| Many observers view the judiciary as the weakest branch of American government due to its inability to unilaterally create policies and enforce change in domestic politics without the action of Congress and the president. Perhaps for this reason, existing research has often overlooked how federal agencies might strategically anticipate the influence of courts in the policymaking process. This study develops a general theory outlining the incentives that agencies possess to avoid costly litigation and the potential for unfavorable court judgments on the merits. Agencies, as a result, should make regulatory enforcement decisions based, in part, on how they expect relevant courts to view their actions. In order to test this theory, this study examines the regulatory behavior of three separate federal agencies---the Environmental Protection Agency, National Labor Relations Board, and the Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission. Using original data sets measuring each agency's regulatory enforcement decisions, the empirical analyses demonstrate how the ideological composition of federal courts exhibit a significant impact on bureaucratic decision making. Most notably, the results highlight the U.S. Supreme Court as a consistent political constraint on each agency examined in the study. Thus, the judicial environment exhibits a meaningful impact on a diverse set of regulatory decision making in the American political system. This research provides scholars with new evidence on the extent of judicial influence in the policymaking process and interinstitutional politics more generally. |
