Carnap's Ideal of Philosophical Neutrality Epistemology Between Kant and Quine

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) is undoubtedly one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His work helped set the agenda for a good deal of twentieth century analytic philosophy of science and epistemology. Most recently, a number of philosophers have used Carnap's work to motivate attenuated forms of (neo-Kantian) transcendental philosophy, accounts of a priori knowledge, and resistance to philosophical naturalism. In my dissertation, I investigate Carnap's early work (1920-1934) in order to assess the basis for some of the contemporary uses to which Carnap's philosophy has been fitted. To this end, I focus on the origins of an important (but underappreciated) theme in Carnap's work, his ideal of philosophical neutrality, which Carnap uses in order to set aside or minimize many traditional philosophical. It is my contention that this ideal is achieved, for Carnap, by replacing broad-stroke philosophical positions with a more piecemeal approach to addressing philosophical issues. I argue that more weight needs to be given to this feature of Carnap's thought. In particular, I argue that, while Carnap begins his philosophical career defending a version of neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy, he soon develops a philosophical position that is neutral with respect to both neo-Kantianism and traditional empiricism. On my interpretation of Carnap's early work, Carnap's views are much closer to Quine's than is usually recognized (yet avoids collapsing into Quinean naturalism). I also investigate how Carnap applies his philosophical neutrality to some important twentieth-century debates in the foundations of mathematics.