| Remarkably, in spite of the increasing risk of an attack by a biological weapon since 1989 and extraordinary advances in bioscience and biotechnology, the BTWC remains unmodified. Unlike the other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) agreements, thirty-five years after its entry into force, the BTWC still lacks exacting declaration and verification norms that would allow rigorous enforcement of its disarmament and nonproliferation principles. This is curious given the potentially state-breaking power of biological weapons. Equally curious is the reaction of states to this oddity. Given the 2001 Amerithrax incident, it would seem logical to for states to cooperate to strengthen the BTWC. In actuality, states are cooperatively contesting the BTWC in two ways. One, except for China, states that have WMD programs ("the haves") are cooperatively contesting the inclusion of declaration and verification norms in the BTWC. Two, states that do not have WMD programs ("the have nots") along with China are cooperatively contesting the exclusion of declaration and verification norms that would bolster the enforcement of BTWC Article X norms. Ironically, the reasons underlying both groups' contestation are how three issues---equality, equity, and equanimity---impact states' economies and their market shares in bioscience and biotechnology. To defend these conclusions, I extract and analyze quantitative and qualitative data from United Nations documents and sources. I then discusses the impact of the findings on international relations, international law, and the future of international agreements. I conclude that the future of international security agreements could be in jeopardy if policy makers do not take a more integrated, interdisciplinary approach that addresses these equality, equity, and equanimity when developing such agreements. |
