| The following project represents the first step towards championing a more practical approach to epistemological matters. Contemporary epistemology is suffering from an acute case of value monism, in which the epistemic goods of knowledge and true belief have been over-emphasized at the expense of other important epistemic goods. It is precisely this rather narrow focus which contributes to the predominance of externalist forms of virtue epistemology. While externalists are free to utilize the notion of intellectual virtue to develop their respective theories, their accounts fail to grasp what is most significant about an intellectual virtue.;In short, a virtue represents a character trait for which one deserves praise for exemplifying. And I will show that the externalist models of virtue epistemology lack the resources for accommodating this important epistemic attribution, and thereby divorce themselves from the primary attraction of a virtue theory. Indeed, I will argue that while the virtues are somewhat helpful for dealing with the traditional problems of epistemology, they are more relevant as instruments for achieving the good life. Understanding the virtues in this way gives credence to an intemalist virtue epistemology, in which the epistemic goods of wisdom and understanding take precedence over knowledge and true belief. |
