Duties of love and Kant's doctrine of obligatory ends

This dissertation provides a comprehensive account of Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) conception of the moral obligations which fall under the general heading beneficence - obligations which he refers to in the Doctrine of Virtue as our duties of love to others. I argue that previous interpretations have, by and large, suffered from two defects: they underappreciate how significantly the Doctrine of Virtue departs from the earlier Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and they underestimate the affective dimension of the duties of love.;According to the Doctrine of Virtue taxonomy, duties of love are wide ethical duties and duties of virtue. I argue that the duties of love must be understood in relation to the more fundamental duty to make the happiness of others one's end. I defend the view that, in addition to the familiar requirement to perform beneficent actions, making the happiness of others one's end entails significant dispositional requirements, including the cultivation of the virtues of love.;Duties of virtue are said to be wide insofar as they allow agents latitude in determining how, when, and even to what extent they act for the sake of the obligatory end. I consider both rigorist and permissive interpretations of the latitude entailed by the duties of love and argue that both are problematic. I propose an alternative account that sets a minimal standard of consistency with regard to an agent's disposition, actions, and the regard for the obligatory end.;Finally, I explore the foundations for the duties of love, seeking an explanation for Kant's claim that the happiness of others is an end that is also a duty. I argue that neither of Kant's Groundwork arguments for a duty of beneficence is capable of justifying a duty to make others' happiness one's end. I contend that a more promising strategy for grounding this duty appeals to Kant's doctrine of the highest good and the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue.