Carnap And Quinn's Analytical Confrontation

The research on analytical concepts begins with the dichotomy of knowledge,which can be traced back to Leibniz and Hume.They both believe that one type of knowledge is related to our actual experience,and this type of knowledge can be obtained by summarizing the experience.Another type of knowledge has nothing to do with our experience,such as mathematics and logical truth.Understanding and knowing this part of knowledge has become a topic of constant debate among philosophers.Analytical questions are put forward to illustrate this type of knowledge.With the establishment of Frege's first-order logic,analytical problems are presented in a brand-new outlook,the most striking of which is Carnap and Quine's discussion of analyticality.This article mainly discusses the analytical confrontation between Carnap and Quine.Carnap upholds analyticity.According to Carnap's usage of the word analysis,analytic truth is L-truth,and L-truth as an analytical interpretive term is usually understood as their truth is only due to their meaning.According to Carnap,the meaning of a sentence is determined by semantic rules,so the analytic item can be well reflected by semantic rules.Carnap put forward the concept of analysis in order to reject metaphysics and explain his philosophy of mathematics.Carnap believes that all knowledge has only two types of logical truth and factual truth.Through logical analysis,it will be found that metaphysics cannot be confirmed to belong to either of these two types of knowledge,so it should be expelled.The principle of verification of logical empiricism has caused two troubles: the components of existing science cannot be all expressed by the finite truth function of simple observation statements,and the other trouble is to render mathematical propositions meaningless.Carnap put forward analyticity to show that mathematical truths can inevitably be true without experience.However,the concept of analyticity was opposed by Quine,who believed that it was unnecessary to establish the concept of analyticity.Quine believes that Carnap's analytical concepts will fall into circular arguments no matter how they are explained.As for the dilemma faced by the philosophy of mathematics,a better explanation can be obtained from holism,the principle of simplicity and the principle of conservativeness,without the need Analytical concepts are used.Analytical concepts are epistemologically worthless.Facing Quine's questioning,Carnap chose to accept some of the reasons,but Carnap did not believe that the analytical concept was therefore refuted.In response to Quine's condemnation,Carnap proposed the concept of "meaning postulate" to ensure the rationality of the analytical concept.It is worth noting that Quine does not completely deny the analytical concept,but has reservations.Quine believes that although analytical concepts have no value in epistemology,they can have a place in common sense.He also defined analyticity from a behaviorist perspective,that is,if a sentence is logically true,then it is analytic.Yes,because its semantic rules are that native speakers know the true value of one or several words in the process of learning the usage of one or several words.By examining Carnap and Quine's analytic discourse,we can find that the biggest reason for their disagreement is their choice of language system.Carnap has always insisted on talking about philosophy in a purely formal language framework,so he insisted on distinguishing between logical truth and factual truth.Quine believes that philosophy can be discussed within the framework of natural language and insists on opposing the difference between analytical propositions and comprehensive propositions as a dogma.