Sentimentalist Virtue Theories of Mengzi and Hume

Mengzi and Hume, despite the spatial and temporal gaps between them, are similar in their efforts to construct virtue theories on the cornerstone of our sentiments. Moral sentiments, deemed variable and subjective, impose on both philosophers the same philosophical task of presenting an objective standard of virtue for appropriate moral evaluation. Investigating the standard of virtue in Mengzi's teachings about self-cultivation and Hume's scientific analysis of virtue, I show that they concurrently seek the ultimate standard of moral sentiments in the natural constitution of our mind.;At first glance, Mengzi and Hume show discrepant approaches to moral sentiments. While Mengzi aims to make others cultivate human virtues by nurturing their sentimental sprouts, Hume attempts to present the empirical science of virtue based on moral sentiments. The difference in their theoretical purposes instructs us how to design a comparative investigation of their virtue theories. Hume's scientific research on virtue sheds light on the obscure side of Mengzi's moral psychology, and Mengzi's methods for self-cultivation illuminate the idea of virtue cultivation in Hume's moral thoughts that his modern scientific mind tends to neglect.;At first, I begin with examining Mengzi's sentimentalist foundation of virtue, "the heart of compassion" in comparison with Hume's accounts of compassion. His analyses enable us to postulate that Mengzi's heart of compassion should be regarded as an outward expression of the heart's natural pattern, rather than an instance of a mere spontaneous emotion. Next I turn to their thoughts on virtue and its cultivation. While Mengzi, adopting a developmental account of virtue, focuses on the method for cultivating benevolence by extending compassion to others, Hume aims to offer general accounts on determining virtues from a social and empirical perspective. Their different views, however, necessarily meet at the question of setting a standard for determining and cultivating virtue. Also, we see that they inevitably seek it in the inherent constitution of the human mind.;Both philosophers' sentimentalist accounts of virtue are closely related to the matter of taste, which is also expressed by sentiment. Hume partly endorses a skeptical view of the variety of taste, whereas Mengzi seeks from the universality of taste the critical evidence for the inherent seed of righteousness. Hume seeks for the standard of taste in the sentimental judgments of aesthetic connoisseurs, whereas Mengzi emphasizes aesthetic artisans' incessant cultivation of their performances, of which our experiences realize our universal taste. Though their contrasting views on taste are aligned with their different emphases on virtue, Hume's on moral evaluation by judgment and Mengzi's on moral cultivation by performance, I show that they rely on the fundamental natural cause of taste's uniformity for the standard of taste: in Hume's terminology the primary constitution of the mind, or in Mengzi's the natural pattern of the heart. Lastly, I discuss both philosophers' views on self-regarding virtues. Mengzi points out that relentless acting for righteousness nourishes the "flood-like vital energy (qi)," an ultimate reward of self-perfection even without social approval. Similarly, Hume's categorization of virtues includes some self-regarding virtues derived from one's due pride. This parallel will show that their sentimentalist approaches synchronously bear the sense of human dignity in their virtue theories.;Sentiments, as Hume observes, are protean, and as Mengzi notes, universal. Both philosophers, grounding morality upon sentiment, cannot but situate the standard of virtue and taste in the natural constitution of the mind that produces universal sentiments independent of situations. They identically believe that humans have a moral compass in their heart for moral navigation, and instruct us to consult with its natural pattern in making moral judgments. This implies a normative force to cultivate our mental faculties and virtues to maintain our natural heart intact from the influence of situational factors.