration.Based on the background of full circulation,this paper studies the Formation Mechanism andEvolution of the private benefits of control behaviors of the controlling shareholders,through the game analysis of private benefits of control behavior of controlling shareholders and the study of the matching relationship between structural influencing factors and contextual variables of private benefits of control behavior of controlling shareholders,so as to open the controlling shareholders' private benefits of control behavior formation mechanism "black box".The paper also makes an empirical test on the fit of structural influencing factors and contextual factors of private benefits of the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholders,and from the three aspects of cash dividend policy,related party transactions and earnings management,and this paper discusses the evolution of the private benefits of control behaviors of the controlling shareholders and conducts empirical tests.so as to discuss the governance mechanism of private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder in the Chinese context from the perspective of decision-making.The main conclusions of this study are as follows:(1)The internal mechanism of the formation of private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder is as follows:(1)the modern enterprise system provides institutional arrangements for the generation of the controlling shareholders' private behaviors of control,and the motive depends mainly on the acquisition and cost compensation,and the private costs will inevitably make the controlling shareholders have strong private behavior motives of control.(2)The formation of private benefits of control behavior of controlling shareholders is a complicated process in which individual characteristics of controlling shareholders and contextual characteristics fit together.(2)This paper focuses on the effect of the controlling shareholder characteristics on the cash dividend policy,and examines the regulatory impact of board characteristics in the controlling shareholder characteristics and cash dividend policy.The empirical research shows:(1)The controlling shareholder's cash flow rights are negatively related to the cash dividend policy,and to a degree,U-nonlinear curve relationship;the control rights and the cash dividend policy are significantly positively correlated;the two rights separation and the cash dividends policy is significantly positively related.This shows that the cash dividend policy is not only a tool for the controlling shareholder to tunnel,but also a mask to cover up tunneling.(2)The shareholding balance between the second largest shareholder and the tenth largest shareholder is difficult to counterbalance the concealed short selling behavior of the controlling shareholder.(3)The ceoduality can enhance the influence of the controlling shareholder characteristics on the cash dividend policy.(4)The independence of the board of directors significantly reduced the influence of the controlling shareholder characteristics on the cash dividend policy.(3)This paper focuses on the impact of the controlling shareholder characteristics and board characteristics on related party transactions,and examines the influence of ultimate controlling shareholder characteristics on the related party transactions under the characteristics of the board of directors.Empirical research shows :(1)Cash flow rights are negatively related to related transactions,and present a U-shaped non-linear curve relationship at a degree,presenting the “incentive-barrier”effect.Pyramid shareholdings provide a natural barrier for the controlling shareholder to hollow out.(2)From the second largest shareholder to the tenth largest shareholder,it is difficult to balance the hidden tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholder,and it is also possible to collude with the controlling shareholder.(3)In the face of concealed short-sighted behavior,independent directors did not fully perform their independent supervision functions.In the case of ceo duality,independent directors may fall into the position of “Vase Directors”.(4)The ceo duality can enhance the influence of the controlling shareholder characteristics on related party transactions.(5)Under the regulation of the independence of the board of directors,the influence of the controlling shareholder characteristics on related party transactions has weakened.(4)This paper focuses on the impact of the controlling shareholder characteristics and board characteristics on earnings management,and examines the influence of controlling shareholder characteristics on earnings management under the characteristics of the board of directors.Empirical research shows :(1)Cash flow rights are negatively related to earnings management,and present a U-shaped non-linear curve relationship at a degree,presenting the “incentivebarrier”effect.Pyramid shares provide a natural barrier to controlling shareholder earnings management.(2)From the second largest shareholder to the tenth largest shareholder,it is difficult to counterbalance the hidden earnings management actions of the controlling shareholder,and it is also possible to collude with the controlling shareholder.(3)In the face of covert earnings management practices,independent directors are unable to fully play their independent supervisory functions due to lack of internal information.(4)The ceo duality can enhance the influence of the controlling shareholder characteristics on earnings management.(5)Under the regulation of the independence of the board of directors,the influence of the controlling shareholder characteristics on earnings management has weakened.(5)Through literature research and empirical research,this paper expounds the evolution ofprivate benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholders in the context of full circulation from three aspects: cash dividend policy,related-party transaction and earnings management.Under the background of full circulation,the evolution path of private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder is as follows:(1)the willingness of China's listed companies to issue cash dividends has been continuously enhanced,and cash dividends have been widely distributed.the cash dividend policy is not only a tool for the controlling shareholder to tunnel,but also a mask to cover up tunneling.(2)the controlling shareholder adopts more intimate connected transactions to tunnel,and pyramid shareholdings or cross-holding provide a natural barrier for the controlling shareholder to hollow out.(3)the controlling shareholder adopts more subtle earnings management in conjunction with its tunneling,and The earnings management is a tool to disguise the tunneling.(4)Under the constraint of the degree of transfer of the established interests,out of the cost and benefit comparison of hollowing out,the controlling shareholders prefer to choose the related party transaction as a benefit transmission behavior,that is,the cash dividend policy and the related transaction have an alternative relationship.The main innovations in this study are as follows:(1)Through the analysis of the motive and the decision-making mechanism of the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder and the study on the structural influencing factors and the fit of the situation factors of the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder,the paper expounds the internal formation mechanism of the private benefits of control behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder.This paper constructs the conceptual model of the research on private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholders from three aspects: the behavior ability,the motive of the behavior and the external legal environment.This paper innovatively constructs the structure analysis framework of the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder from the structural influencing factors and the fit of the situation factors of the private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholder.(2)In the past,the study of the hollowing behavior of controlling shareholders was mostly from a certain perspective.The research problems were single,and the impact before and after the reform of equity division was not distinguished and the research conclusions were inconsistent.this paper expounds the evolution of private benefits of control behavior of the controlling shareholders in the context of full circulation from three aspects: cash dividend policy,related-party transactionand earnings management.Under the background of full circulation,the evolution path of private benefits of control behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder is as follows:(1)the willingness of China's listed companies to issue cash dividends has been continuously enhanced,and cash dividends have been widely distributed.the cash dividend policy is not only a tool for the controlling shareholder to tunnel,but also a mask to cover up tunneling.(2)the controlling shareholder adopts more intimate connected transactions to tunnel.(3)The earnings management is a tool to disguise the tunneling.(4)There is an alternative relationship between cash dividend policy and related party transactions. |
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