The effect of MSHA inspections and regulation enforcement on unplanned roof fall events in underground coalmining

This study examines regulatory enforcement of roof fall-related standards by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) at underground coalmines from 1995-2003. Industry-specific regulations are enforced by MSHA via regular inspections, citations, and monetary fines for non-compliance. Decreases in the all-cause injury and fatality rates during this period suggest that this process works. However, roof fall-related safety has not kept pace with this overall safety trend. Roof falls are responsible for half of all underground coal fatalities, and are a leading cause of injury.;This dissertation explores how roof fall safety varies by three primary factors: (1) the type of deterrence approach; (2) unionization, and (3) aspects of regulatory enforcement. Research suggests that safety responses of coalmines have shifted from specific deterrence (safety via at-site inspections) toward general deterrence (safety via knowledge that inspections and penalties are possible). Unionization has historically been highly correlated with establishment size and safer mining methods. Yet the underground coalmining industry has recently undergone decreased unionization and increased establishment size; presenting the opportunity to potentially disentangle these influences. Lastly, the effect on injury and fatality rates of three specific aspects of regulatory enforcement that elicit compliance (inspection intensity, citation frequency, and citation costs) is examined.;To explore these questions roof fall injury and fatality rates over the study period were modeled. Industry and coalmine level analyses were conducted via time-series and Poisson models, respectively. At both levels, data were aggregated into months, enabling examination of the impact of enforcement on subsequent months' roof fall-related safety. Industry-wide responses to enforcement are consistent with general deterrence, while coalmine-level responses are consistent with specific deterrence. Union influence was examined as a potential confounder and effect modifier via stratified models.;Responses to regulatory enforcement were identified only at the industry level. Union and non-union responses to regulatory enforcement via general deterrence differed. The lack of a specific deterrence effect suggests that the assumptions underlying underground coal regulatory enforcement may no longer be applicable and/or a breakdown in the process has occurred. In combination, these results suggest the need to re-examine the approach of regulatory enforcement at U.S. underground coalmines.