Peter Abelard's conception of the good

Discussions of Peter Abelard's ethics are plagued with accusations that he is hopelessly subjectivist or does not acknowledge the existence of sources of value other than an agent's own understanding of his actions. This arises from the tendency of many interpreters to consider his ethical views without consideration of his value theory in general, his theology, or his logic. By beginning with his conception of the good as expressed in his logical works, and attentive to issues in the philosophy of language that he explored earlier in his career, we find that his ethical views are not subject to the criticisms so often leveled. Instead, his understanding of value, and of ethical questions, is consistent and plausible, and connects centrally with his views on soteriology and grace.;Abelard believes that the meaning of good varies from context to context, and I explore the various meanings he gives to this central term---a viewpoint of his that most interpreters either ignore, discount, or misunderstand---and I connect it to disputed issues in the interpretation of his ethical theories. Objective criteria of usefulness are important in his account, and play a central role in grounding the moral evaluation of persons in more than purely subjective criteria.;Abelard believes that people are said to be good or bad with reference to their character, which in turn depends upon the decisions they make: upon their intentions, and not the success of their goals, their possession of virtues or vices, or their desires. But Abelard does not believe that only intentions can be said to be good or bad, a view that indeed would be disastrous.;Abelard believes that the highest good of a human being is God, rather than any internal state, such as happiness or enjoyment of God. This often misunderstood point helps to connect Abelard's soteriology and his ethics. The pursuit of our highest good in heaven is an ongoing process, characterized by ever-increasing growth and love. This love, the means by which we grasp God, is necessarily other-regarding, turning us away from a focus on ourselves towards a focus on God and our neighbor.