Research On Tunneling Behavior Of Controlling Shareholders Of Listing Corporation Based On Related Party Transactions

After non-tradable share reform, there is still a large number of controlling shareholders'tunneling behavior in the listing corporation,because the ownership of listed firms doesn't decrease quickly, and the corporate governance structure of listing corporation in China is still not perfect, the law are still not good enough to protect minority shareholders effectively. In the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders of listing corporation, the most prominent is the related party transactions. Tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders will not only damage the rights and interests of small shareholders, but also is not conducive to the development and growth of listing corporation. Related cases in recent years, just like" Kang Chi pharmaceutical"" Yaxing chemical", a series of cases show that the controlling shareholders through related party transactions occupy listing Corporation's assets has seriously affected the governance of listing Corporation in China. That how to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders, reduce the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders of listing corporation, and promote the healthy development of listing corporation has become an urgent problem to be solved.The research contents of this paper are as follows:Firstly,the research background and the significance of this thesis are clarified, this is the starting point of the full text. And introduces the relationship between controlling shareholders tunneling and related party transactions through a series of theoretical basis,this paper also defines the relationship between the two, as the basis of the analysis of the present situation and the empirical analysis. Then, on the basis of the review of domestic and foreign research, the main research contents are determined,that is to make a general summary of the current situation of China's controlling shareholder tunneling and its causes and hazards, to use empirical analysis to explore the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on tunneling of controlling shareholders,to use case analysis to analyze the controlling shareholder of the use of related partytransactions tunnel excavation of a variety of specific means, On the basis of a series of normative research and empirical research, the conclusion of this paper is drawn.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:Firstly, the amount of Chinese listing corporation related party transaction is huge, from the side can reflect the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholder of the listing corporation is still a large number of tunneling. Secondly, tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders is positively related to the proportion of controlling shareholder, tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders increases with the concentration of ownership.Thirdly, the governance mechanism can not play an effective role in the controlling shareholders'tunneling behavior, tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders has great damage to the operating performance and market value of listing corporation. Fourth, the controlling shareholders' tunneling behavior has great harm to the listing corporation's performance and market value and serious impact on the sustainable development of the listing corporation. Fifth, there are many problems in the regulation of related party transactions in China's listing corporation, the relevant laws and regulations still not perfect. After a series of research conclusions, this paper also puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions to the governance of controlling shareholders tunneling behavior.