God the Created: Philosophy, Science, and Pragmatic Constructive Realism

A methodological problem exists in theology. Some theologians feel content to investigate nature with a tool-box already filled with theological concepts, meaning their quest will only discover what aspects of reality already exemplify those concepts. For others, such initial ideological baggage ensures conclusions will always be connected to a biased starting point. A solution needs to get beyond the impasse of realism and constructivism, in science, philosophy, and theology. Both realism and constructivism provide limited ways of knowing the world. Consequently, both have skewed understandings of what exists in the world. Realists have a lavish world bordering on naivete while constructivists are too sparse in their ontological offerings. However, a hypothetical, pragmatic, and open-ended way of thinking in philosophy, science, and theology provides a promising future.;After examining the promises and problems in realist and constructivist approaches to truth in philosophy and science, "Pragmatic Constructive Realism" (PCR) is pointed to as the most promising way of overcoming the problems in these approaches while synthesizing their insights. PCR is found in the work of the American pragmatists, especially Charles S. Peirce, with some necessary modifications. The chief tools to be employed by PCR come from Peirce. His categories of Firstness (qualitative possibility), Secondness (brute fact), and Thirdness (law and generality) mark the real features of the world and their evolution. Abduction (imaginative hypotheses), deduction (logical conclusions), and induction (testing hypotheses) are the features of interpretive human inquiry. Icons, indices, and symbols are the specific features of those interpretations. Thirdness and symbolic reference indicate synechism, or the reality of continuity. And the transition from Firstness to Secondness, the presentation of shocking new facts requiring interpretation, points to the reality of tychism, or chance. Peirce's belief in panpsychism and evolutionary love, a strong form of teleology directed by God, are rejected. As hypotheses in and of the world, theological systems can be understood in light of these features.;PCR is then used to analyze the relationship between process theology and ground of being theology, a dialogue which has already occurred between John Cobb and Robert Neville. But their dialogue took place almost exclusively in terms of shared commitments to the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and where those commitments diverged. Cobb construes God alongside the world, both fluctuating between indeterminate and determinate states in a process of mutual creative transformation. Neville argues God is the indeterminate creator asymmetrically related to the determinate world. Despite sharing agreement with most of Whitehead's philosophy, their models of God are radically opposed. However, this dialogue can be reinvigorated by engaging their work with PCR. While Whitehead's philosophy focuses on the coming together of discrete entities, pragmatists like Peirce focus on continuity as entities emerge out of previous realities that are in turn impacted by that emergence.;The debate between Cobb and Neville has three possible resolutions: Cobb may be right that God alongside the world, both mutually transforming the other, is the world's best ultimate explanation; Neville may correctly see a transition from nonbeing to being; or there could be a position affirming that the ground of the determinate world both transcends and yet nonetheless grows in generality with that world. A deeper nothingness giving rise to the nothingness of Firstness prior to Secondness and Thirdness would have indefinite specifiability and a tendency of possibilities. The universe would emerge from an indeterminacy that is not passive. Cosmic nothingness is lesser than this, consisting of an already settled pool of possibilities. Prior to that there is a deeper indeterminacy making all variety possible. But in the emergent ontology of PCR, that deepest indeterminacy cannot be kept separate from the determinate orders that emerge from its activity. They mutually determinate one another.;An inherent pluralism within PCR is on display in the way Cobb and Neville are treated as equals to be pushed and challenged on a quest, not opponents to be vanquished. Knowing one's own pragmatic commitments means knowing why others in different contexts with different presuppositions will differ. Genuine difference is expected and to be embraced as an inevitable feature of human inquiry, but this pluralism is not due to indifference as can be the case in relativism. Rather, distinct differences and contexts are what shock and grab people and demand (or fail to demand) adherence. This is a good result. The only conclusion to be avoided is exclusive dogmatic positions that admit no position other than their own. They self-exclude from pragmatic inquiry by freely choosing positions incapable of being included in open dialogue.