| In this dissertation, I argue that the standard interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature as presenting an aprioristic deduction of natural laws is seriously flawed, and I present an alternative, nonaprioristic interpretation. More specifically, I argue that the standard interpretation misinterprets the role and development of apriority from Kant to Hegel. According to this misinterpretation, the domain of the a priori grows ever larger, and the category itself ever more important, in a steady progression from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel. I argue, on the contrary, that while with Fichte the domain of the a priori enjoys an expansion, Schelling suggests a fundamental transformation that deprives the category of its previous significance and gives it a new, less important role. By the time Hegel develops his mature system, the category of the a priori has disappeared from his philosophy completely. We therefore cannot treat Hegel's Philosophy of Nature as providing an a priori deduction of the laws of nature.;I articulate my positive account of Hegel's philosophy of nature by tracing the development of the most basic part of idealist theory of science---matter theory---from Kant through his major successors. Kant, Fichte, and Schelling all develop matter theory within broadly foundationalist programs designed to demonstrate the, compatibility of human autonomy and mathematized science. The basic strategy is to show that the fundamental laws of that science are a priori principles constitutive of experience for autonomous subjects. If this were the case, it would be difficult to see how such principles could threaten the autonomy of the subjects in question. But this strategy runs into problems accounting for the origins of its most basic principles, both transcendental and physical.;Hegel rejects the foundationalist approach to autonomy, arguing instead that human autonomy has been achieved through work in history. Similarly, the role of the philosophy of nature is not to demonstrate or justify the foundations of natural science as a priori principles, but to transform the results of those sciences into part of a totality in which both nature and human autonomy are included. |
